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This conference is dedicated to the analysis of "Dimensions of a Critical Theory of 
European Integration".1 At the beginning I would like to mention two - rather general ­
approaches to this subject. The first is connected to the experience of fundamental 
changes going on in the world during the last quarter of this 20th century wh ich Eric 
Hobsbawm, in his "Age of Extremes", characterized as "The Landslide".2 European 
societies and politics have been deeply transformed and restructured by these 
transformations - not only as a consequence of external events like the breakdown of 
state-socialist systems in Eastern Europe and of German Unification but also of en­
dogenous technological, economic and social change. At the same time progress in 
European Integration - starting with the Common Market project in the mid 80es and 
continuing with Maastricht (1991) and Amsterdam (1997) until the achievement of 
the Common Currency, the "Euro" (1999) - has had considerable impact on social 
and political science research and debate in this field. Old theoretical paradigms - for 
instance neofunctionalism, the "method Jean Monnet" - seem to be exhausted. New 
efforts in Political Science research - for instance the multi-Ievel-governance-ap­
proach or the institutionalist revival in Political Science - indicate growing interest for 
new tendencies in European integration, connected to new dimensions of transna­
tionalisation of pOlitics, to transformations of form and function of the capitalist state, 
policy networks and new actors' constellations in European politics. 
The second approach - still rather general - refers to the status of critical theory in 
the tradition of Historical Materialism.3 Of course, the influence of critical theory is 
affected by the Big Landslide and the Big Crash of Socialism in the past decades. In 
large parts of the global system of social and political science, critical theory today is 
rather marginalized, not necessarily beneficial to academic careers. On the other 
side, there is a growing interest for International Political Economy since the 80s re­
flecting not only the hegemony of capital in the consequence of globalisation and the 
victories over socialism everywhere, but also reflecting the need for a critical ap­
proach to the analysis of the contradictions obviously inherent to this new type of 
capitalism: social pOlarization, mass unemployment, poverty and cultural deforma­
tions, new warfare, destruction of nature etc. 
The conference took place at the University of Marburg, 15./16. October 1999. The preparation and editorial 
work of this study were supported by the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (BerJin) and the Noies-Schrittweis­
Stiftung (Marburg/Diemelsee). 
2 Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914 - 1991, London 1994, pp. 403 ff. 
3 Cf. Stephen Gill (Ed.), Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations, Cambridge 1993. 
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In the past ten years our Marburg Research Group on European Integration has re­
alized some projects which were dedicated to an analysis of social, economic and 
political transformation within the European Union. We started with a project analyz­
ing the Common Market Program '92 and its implications for Industrial Relations in 
the member states.4 We confirmed a diversity of institutional systems within the 
member states, but at the same time there is a convergence of a common pressure ­
based upon the new market dynamics and - since the early 80s - neoliberal pOlitics 
of deregulation and privatization. This pressure works in the direction of weakening 
collective labour law, welfare state regulations, trade unions, workers councils, 
strengthening at the same time the power and bargaining position of management ­
especially of transnational corporations - as weil as the political forces of neoliberal­
ism. 
Some years later another project was dedicated to the topic of "Unemployment and 
the Welfare State in Western Europe" (1997).5 Now, we were already referring to 
one of the central contradictions of transnational capitalism in the age of neoliberal 
hegemony: the continuolJs increase in unemployment in Western Europe. Again, the 
national welfare systems - reflecting institutional and legal diversity - are put under 
pressure by the costs of unemployment and poverty on the one side and transna­
tional markets, competitiveness, austerity and deregulatory politics on the other. 
There exists however a diversity of different "paths" (in different countries or regions) 
which are a result not only of traditions, but also of concrete relations of social and 
political forces, and of social and political struggles. We therefore provided some 
arguments for actual political debates, referring to "models" where the problem of 
unemployment seems to have been solved or - at least - considerably reduced: the 
United States and Great Britain, the ideal model of neoliberalism and market radi­
calism; and/or the corporatist model of the Netherlands, and/or the Scandinavian 
countries, foremost Denmark which still has strong welfare politics and active labour 
market policies. 
Since 1997 we have continued this kind of investigation - always including empirical 
research - with a project entitled "Employment Policy within the European Union" (di­
rected by Stefan Tidow) referring to the new employment Title of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the new kind of bench-marking-policy-processes and of course, to the ten­
sions between national employment policies and the range and effects of a Euro­
pean employment governance-system which raises many questions related to the 
4 	 Frank Deppe I Klaus-Peter Weiner (Hrsg.), Binnenmarkt '92. Zur Entwicklung der Arbeitsbeziehungen in 
Europa, Hamburg 1991. 
5 	 Hans-Jürgen Bieling I Frank Deppe (Hrsg.), Arbeitslosigkeit und Wohlfahrtsstaat in Westeuropa. Neun 
Länder im Vergleich, Opladen 1997. 
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character of the institutional elements of the European political system and its dy­
namics.6 
This summary would however remain incomplete without referring to our efforts to 
combine empirical analysis with a more theoretical reflection of the transformations 
and the dynamics of modern capitalism. For some time, we feit quite sure character­
izing our own approach as a "Regulation school approach enlarged by Neogram­
scianism". Our primary intent is to integrate the regulationist approach to the trans­
formation from Fordism to Postfordism7 with the Gramscian School of International 
Political Economy founded by Robert Cox in Toronto.8 This school - within the disci­
pline of International Relations - focuses upon "historical blocs" of transnational he­
gemony on the structural basis of a certain formation of capitalism and realized by 
the actions, conflicts and struggles of "social forces in the making of history" (Cox). 
We found it quite productive to confront mainstream social science theory with these 
approaches. We are still convinced that by this way we can grasp the inner relation­
ship between the transformation of modern Capitalism - the dissolution of the Fordist 
coherence between the accumulation regime, a mode of regulation and a hegemonic 
paradigm - on the one side a.nd the changes in the dynamics and the mode of Euro­
pean Integration on the other - as one pillar of the advanced international capitalist 
system still dominated by the United States. Kees van der Pijl, Otto Holman and 
Henk Overbeek from Amsterdam have developed a better understanding of the 
transnational class basis in the formation of hegemony. 9 To achieve a more precise 
concept of the changing role and function of the capitalist state - under the pressures 
of capital hegemony and globalisation - we integrated the concept of the "competitive 
state" (Joachim Hirsch) 10 or the "Schumpeterian workfare regime" by Bob Jessop 11 
into our discussions. We believe that there are still considerable deficits in the appli­
cation of these theoretical approaches and traditions to the analysis of European 
Integration. 
6 	 Stefan Tidow, Europäische Beschäftigungspolitik. Die Entstehung eines neuen Politikfeldes, FEG-Arbeits­
papier Nr. 18, Marburg 1998; Frank Deppe I Stefan Tidow, "Auf der europäischen Tagesordnung ganz 
oben" - Ein Neuanfang in der europäischen Beschäftigungspolitik? In: Klaus Busch u.a. Wege zum sozialen 
Frieden, Osnabrück 1999, S. 95 ff. 
7 	 Cf. Alain Lipietz, Die Welt des Postfordismus, in: ders. u.a., Labour Markets and Employment Policy in the 
European Union, FEG Studie Nr. 10, Marburg 1997, S. 9 - 48. 
8 We were very happy to welcome hirn tor a lecture at Marburg University in May 1998, cf. Robert W. Cox, 
Weltordnung und Hegemonie. Grundlagen der "Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie", mit einem Vorwort 
von Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Frank Deppe und Stefan Tidow, FEG-Studie Nr. 11, Marburg 1998. 
9 	 Cf. Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations, London and New York 1998. 
10 	 Joachim Hirsch, Der nationale Wettbewerbsstaat. Berlin 1995. 
11 	 Bob Jessop, Die Zukunft des Nationalstaates: Erosion oder Reorganisation? in: ders. u.a., Europäische 
Integration und politische Regulierung, FEG Studie Nr. 5, Marburg 1995, S. 9 - 48. 
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Speaking about a whole period of research on transnational capitalism and Euro­
pean Integration we may conclude that - though there is obviously an accumulation 
of knowledge - there are still many open questions in respect to the character of so­
cial conflicts, power relations and future structures of hegemony. 
By now we know a lot about the erosion of the Fordist formation of World Capitalism 
which was constructed after the Second World War, in the now "Golden Age" of 
post-war capitalism: technological revolutions on the basis of microelectronics, 
growing importance of the service sector and of the financial sector, tra.nsformations 
in the social structures of advanced capitalist societies and in the modes of sociali­
zation, the impact of global cornpetition, the new role of the national state as an 
agent of enforcing deregulation and competitiveness. 
We do know a lot more about the changes in the global political and power struc­
tures which followed the Cold-War-period. State Socialism - with the Soviet Union 
and the Warshaw Pact as its focus - does not exist any more as a relevant force in 
world politics. The Third World, which gained self-consciousness as a consequence 
of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements since the second World War and as a 
consequence of discussions on the New International Economic Order in the 70s, 
has dissolved as a political unity and is no longer a cha.llenge to the developed capi­
talist world. 
We know much more about the intensified competition between the centers of capi­
talism in the North and the old and new divisions between North and South. Some of 
us - following the international debate opened by Paul Kennedy in 1987 on the de­
cline of the US12 - have been astonished by the revival of the military and, even 
more, by the economic power and dynamics of US-capitalism in the 80s and espe­
cially in the 90s. 
Finally, we know much more about the defeats of the Left in this period of transition. 
It is not only the breakdown of Socialism in the East and - often forgotten - in the 
Third World, but also the dramatic change in the relations of social and political 
forces in the centers of developed capitalism - especially in Europe which is the only 
continent with a strong tradition of socialism.13 Left wing parties (communists and 
socialist) and trade unions suffered substantial losses in power, membership, votes, 
resources and their capacity to mobilize and lead the working class. 
I will begin with the last point mentioned. We still do not know whether this process of 
radical changes in the relation of forces will lead to a new and rather stable formation 
of capitalism, including a new mode of regulation with respect to class relations. 
12 Cf. Frank Deppe, Jenseits der Systemkonkurrenz. Überlegungen zur neuen Weltordnung, Marburg 1991. 




European Social Oemocracy - since the mid 90s - has revived as a governing party 
in most of the EU-member states 14; but it still seems to be quite open where Euro­
pean Social Oemocracy will go. This does not only refer to strategies of moderniza­
tion but also to the role of social and political conflicts and movements within the 
European Union. 
More generally, there is no law of history that can foresee the future. In the 90s the 
global capitalist economy has been struck by aseries of economic and financial cri­
ses - in Japan, East Asia, Russia, Latin America. How long will the boom of US­
capitalism go on? What would be the consequences of a crash of US-capitalism for 
transnational capitalism and politics? What will be the future "Peace Formula" for the 
regulation of capital-Iabour-relations? Which role will be played by the national state 
in the restructuring of international power relations and internal class relations? 
We know that since the end of the Cold War international tensions, ethnic conflicts, 
nationalism and fundamentalism have increased. We have already got accustomed 
to the every day presence of warfare - not only in Germany where the Kosovo War, 
for the first time after the Second World War, opened the opportunity for a final Ger­
man "return to normality" or the "champions league" of international politics (as our 
secretary of defense likes to say!). At the same time the new NATO strategy (exem­
plified during the Jugoslav war) seems to have become the most effective instrument 
of regulating transnational power relations. The United Nations as an instrument of 
collective conflict solution and multilateralism have been seriously devaluated (since 
the days of the Reagan adminstration proclaiming that the US must become "Num­
ber One" in World Politics again!). 
It is exactly this simultaneity of knowledge and uncertainty which not only structures 
scientific analysis and debates, but which also constitutes much of the Fin de Siecle 
pessimism, including all these post-Nietzschean revivals which attack decadence, 
favor social darwinism and dream of new elitist regimes beyond democracy. In these 
days 01 E ZEIT published an article on the present relationship between German top 
managers a.nd the Schröder government. The article concluded that still a consider­
able proportion of German managers accepts the "German Model" of Social Partner­
ship at the enterprise level; yet - in their relation to politics - a growing number of 
them follows the slogan of Jack Welsh, boss of US-Giant-General Electric: "Get out 
of myway"! 
The cultural contradictions of present capitalism are of course not the subject of our 
conference. However, this simultaneity of knowledge and uncertainty also dominates 
the evaluation of the processes of European Integration in the 1990s. Obviously the 
character of the integration process - of its driving forces, framing conditions and of 
Cf. Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Neo-liberalism and Communitarianism: towards a new type of employment policy 
in Western Europe? Amsterdam International Studies, Working Paper No. 54, Amsterdam 1999. 
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its political system .. has significantly changed. I only mention the fact that with the 
end of the Cold War one central motive of European integration since the early 50s 
has disappeared. The coherence of interests holding together the Union is more than 
ever before determined by economic inte rests , but also - according to the character 
of capitalism - by transnational market competition. At the same time European 
integration and European Politics no longer function in a relationship of cOrTlple­
mentarity to the sovereign national member states (Patrick Ziltener). The EU has 
brought forth a political system sui generis with a dominant mode of "network gov­
ernance" (Kohler-Koch) which progressiveley influences (or rather determines) na­
tional and subnational politics. 
This transformation is primarily a result of two big - hegemonic .. projects , which 
were launched since the mid 80s: the COrTlmon Market project and - with Maastricht 
(1991) - the Common Currency-Project ("Euro"), based upon the convergence crite­
ria, the "Stability Pact" and the European Central Bank. The project itself imposes 
fiscal and monetary discipline upon national governments. The so far successful im­
plementation of these two - closely interconnected - projects (both aiming at making 
Western Europe "fit" for global competition) - together with institutional reforms since 
the Unitary European Act of 1985 which enlarged the competence but also the scope 
of policy moderation by the European Commission - have deeply transformed the 
mode of integration .. and I believe this might weil be one of the central subjects of 
our conference. Integration theory is challenged by the new polity of the European 
Union .. a new kind of relationship between elements of statehood at the EU-level 
(the EU does not have the quality of astate but contains elements of statehood), and 
the national and subnational level and by actor constellations dominated by state and 
non-state actors. Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso for 
instance speak about a "fourth phase" of European integration a.nalysis "in which 
integration is examined in conjunction with the transformation of the very domestic 
society and polity which during the first and second phase assumed a dominant cas­
ual role affecting integration". 
A critical theory of European integration will, however, focus on contradictions in­
herent to the new dynamics and the new polity of the European Union. The hegemo­
ny of neoliberalism - at the international as weil as at the national and subnational 
level - produces contradictions, conflicts and resistance. Stephen Gill has stressed 
the tendency towards "disciplinary neoliberalism" articulated not only by the strength­
ening of the repressive apparatuses of the state, but also by the military role of the 
USA and of NATO. On the other hand neoliberalism fails to solve the problems of a 
revitalization of capitalist growth and of solving the problems of unerTlployment, so­
cial polarization, mass poverty etc. On the contrary, neoliberalism - dis-embedded 
transnational capitalism - produces and multiplies these contradictions. One of the 
most interesting questions to be discussed will therefore refer to the potential of re.. 
sistance and alternative politics on the one side, the emergence of new forms of 
12 

policy and governance within the EU (for instance the new employment policy of the 
Amsterdam treaty) which reflect the changing relation of forces within the EU and the 
need to react against social disintegration produced by transnational capitalism and 
neoliberal politics. This debate might include the question whether the whole period 
of neoliberal hegemony since the late 70s has come to an end, has entered a final 
phase of erosion or has been succeeded by a new formation under social democrat 
governments) characterized by a new coherence (and stability) of economic accu­
mulation and social and political regulation. 
Mainstream integration analysis and theory seems to be rather uninterested in these 
elements of a social and political crisis. The integration process itself is, however, 
confronted with a large potential of crisis and stagnation. I only mention two aspects 
of the problem. While the hegemonie projects (Common Market, Common Currency) 
have been successfully implemented, a lot of political projects - for instance the ex­
pansion towards Eastern and South Eastern Europe as weil as the institutional re­
forms of the EU - so far have not found any solution. The once declared parallelism 
between deepening and enlarging the Community is seriously questioned - espe­
cially in respect to the future of Eastern Europe and Turkey within the EU. The insti­
tutional problems of the Community may be best iIIustrated by the collective retreat 
of the European Commission in spring 1999 as a consequence of a"egations of cor­
ruption and mismanagement. Never before this happened. It may be interpreted as a 
potential "democratic ca.rtharsis" within the EU. 
It might, however, also be conceived as a serious devaluation and weakening of the 
political role of the Commission in respect to the open problems that have to be 
solved. At the same time - since Maastricht - the EU has entered a crisis of legitima­
tion. We ca"ed it the Post-Maastricht-Crisis 15 already in 1993: the end of the "per­
missive consensus" has come; large parts of the electorate in the member states are 
uninterested or rather hostile towards European politics. Parties in national govern­
ments must defend their majority rather by nationalist than by "European" (interna­
tionalist) arguments. The "Euro-Barometer" which showed extremely low participation 
rates in the elections for the European Parliament in 1999 iIIustrate what I mean by a 
deep crisis of legitimacy which goes hand in hand with a revival of nationalism, ra­
cism and other forms of reactionary politics directed against internationalism, democ­
racy and the welfare state. The successful electoral campaign of Jörg Haider in the 
recent Austrian elections clearly iIIustrates this argument! 
Frank Deppe / Michael Felder, Zur Post-Maastricht-Krise der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG), FEG Ar­




Those who prepared a paper for this conference beforehand were asked the follow­
ing questions: 
• 	 What are the most serious problems within the discussion on integration theory 
and how can they be solved? 
• 	 How can important insights derived from state theory and international political 
economy prove to be useful for the analysis of European integration? 
• 	 In what way can the different approaches of transnational historical materialism 
and critical institutionalism be connected with each other? 





Theoretical Foundations of a Neo-Gramscian 
Analysis of European Integration 
Introduction 
The conference organisers have asked us to consider certa.in contemporary prob­
lems of European integration with a view to their ilTlplications for the development of 
a theory of European integration. They have posed three sets of questions concern­
ing the problems for integration theory and their possible solution - in light of theories 
of the state and the global political economy. In order to answer these questions we 
will follow a methodological injunction of Gramsci's historicism, and try to distinguish 
the "occasional" from the "permanent", or what Fernand Braudei called the event, the 
conjuncture and the very long-term or longue duree, for example in the analysis of 
crises that may last for decades. 1 
Thus, from the viewpoint of the longue duree, the 1990s par excellence may be con­
sidered to be a new phase of the bourgeois revolution with its origins in the Glorious 
Revolution in England in 1688 and the American and French revolutions at the end 
of the eighteenth century. This revolution is experienced in the periphery of western 
Europe as a "passive revolution". In the twentieth century, the USA has been central 
and often decisive in the spread of this revolution. Indeed, its form of state, civil soci­
ety and mode of accumulation have become models for passive revolution else­
where. Moreover, since the 1940s, the USA's military dominance in Europe partly 
exercised through NATO means that any discussion of European integration has to 
be placed in the context of what Gramsei called the "relations of force". The eco­
nomic, political and military dimensions of European integration operate in and 
across different "complexes" of state and civil society and civilisation. 
In the notebook "Relations between strueture and superstructures" Gramsei wrote about the events in 
France between 1789-1870. He points out that only in 1870-71, with the attempt at the Commune were the 
seeds of 1789 "historically exhausted", that is when a new class "struggling for power" demonstrated its vi­
tality over ''the old and the very new". The internal eontradietions in the French soeial structure that took 
form in 1789 were therefore only resolved with the Third Republie after several''waves of upheaval". Gram­
sei indieates that only by careful study of these waves (1789-94; 1794-1815; 1815-30; 1830-48; 1848-70) of 
varying dura.tion "makes it possible to determine the relations on the one hand between strueture and su­
perstrueture" and the "permanent and the occasional" (Gramsei and Buttjgieg 1992: 177ff). 
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The object of analysis of political science 
What I have mentioned in the introduction forms the theoretical perspective from 
which we shall approach the question of European integration in a particular histori­
cal situation. 
In order to show that the theoretical and practical object of political science is the 
historical situation, in The Modern Prince, Gramsci compares the theoretical and 
practical "object" of Machiavelli with that of Bodin (1530-1596), who was analysing 
the internal class relations within a unified France. By contrast, Machiavelli was 
dealing with a situation where the political institutions of Italy between 1500-1700 
were underdeveloped primarily because of the primacy o( international relations over 
internal relations. 
Gramsci points out that Machiavelli as a "man of his times" sought to deduce the 
rules and principles for the foundation of a new form of state from the international 
context of his era - that is in a Europe where Absolutist and centralised state forms 
had been created in France and Spain, but not in Italy. By contrast Bodin was con­
cerned not with the problem of founding a unified state but with "balancing the con­
flicting social forces within this strong and well-implanted state"; that is, his problem­
atic was the construction of consent within France at the time of the civil wars, that is 
the problem of forming a new hegemony, that is a form of leadership that incorpo­
rated subordinate classes. Thus Bodin lays the foundations of political science in 
France "on a terrain which is far more advanced and cornplex than that Italy offered 
Machiavelli". This also explains why Machiavelli's ideas were already at the "service 
of reaction" in a France where dominance belonged to the Third Estate, operating 
through the rule of the absolute monarchy (Gramsci 1971: 142). 
Thus, at the very start of one of the key texts of Gramsci, we can see that what was 
really at issue for Gramsci was not the national or the international per se: it was the 
analysis of the effective reality of a concrete historical situation in order to clarify the 
political questions of today and tomorrow. Thus with respect to theoretical develop­
ment we might start by saying that the key is to fruitfully combine different perspec­
tives (co m parative , international) to produce a convincing explanation of an historical 
situation. In order to do this, Gramsci introduces his method of the "relations of 
force". 
Relations of force and the problem of hegemony 
With this in mind in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci asks whether "fundamental his­
torical events" are caused by prosperity or economic malaise a.nd his reply is that no 
general answer seems possible and it is only part of "the equation of the relations of 
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force" and it is a question that cannot be reduced by the application of economistic 
forms of analysis of particular historical conjunctures: there is no necessary link be­
tween economic and political crisis (Gramsei 1971: 181). The "relations of force" op­
erate at three interlinked levels: 
1) 	 Struetural. These are social forces "closely linked to the structure", an "objective 
relation" that can be measured to estimate the formation of and alignment of 
"groups in relation to production". This enables the examination of the question 
whether "the necessary and sufficient conditions exist in a society for its trans­
formation." (Gramsei 1971: 179). 
2) 	 Politieal. This involves an assessment of the degree of homogeneity and political 
consciousness amongst different classes and political groupings, viz.: 
a) 	 The primitive economic moment, reflected in awareness and solidarity couched in 
terms of "corporate" interests for exa.mple between merchants, or between manu­
facturers to advance their economic position. 
b) 	 The attainment of solidarity; this poses the question of the state in terms of "ru­
dimentary political equality", normally reflected in a politics of reform within an 
existing 'framework. 
c) 	 The hegemonie moment, where there is a consciousness that "corporate inter­
ests" go beyond the specific confines of an economic group and can and must 
become the interests of the subordinate groups. This is the most purely political 
phase that culminates in hegemony. 
3) 	 Strategie. This primarily involves the relation of military forces, "which from time to 
time is immediately decisive", for example the occupati.on of one state's territory 
by another involving the former's subordination, as when an imperial state domi­
nates a colony, and when a conquering state occupies the defeated state, as was 
in effect the case in the Former East Bloc after the collapse of communist rule. 
Indeed, we might add that the strategie question is at the heart of any problematic 
for understanding and explaining European integration today (Gramsei 1971: 
181-2). 
Taking a longer historical view enables us to bring into relief some of the important 
conjunctures in the twentieth century, with respect to the relations of force, for example 
aspects of the strueture as Gramsei defines it. Thus it is worth noting that the nature of 
contemporary capitalism in western Europe - in part because of the influence and 
power of the USA - is quite different to that in the 1930s. For example, despite the ex­
istence of mass unemployment in Europe today, the dislocations associated with con­
temporary capitalist development are different in terms of their material and political 
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implications. For example at the time of the Wall Street Crash in 1929 the service 
sector in western Europe and North America comprised approximately one-third of all 
workers, whereas at the beginning of the crash of 1987 two-thirds of a.1I workers were 
in services, and half of those service workers were within the public sector. In 1929 
transfer incomes in western Europe amounted to less than 4 percent of GNP, whereas 
in 1987, because of unemployment benefits, pensions, family and social security al­
lowances, transfer payments amounted to 30 percent of GNP. Thus the scourge of 
mass unemployment today involves lower levels of social dislocation than in the 1930s, 
and despite the secular trend towards lower growth few speak today of a crisis of 
capitalism 
With respect to the pOlitiea/level of analysis, or the second moment in the relations of 
force, if we look at the situation in Europe today in contrast to the 1930s, once again 
the liberal democratic political form has been consolidated, and indeed has now be­
come relatively universal in European politics in not only the European Union but also 
the Former East Bloc, although this is not necessaJily commensurate with the spread 
of substantive or direct democracy. 
Indeed, in the West European context the main achievement of socialism and social 
democracy have been couched in terms of the eorporate or reformist moments of con­
sciousness, that is with welfare-nationalism understood primarily as anational project. 
The central goal of socialism and social democracy (and of some of the communist 
parties) seems to have been not the replacement of capitalism, but the civilising of the 
capitalist mode of production, in effect conferring it with a hegemonie aura. Thus most 
of the institutional innovations associated with the post-war European welfare states, 
as weil as the institutional order of the liberal international economic order that was 
restored after World War 11, have been connected to the stabilisation and legitimation 
of capitalism through the use of an expanding sphere of state regulation. That is, the 
hegemony of capital has been largely reinforced although we have entered aperiod in 
which the nature of state forms is undergoing transformation. 
Moreover, of course, communism in Europe, at least as a form of rule, has collapsed 
and as such really existing alternatives to capitalism are notable by their absence. This 
is not to say that alternatives to the dominant political orthodoxy do not exist, especially 
on the right. 
With respect to the strategie or military level of force, perhaps the central feature of 
the 1990s is how the power and influence of the United States has increased. Here 
we understand the USA as astate civil society complex, as a locus and model of 
accumulation and as a crystallisation of military power and power projection capabili­
ties. This is despite the efforts of other nations, for example China and Russia, to 
counterbalance some of this strategic power; and despite efforts to countervail 
American economic and monetary power through the process of European integra­
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tion, for example by developing a single currency in EMU. One indicator of this re­
lates to the redefinition and extension of NATO and its use in the Balkans, most re­
cently in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo. Most of this has occurred on American 
terms, and the 1990s have shown once again the subordination of the European 
Union to American military supremacy. 
The rest of the world is also subjected to the threats that emanate from American 
power projection and its capacity to sustain remote controlled aerial warfare, irre­
spective of whether this power is sanctioned or legitimated by a UN mandate. 
Moreover, this has political implications for European integration. The penetration of 
European economic development by American power means that European integra­
tion is limited politically by the way that the USA is at the centre of a "hub and spoke" 
relationship with each member state, that is to say that European Union nations have 
stronger ties to the USA than they have with any other European Union member 
(with the possible exception of Franco-German relations). That is each state neces­
sarily responds to and is partly subordinate to American foreign policy, its power po­
tentials and institutional preferences, irrespective of their pooling of sovereignty in 
the European Union, and as the wars with Iraq and Serbia indicated, some nations, 
for example the UK, are more subordinated than others to United States world order 
projects. 
In sum, we might ask what does this analysis imply for the discourse of politics in the 
process of European integration, for example from the perspective of radical-demo­
cratic forces? 
Passive revolution and the absence of hegemony 
So far we have largely discussed the dialectic between capitalist hegemony and the 
subordination of socialism and social democracy to that hegemony. However a key 
concept in Gramsci's lexicon relates to a situation associated with the creation of a 
new form of state characterised by the absence of the hegemony of a leading class. 
Gramsei called this a situation of passive revolution. 
Generally for Gramsci, passive revolution refers to two sets of situations. 
1) 	 A revolution without mass participation that is often prompted by external forces. 
This type of revolution can often be rapid, involving what Gramsci called a "war of 
movement". 
2) 	 A capillary or molecular social transformation which occurs more slowly, beneath 
the surface, particularly where the most progressive class must advance its position 
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surreptitiously. This may involve a different political strategy, or what Gramsci called 
a war of position, which he often understood as something long-term.2 
The concept of passive revolution and the two strategic concepts (wars of movement 
and position) are derived from what Gramsci calls the "the two fundamental principles 
of political science": 
1) 	 that no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces which have 
developed within it still find room for further forward movement; 
2) 	 that a society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the necessary conditions 
have not already been incubated, etc."(Gramsci 1971: 1 06) 
Thus for Gramsci, the European question of the nineteenth century is interpreted in 
terms of the relationship between the revolutionary French state and the states of 
continental Europe. He argues that this "should be based on the study of four 
elements": 
1) 	 The revolutionary explosion in France with a radical and violent transformation of 
social and political relations; 
2) 	 European opposition to the French Revolution and to any extension of it along 
class lines; 
3) 	 war between France, under the republic and Napoleon, and the rest of Europe ­
initially, in order to avoid being stifled at birth, and subsequently with the aim of 
establishing a permanent French hegemony tending toward the creation of a 
universal empire', 
4) 	 national revolts against French hegemony, and the birth of the modern European 
states by successive small waves of reform rather than by revolutionary explosions 
like the original French one. The "successive waves" were made up of a 
combination of social struggles, interventions 'from above of the enlightened 
monarchy type, and national wars - with the two latter phenomena predominating . 
... restoration becomes the first policy whereby social struggles find sufficiently 
elastic frameworks to allow the bourgeoisie to gain power without dramatic 
upheavals, without the French machinery of terror. The old feudal classes are 
demoted from their dominant position to a "governing" one, but are not eliminated 
(Gramsci 1971: 114-5). 
The main examples Gramsei gives are the bourgeoisie in Restoration France after 1815 and the emergence of 
Christianity within the Roman Empire. Gramsei also uses the concept relative to Italian Fascism which he inter­
prets in a way similarto the role of Napoleon 111 in France. See (Gramsei 1971: 106-120). 
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Gramsci then asks Clean this "model" for the creation of the modern states be repeated 
in other conditions? The answer to this question seems to be in the affirmative, partly 
because it is, like most of Gramsci's concepts, very elastic and only attains a precise 
meaning when it is used in the context of an historical situation. In the case of Europe 
in the 1990s, for example, the fourth element is crucial to our interpretation. A parallel 
might be the revolts against communist rule that have been followed by externally 
determined reforms, and it of course places the question of European integration on an 
international as weil as the regional scale - that is in the context of the disintegration of 
the Former East Bloc. 
Moreover, the notion of passive revolution is crucial to Gramsci's analysis of what 
today have been described by Michel Albert as "competing capitalisms" (Albert 1993). 
The concept is used to characterise the relationship between Americanism and 
Fordism, on the one hand, and the backward forms of political economy in Europe, 
notably in Italy, on the other. In the latter case it involved efforts to introduce advanced 
methods of capitalist production in the absence of bourgeois hegemony, both before 
and irnmediately after the war, the latter in the context of the American occupation and 
the Marshall Plan, when efforts were made to comprehensively introduce Fordist 
production under reformist conditions imposed from the outside, in order to both 
preserve European capitalism and to subordinate it to American dominance.3 
As we noted, the concept of passive revolution is particularly useful for analysing the 
transformation of the former Soviet bloc, and its gradual incorporation into the 
institutional and constitutional forms associated with Western capitalist hegemony, and 
in time with European integration. Here it is noteworthy that the reform programs that 
have been introduced not just by external forces drawn from Western Europe, but 
within the broader framework of the institutional complexes of transnational capitalism 
Iinked to the leadership of the United States in the G7. The process of transformation 
from state socialism and Soviet communism to liberal capitalism has been a c1assic 
example of the introduction of new constitutional and political forms from above - in 
order to adva.nce capitalism in the absence of a domestic capitalist class. 
In this connection, the latest phase in the passive revolution of capital can be 
understood in terms of the two fundamental principles of political science that Gramsci, 
drawing upon Marx, outlined above. First, the social formations in the former Soviet 
bloc had reached the limits of their potential for "further forward movemenf'. Second, 
the rulers had set tasks for whose "solution the necessary conditions have not already 
been incubated", that is the goal of the Soviet Union to achieve ideological, military, 
Moreover, other theorists have applied the concept of passive revolution not only to Western Europe, but also 




strategie and economic parity with the United States and NATO had not been, nor 
could be achieved. The USSR faced impossible odds; the dynamism and flexibility of 
American capitalism and its military industrial complex organised organic alliances with 
other West European, North American, Pacific and other nations. Moreover, this goal 
became increasingly chimerical as the former East bloc nations drained Soviet 
resources throughout the 1980s, a time when Soviet economic growth and innovation 
stagnated. 
The new situation in the Former East Bloc can yield the following interpretation. On the 
one hand, the desire for politico-constitutional forms that would allow for freedom and 
equality before the law meant that Western political models held out considerable long­
term appeal to the populations of the east (moment of consent). The appeal of the 
latter was connected to a longer-term war of position on the part of the west designed 
to roll-back communism by using a combination of propaganda and persuasion largely 
built on the success of the Fordist-consumerist formula that succeeded in post-war 
western Europe. On the other hand, the conditionality that was imposed on the former 
East bloc nations by the West left little choice: either accept a Western liberal political 
and constitutional framework, with absolute guarantees for private property rights, or 
Western aid would be denied and those who refused would be severely punished, for 
example Serbia. This would correspond to the moment of coercion, involving a rapid 
war of movement, with the main weapons being shock therapy, allowing rapid entry of 
free enterprise and free exchange and swift imposition of market-based capitalist 
discipline throughout the economic structure and on the state. The tactics for this on 
the part of the West wereestablished in restructuring programmes for not only 
Poland, but also and more importantly, the restructuring of the Former DDR following 
its de facta annexation by West Germany. 
Thus, the reforms were intended to domesticate radical-democratic impulses and allow 
both the restoration of capitalism in the east (moment of revolution-restoration) and the 
further weakening and incorporation of the enemy. The strategie aim was to extend the 
boundaries and political basis of the western bloc and incorporate a newly empowered 
bourgeoisie in the East, as weil as subordinating or appropriating its military assets 
under NATO command, whilst preventing a purely European solution to the question of 
restructuring.4 
Moreover, whilst the reforms were the direct product of domestic legislation and initiative, in reality they were 
administered under the supervision of not only the international financial institutions, but also the European 
Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and of course the agencies of the West Ger­
man state in the DDR, plus the operations of the military security forces of NATO and the secret intelligence 
agencies, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. A form of political re-education was linked to the formation of 
new political cadres and entrepreneurs drew on experts fram western governments, universities, think-tanks 
and management consultancy, drawn from the major G7 countries, led by the United States. A World Bank 




Today, a decade later, much of the evidence indicates that the restoration of capitalism 
has brought about a catastrophic decline in the standard of living and quality of life for 
the vast majority of the population in the Former East Bloc, with women, children and 
the elderly particularly hard hit. Not only has there been a decrease in life expectancy, 
especially in Russia, but there has been a precipitate drop in the birth-rate, as women, 
like men, experienced greater anxiety and insecurity about the post-Communist future. 
Since 1989, there has been a steep increase in murder, suicides, crime rates, 
domestic violence, and a rapid increase in income inequality.5 
European integration/disintegration; between hegemony 
and passive revolution 
When Gramsci addressed the question of Europe in the 1930s the question posed 
was not of European integration but its opposite: the disintegration and destruction of 
European civilisation. Gramsci argued that an organic crisis was manifest: where the 
old was dying and the new was struggling to be born, and in the interregnum there 
arose "many morbid symptoms". No solution to the crisis was evident: the best that 
Gramsci could da from his prison cell was to invoke his favourite political slogan: to 
combine "the pessimism of the intelligence" with the "optimism of the will". The crisis of 
the economic structure was a crisis of hegemony for capitalism as a system, a general 
crisis of the state and of political authority. "Popular masses" no longer adhered to the 
orthodox political ideologies that legitimated the relationship between rulers and ruled. 
Thus the coercive face of power came to the fore and the ruling-classes in many states 
were prepared to sacrifice constitutionalism and democracy at the altar of reaction and 
Fascism. 
Of course, it took the most destructive war in history for the organic crisis to be re­
solved, although the struggle did not produce an authentic revolution against capital as 
such. In fact, in western Europe, the defeat of fascism led to the restoration of capital­
ism and the rebirth of liberal democratic constitutional forms which had been sup­
planted or obliterated by authoritarianism and fascism throughout much of the conti­
ian ministers and civil servants towards an understanding of market economics - a programme which is ap­
parently paying dividends because of the high level of mathematics among the post-Soviet cadres. It at­
tracted the attention of George Soros, who announced in September 1994 that he would like to finance a 
Ukrainian centre to co-ordinate public economic education. See J. Barshay and C. Freeland, 'Economists 
go back to school', Financial Times, October 6, 1994. In the Third World, whilst the supply of western 
"know-how" has been plentiful (in Africa in the early 1990s there were more foreign consultants, business 
and government personnel than there,were during the height of the colonial period), the supply of funds has 
been relatively meagre (at least, for example, when compared to Marshall Aid after the second world war). 
Indeed, there was a net outflow of funds from most black African countries to the North during the 1980s. 





nent during the 1930s. The wartime alliance between Soviet Russia and the capitalist 
allies paradoxically allowed for the re-legitimation of capital in Western Europe under 
the aegis of the Marshall Plan. The geopolitical context was the emergence of the Cold 
War following the deterioration of United States-Soviet relations after the use of atomic 
weapons by the United States in Japan. The symptoms of morbidity between 1939 and 
1945 involved the deaths of perhaps 50 million people. 
Nevertheless, in his analysis of the condition of political life in the inter-war years, 
Gramsci posed the question whether the advance of Americanism and Fordism con­
stituted the beginnings of a new historical epoch, or simply a combination of particu­
lar events that had no long-term signi'ficance. Indeed, he posed the question relative 
to the forms of state and class structures of the old and new worlds to ask whether 
the emergent historical bloc of American power in the international relations of the 
inter-war period was provoking a "transformation of the material bases of European 
civilisation" (Gramsci 1971: 317). Weil before his incarceration Gramsci thought that 
the revolution in production in the new urban centres of industrial capitalism clarified 
the class struggle and symbolised the fundamental political issue for the future of 
Europe.6 
The dialectic between hegemony and passive revolution is a central theme of Ameri­
canism and Fordism. For Gramsci, Fordism and Americanism represented an accel­
eration of a new social form based upon a deep organic link between form of state, 
civii society and mode of production, and as such, represented a new form of 
planned economy where hegemony was based in the forces of production and "was 
born in the factory". By contrast the European class structure involved power blocs 
that were degenerate and had many parasitic elements in the class structure, which 
Gramsci indicated as he unravelled the so-called "Mystery of Naples".7 
This situation that was not unique to Italy since it was found throughout "Old Europe" 
and in an even more extreme form in India and China. As such the bourgeoisie were 
6 	
"At the root of every production problem is the political problem, that is, the problem of social relations, of 
the organic functioning of society. In order to organise production seriously, it is necessary first or, better, 
simultaneously to organise all of society in relation to production, which is the most general and direct ex­
pression of society. Production is society's soul, its most comprehensive and immediate symbol." uProduzi­
one e politica", L'Ordine Nuovo, 24-31 January 1920. 
7 	 He noted that in contrast to America, where even millionaires worked until the day that they died, Naples 
represented here the sad urban spectacle of a decaying and outmoded economic system. The rentier and 
unproductive classes, that is the Southern landowners and the petit-bourgeoisie exploited the producers, 
the peasantry and went to Naples to spend the pensions and rents extracted from the peasants. Gramsci 
also noted how an enormous proportion of the Italian population, perhaps one tenth of the total, lived off the 
state budget. By contrast, in a modern industrial city like Turin was the locus where the struggle between 
capital and labour occurred - without the dead weight of the parasitic strata and as such, it indicated the so­
cial basis for the new society. 
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not hegemonic in these societies, and the transformations took the form of "passive 
revolution", and often political dominance was manifested bya regressive caesarism. 
The productive apparatus of society was not shaped by the hegemony of capital in 
civil society but 'from control from above by the authoritarian state apparatus, mobi­
lising the petit bourgeoisie and repressing the working-class as in Fascism.8 
The ideological hypothesis could be presented in the following terms: that there is a 
passive revolution involved the fact that - through the legislative intervention of the 
State, and by means of the corporative organisation - relatively far-reaching modifi­
cations are being introduced into the country's economic structure in order to ac­
centuate the "plan of production" element; in other words, that socialisation and co­
operation in the sphere of production are being increased, without however touching 
(or at least not going beyond the regulation and the control of) individual and group 
appropriation of profit (Gramsci 1971: 119-120). 
By contrast Fordism had triumphed in the USA by a combination of force, (destroying 
working-class unionism and solidarity), and persuasion (high wages, social benefits, 
ideological and political propaganda) to create a new form of worker subjected to 
intense and "Puritanical" moral and social regulation (requiring monogamy and free­
dom from alcoholism). However, Gramsci considered each of these weapons of ex­
ploitation as a doubled-edged sword: workers resist the imposition of moral regi­
mentation and identify the hypocrisy of the ruling classes with respect to sexual 
relations; the workers gain "a state of complete [mental] freedom" after the worker 
has "overcome the crisis of adaptation" associated with repetitive mechanica.l work, 
so that he has "greater opportunities for thinking" (Gramsci 1971: 310). 
Americanism and Fordism required a particular form of state and social structure, 
namely a liberal state based on free initiative and economic individualism and a cor­
responding form of civil society, but the very development of a planned economy and 
the need for social and moral regulation meant an increase in state intervention. 
Thus, the capitalist state can never be the same as before. The state increasingly 
intervenes in the process of production, even reorganising productive processes ac­
cording to plans and assuming the nationalisation and socialisation of risk. Thus the 
formal character of the liberal state is preserved within civil society at the level of 
''The characteristic feature of fascism consists in the fact that it has succeeded in creating a mass organisa­
tion of the petty bourgeoisie. It is the first time in history that this has happened. The originality of fascism 
consists in having found the right form of organisation for a social class which has always been incapable of 
having any cohesion or unitary ideology: this form of organisation is the army in the field". (Gramsci and 




freedom of initiative and enterprise but with its fundamental meaning reconfigured by 
statism, industrial concentration and monopoly.9 
Historical blocs and International Relations 
If Gramsci were alive today, it is likely that he would have identified the central ques­
tion of Europe by combining those posed earlier by Machiavelli and Bodin: how to 
create not a new form of state as such, but a new transnational political community in 
the European space, and how to construct radical-democratic hegemony within that 
space, a problem involving past, present, and future. 
In this context, we now introduce what Gramsci called an historical bloc. This concept 
helps to describe the basis of a form of state and its capacity for rule and leader­
ship.10 A historical bloc may be formed "through aseries of compromises or force of 
arms. "A historical bloc is, however, not simply the creation of leaders, since it also 
allows the collective will of groups to be realised as they seek to forge their own per­
sonality, that is it combines structure and superstructure, the material and the ideo­
logical, in an organic way (Gramsci 1971: 137 ff.).11 Indeed, as Gramsci shows the 
historical bloc is not something that depends upon a specific "state" for its existence 
as such. The Modern Prince principally explores the case of modern Italy, which was 
a nation before it had astate, and as such, the formation of a blocco storico pre­
ceded the unification of Italy in the nineteenth century under Garibaldi. So here, in 
the spirit of Gramsci's conceptual elasticity, we use the idea of historical bloc to ana­
lyse forms of state or political association in and across "complexes of civilisations". 
As we have seen, twentieth century European development and identity has been 
over-determined by American globalism and Soviet communism. The result for the 
European Union, is that the national state-society formations are penetrated by, or 
interpenetrated with, those of other nations and by international organisations. Of 
course, the USA is the imperial sun in this respect with its power radiating across the 
politica.1 universe of less powerful states. Indeed, after World War 11, in the context of 
9 	 Gramsci took the broader political implication of this to be as follows "The "collective worker" understands 
that this is what he iS, not merely in each individual factory but in the broader spheres of the national and 
international division of labour. It is precisely in the organisms which represent the factory as a producer of 
real objects and not of profit that he gives an external, pOlitical demonstration of the consciousness he has 
acquired". (Gramsci and Boothman 1995: 202). 
10 	 For a full elaboration of my conception of an historical bloc and its use in understanding International Rela­
tions see (Gill 1990). 
11 " ... the conception of historical bloc in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the 
form, though this distinction between form and conte nt has purely didactic value, since the material forces 
would be inconceivable historically without the form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without 
the material forces" (Gramsci 1971: 377). 
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the Marshall Plan, NATO and the emergence of the EEC, the Pax Amerieana in­
volved an international historieal bloe built on Fordist foundations, and on the inter­
nationalisation of aspects of the American New Deal state form, modified by wartime 
mobilisation and the subsequent establishment of the military-industrial complex (Pijl 
1984). The new political settlements included moderate organised labour and big 
capital - as weil as leaders from civil society for example in the media, centrist and 
political parties and churches - in aseries of European and transatlantic political set­
tlements under American leadership. It thus combinedcoercion and consent with 
Fordist accumulation and the legitimation of the material basis of the system through 
mass-consumption. Its ideological banners included the concepts of liberty, modernity, 
affluence, welfare and the 'end of ideology', fused into a concept of 'the West' and an 
anti-Communist alliance. The bloc balanced national and transnational capital, organ­
ised labour and the state. This transatlantic bloc was constructed during the late 1940s 
and 1950s, and lasted until at least the late 1960s (Gill 1990: 49). 
Recently, political change and economic globalization have undermined this integral 
hegemony. For example, there has been anideological shift towards neo-conservatism 
in politics and neo-liberalism in economics. Finance has taken the place of production 
as the main determinant of capitalist accumulation strategies. A political shift occurred 
which marginalized labour and social democratic parties from the inner circles of power 
(Iess so in some countries, such as Germany, than in others, e.g. the USA, UK, and 
Japan). What I call the "terrain of political contestabi I ity" has shifted to the right in the 
OECD countries since the early 1970s and it has moved further in a neo-liberal 
direction during the 1990s period of American triumphalism. 
Thus the transatlantic historical bloc was unravelled in the 1960s and 1970s not by 
changes in the inter-state distribution of power as such (remember this was aperiod 
where American power was supposedly in relative decline), but by effects of the 
restructuring of capital both within and across states. This involved internationalisation 
and gradual liberalisation of produc1:ion, capital and exchange markets, complex 
communications grids, rapid innovation and diffusion of technology. Above all, change 
was accelerated by cumulative and accelerating growth in the globalization of finance 
with American capital at the vanguard, a process that was facilitated and promoted by 
both state power and a resurgence in the power of capital. 
In time, therefore, with the emergence of a more integrated global political economy, 
the former international historie bloe has been transformed into an American-centred 
and led transnational historie bloe, where organised labour has been virtually margi­
nalised. At its apex of are elements in the leading states in the G-7 and capital linked 
to advanced sectors in international investment, production and 'finance, and the ac­
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eumulation patterns of virtual aeeumulation. Inereasingly in the 1990s these have been 
Ameriean firms, partly refleeted in the Wall Street boom.12 
By eontrast, one of the most salient features of the 1990s is an unpreeedented in­
erease in soeial inequality, and an intensifieation of exploitation of both people and 
nature in an inereasingly naked pursuit of profit, a development that is partieularly no­
tieeable in the USA.13 At the same time, the neo-liberal shift in government polieies has 
tended to subjeet the majority of the population to the power of market forees (most 
workers, small businesses) whilst preserving social proteetion for the strong (e.g. highly 
skilled workers, oligopolistie eorporate eapital, those with inherited wealth). 
Indeed we might say that the "ideologieal hypothesis" today is that neo-liberal forms 
of aeeumulation are assoeiated inereasingly with a polities of supremaey, rather than 
hegemony. By a situation of supremaey is meant rule by a non-hegemonie bloe of 
forees that exereises dominanee for aperiod over apparently fragmented populations 
until a eoherent form of opposition emerges, for example relative to the social disin­
tegration in the Former East Bloe and the divide between the employed and unem­
ployed, "Ioeals" and immigrants, in western Europe. The supremaeist bloe is based 
on giant oligopolistie firms that operate politieally both "outside" and "inside" the state 
and form part of the "Ioeal" and "global" politieal struetures. The eentral purpose of 
this bloe is the intensifieation of the diseipline of eapital within state and civil soeiety in 
order to inerease the rate of exploitation and long-term profit flows. 
12 	 For example in the 1999 Financial Times Global 500 Survey of the world's largest corporations by country, 
the U.S. ranks highest with 244 American owned and controlled firms (up from 222 in 1998) with a market 
capitalisation of $7.3 trillion dollars; the UK is next with 53 firms valued at $1.2 trillion; Japan comes third 
with 46 companies valued at $866 billion; then Germany with 23 firms at $654 billion, and France with 27 
firms at $490 billion. Nine of the top ten corporations is American. The most noticeable sectoral trend is that 
banking, finance, insurance, business services, telecommunications, computer software, high·technology 
and pharmaceuticals are the largest sectors, thus indicating a shift towards what might be called ''virtual ac­
cumulation": Microsoft is now the world's largest company. 
13 	 For example the UNDP Human Development Report (1997) estimates showed that the world's 225 billion· 
aires had a combined wealth of over one trillion dollars, equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 per­
cent of the world's people (2.5 billion). Indeed, the three richest people in the world had assets greater than 
the combined annual output of the 48 least developed countries. One billion people had no access to safe 
drinking water. 842 million adults are illiterate. 158 million children under 5 were malnourished. In 1996 
there were 1.3 billion in the world: 20 percent of the world's population are living below the income poverty 
line. At the same time, unemployment has been rising throughout the world. The International Labor 
Organization estimated that in 1996 about one billion people were unemployed. They note that this global 
unemployment crisis began in the early 1980s. 
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Implications for theories of European integration 
To return to the question posed by the organisers: what are "the most serious prob­
lems within the discussion on integration theory and how can they be solved?" I have 
already given some of my answer to this question. The solution to the serious prob­
lems in Europe today, depends, however, on collective action. 
As I hope to have shown, or at least to have intimated, any theory of European inte­
gration will only be fully complete if it is placed in the context of an analysis of the rela­
tions of force in the context of global, regional, national and local politics in the past, 
present and future. Local changes interact with and overlay the specific national and 
international struggles to define the nature of the European integration project, as weil 
as the constitutive 'frameworks of the globalization of capital and world order. In this 
sense, any theory of European integration is necessarily a theory of the state and civil 
society as weil as a theory of I nternational Relations and Political Economy and in­
deed, of European civilisation more gene rally. Moreover, since the European question 
is by definition one that involves the past, present and future of European civilisation, 
any theory that seeks to explain European integration must always be a theory in de­
velopment - that is one that is related to the concrete historical situation of Europe, a 
situation that is by definition, in movement. 
What this actually means in practice depends on the different forms of state and 
capitalism in western Europe and the balance or equilibrium of forces within and 
between them. Thus the precise admixture associated with the neo-liberal trend 
varies in different state-civil society complexes or in forms of what Gramsei called the 
"extended state". Gramsci's concept of the extended form of state (represented by the 
formula state =political society + civil society) helps us to understand some aspects of 
this process. Political society includes the "public" sphere of government, administra­
tion and law and order, as weil as security. Civil society includes those elements nor­
mally considered "private", such as free enterprise, political parties, churches, trades 
unions, etc. 
So what is the contemporary and historical terrain upon which we might seek to build 
a theorisation of European integration? Put differently, what are the contemporary 
changes that are structural, or relatively permanent, and what changes are incipient as 
we enter the twenty-first century? 
Here I want to mention three sets of changes that combine coercion and consent that 
might be discussed, in addition to what has already been mentioned: 
1) 	 The reconfiguration of patterns of accumulation at the macro and micro-economic 
levels, associated with disciplinary neo-liberalism and virtual accumulation. This in­
volves the rivalries and collaborations between European and American capital in 
29 

ways reminiscent of the earlier issues discussed relative to Americanism and For­
dism. Part of what is at issue is a gradual and still far 'from complete rede'finition of 
continental European corporate governance in ways that prioritise shareholder 
value and the discipline of capital markets along Anglo-Amierican lines. This trend 
allows for the structural power of mobile financial capital to be exerted more effec­
tively. More generally, microeconomic discipline of the di$ciplinary neo-liberalism 
type is largely coercive for the majority in society, since social protection (sociali­
sation of risk, for example pension, unemployment benefits) is rolled back. 
2) 	 The reconfiguration of state forms according to the principles and practices of new 
constitutionalism, thus indicating a gradual shift away from the social market as weil 
as certain forms of planning, thus a.llowing for the consolidation of "Iocking in" of a 
more limited but still powerful neo-liberal state form insulatad from popular-democ­
racy accountability. Examples of this include the independent European Union 
Central Banks, the trend towards greater centralisation of power in the executive 
branches and in the largely unaccountable European Union bureaucracy, the 
Commission as weil as in national "quangos". 
3) 	 The reconfiguration of civil society and civilisational forms, associated with the 
spread of possessive individualism, privatisation and the marketisation of institu­
tions in an emerging market civilisation premised upon ,commodified desire as a 
means to generate consent. One indicator is the massive growth in private satellite 
TV, and the proliferation of advertising and merchandising linked to not only soccer 
and other corporate products, but also to public institutions, such as schools and 
universities. 
For example the Maastricht Agreements express a characteristically European con­
stitutional moment in these processes of global political restructuring and hierarchy. 
It reflects a synthesis between western European and American interests in a pan­
European historie bloc. Its reform and constitutional project is primarily informed a.nd 
led by disciplinary neo-liberal social forces. As we have shown in an earlier work, 
EMU is commensurate with a neo-liberal framework of governance: new constitu­
tionalism, which restrains democracy and protects private property rights and sets 
the governance frameworks that impose macroeconomic discipline under a regime of 
austerity (Gill 1998). 
Thus the dominant transnational historic bloc has a significant European basis. In a 
previous work co-authored with Magnus Ryner we summarised the characteristics of 
the pan-European transnational historie bloc as including (a) I a relative preponder­
ance of export oriented productive capital as weil as financial, or rentier capital and 
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(b) the crucial importance of the 'social market' to forge mass consent. 14 Indeed, a 
stable compromise between market discipline, public goods-provision, and welfare 
state entitlements seemed to have been reached by the late 1980s, combining social 
provisions and entitlements with market discipline: a combination we call compen­
satory neo-liberalism.15 
However in some parts of the political spectrum this constellation is being called into 
question, partly because of continuing economic stagnation, and partly because of 
mass unemployment. These questions frame the struggle, or in Gramscian terms a 
war of position between those forces advocating a purer andmore disciplinary neo­
liberal reform (especially to impart flexibility or liberalisation to the 'negotiated' labour 
market) versus and those that advocate a new Keynesian direction and thus empha­
sise the more compensatory aspect of neo-liberalism. In this context, the German 
position in the EMU project becomes particularly interestingsince social forces in 
Germany reflect both of these positions. 
Thus the neo-liberal trend varies in different state-civil society complexes or in forms 
of what Gramsci called the "extended state" and thus each requires care'ful empirical 
research, as do the forces - on the right and on the left - that oppose it.16 Thus, in the 
context of a hypothetical continuum, the UK gravitates most towards the more pure 
variant of disciplinary neo-liberalism whereas the new German state with its strategy 
of progressive competitiveness seems caught between the Scylla of the social mar­
ket and the Charybdis of neo-liberal globalization. 
14 	 Magnus Ryner and Stephen Gill. "Disciplinary Neo-liberalism and the Social Market: Germany and the 
European Order" Annual Meeting of the British International Studies' Association, University of Sussex, 
Brighton, UK, December 14, 1998. 
15 	 For example backing for EMU was strongly linked to the interests of large financial houses and firms, gov­
ernment bureaucracies and European Union organisations, with the governments of Germany and France 
pressing strongly for its realisation. The wider transnational historic bloc associated with empowering corpo­
rate capital incorporates a wider range of interests and identities, includil1g many privileged workers, mem­
bers of the professions and small business people (who offen do subcontractil1g or supply to large transna­
tional corporations; import-export businesses) as weil as international and national firms in accountancy, 
law, consultancy, advertising, public relations, computing, stockbroking, and increasingly, educational en­
trepreneurs, architects, urban planners and designers, and many of the top sports stars that serve to market 
corporate images and identities. The bloc comprises interests of both capital and labour, and elements of 
the state apparatus, although it is dominated by the largest and most internationally-mobile transnational 
firms. 
16 	 That is we need to understand the state not only as a legal and juridical form, but also in terms of the inter­
penetration of "political" and "civiI society"that constitutes a particular form of state. In the European Union 
this means political forms that are simultaneously national and transnational, and that are lodged within the 
European constitutional order and security regime. 
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Hans-Jürgen Bieling/Jochen Steinhilber 
Hegemonie Projeets in the Proeess of European 
Integration 
1. Introduction 
Approaches of transnational historical materialism, especially if they are neo-Gram­
scian, pay particular attention to the concept of hegemony. Hegemony thereby is not, 
as in neo-realism, tantamount with structures of dominance, but it rather describes a 
certain kind of social reproduction, even supported by those who are ruled and pow­
erless. As Gramsci explained, hegemony is primarily based on a consensus. How­
ever, if it is questioned as in times of serious social crisis, it is backed by coercion, 
Le. the repressive power of political institutions. In a way, this complementary rela­
tionship between consensus and coercion corresponds with that between civil soci­
ety and political society. Whereas consensus is primarily formed in a civil society 
generating a specific co-operative political culture, coercion is first of all a matter of 
state apparatuses, above all of the army and police. Even if this distinction within the 
whole complex of state-society-relations, Le. the overall political superstructure or the 
state in a wider sense, is rather analytical, it shows clearly that from a neo-Gram­
scian point of view hegemony involves always both, consensus and coercion, civil 
society and the state, and the engagement of social and political forces. 
It was above all Robert W. Cox (1987) who has demonstrated that the Gramscian 
concept of hegemony is not only useful for analysing national but also transnational 
power structures and modes of socio-econorTlic reproduction. In an article on Antonio 
Gramsci published in the early eighties he developed a very famous definition of 
transnational hegemony. 'Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an 
order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of 
production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes 
of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships which connect 
the social classes of the different countries. World hegemony is describable as a 
social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be 
simply one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is 
expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general 
rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across na­
tional boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production.' (Cox 1983: 
171-2) 
In principle, this understanding of hegemony can not only be applied to world orders 
but also to regional (con-)federations as the European Union. For this, however, it is 
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necessary to point to some conceptual modifications: First, there is no unambiguous 
single mode of production which ascents from one dominant economy and then 
penetrates the others. Of course, there are asymmetrically structured modes of eco­
nomic interdependence, but there is no single European superpower based on a su­
perior national economy. Thus, within the EU we can rather observe dense cross­
border networks of economic, social, and political interactions, which tend to be 
dominated by the concerns of the most powerful nation states (Germany, France, 
and Great Britain) on the one hand, and the strategic interests of transnational capi­
talon the other. Second, Cox emphasises the relevance of transnational organisa­
tions their rules, norms, ideologies, and co-opting capacities - for reproducing 
hegemonic structures. This applies particularly to the agreements and institutions of 
the EU. Compared to the regimes of global governance, the regimes of European 
governance are more dense and durable, and have more regulative, conditional, and 
obligatory capacities at their disposal; hence, at least recently some scholars of 
European integration prefer to speak of the emergence of corporatist policy networks 
within a multi-leve1-governance structure (Falkner 1998; Marks et al 1996; Jachten­
fuchs! Kohler-Koch 1996). And finally, hegemonic structures in the EU seem to be 
more complex and dynamic than global ones, since they are subjected to pressures 
and incentives for supranational co-operation. Thus, it is probably use'ful to pay par­
ticular attention to the relevant political projects which spurred the launching of Euro­
pean integration during the past two decades. 
2. 	 The meaning of ,political projects': some theoretical re­
fleetions 
Highlighting the generation, implementation, and the effects of political projects has 
also an impact on the theoretical concept. It contributes to a more complex and per­
haps even more comprehensive understanding of hegemony, since it stresses the 
social constructivist dimensions, Le. the active involvement of social actors and po­
litical organisations, in the processes of hegemonic restructuring. The advantage of 
this is at least twofold: first, it avoids or compensates for a sometimes too narrow, 
one-sided structuralist and elitist interpretation of neo-libera.l restructuring. This does 
not mean at all that the structu ral and behaviou ral power of transnational capital, the 
'new constitutionalism' and the disciplinary effects of neo-liberal restructuring (Gill 
1992; 1997; van der Pijl! Holman 1996) should be ignored, but these aspects are 
neither based merely on coercion nor on a kind of consensus which is exclusively 
produced by the manipulative power of the mass media. Current hegemonie struc­
tures are based on the spread of the 'rentier mentality' (Gill 1998) as weil as on the 
attractiveness of consumerist life styles. To put it another way: from the mid-eighties 
onwards hegemony within the European Union is more than tacit agreement of the 
masses; at least partly it involves active consent and self-motivated engagement as 
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weil as material eompromises with (parts of) the subaltern classes. This means that 
the EU represents a polity-based arena which is dominated by initiatives of neo-lib­
eral forces without being completely controlled by them. Besides this, to set off the 
role of hegemonie projects involves a second advantage. It gives some causes to 
rethink the social theoretical foundations of neo-Gramscian approaches. The con­
ventional perspective is to attribute political strategies, culture, ideology and other 
phenomena merely to the interests of social forces, above all classes. This must not 
be necessarily wrong, but it involves the danger of socio-economic class-reduction­
ism. At least it brings up the serious problem of how to mediate socio-economic 
structures and political class action. T'o avoid the pitfalls of many class theoretical 
approaches it seems useful to invert the relationship between political projects and 
the social structure, Le. to regard political projects not only as the outcome of class 
action, but also as discursive and strategie means to reconfigure social power rela­
tions. 
In principle, the concept of political projects leads to a differentiated and more dy­
namic understanding of hegemony. In referring to Gramsci, hegemony can be dis­
cussed in different contexts and on different analytical levels. At least three of them 
are particularly relevant: first, there is the term 'historie bloe'. Herewith? Gramsei re­
fers to a social order as a relative coherent ensemble of coercive and consensual 
institutions, inclusive of a parl:icular mode of socia.1 development, which lasts for a 
longer period of time. Looking back to the time after the Second World War 'Fordism' 
represents such a 'historie bloc', very typical for most developed capitalist societies. 
It was based on a particular combination of certain technologies (e.g. the assembly 
line), industrial mass production and mass consumption supported by strong trade 
unions and an expansive welfare state. The socio-economic exhaustion of this model 
(declining rates of productivity, growth, and profits but increasing indebtedness of the 
state and high rates of inflation) and the erosion of the stabilising international set­
tlement (the break down of the Bretton Woods System) caused a fundamental crisis 
of the old configuration, which in view of its effects (high economic growth rates, the 
extension of social rights and social security, and full employment) might be called a 
'Keynesian' one. In the meanwhile, due to the socio-economic and political restruc­
turing during the past two decades this 'keynesian configuration' is replaced by a 
new one, which might be called 'neo-liberal'. It can be regarded as the political crys­
tallisation of the new 'historie bloc' of 'transnational high-tech-capitalism', which is 
based on a set of new technologies, forms of production, a transnationalised mode 
of accurnulation, a changed social structure and class relations, different criteria and 
forms of regulation etc. 
The second level of analysis refers not to the structural conditions and the general 
mode of social evolution, but to the social and political forces, which are shaping, 
directing or even steering its internal development. Of course, in principle all these 
forces pursue particular - partly competing, contradictory or even antagonistic - in­
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te rests so that, in order to be sueeessful, most of the time they are eaused to eo-op­
erate, agree on eompromises, and form allianees. If these allianees are dorrlinant 
and stable, Le. if they last for a longer period of time, they represent a 'hegemonie 
bloe'. As a rule such a 'hegemonie bloe' defines the cornerstones of the prevailing 
world-view. In this eonneetion, intelleetuals playa erueial role. In organising politieal 
and ideologieal leadership, they are involved in both, in the making and in the disin­
tegration of social allianees ('hegemonie bloes') and soeial orders ('historieal bloes'). 
However, the eomplianee with the hegemonie eore beliefs is not merely organised by 
diseussion and eonvietion. As hegemony ineludes not only consensus but also eoer­
eion, it is as weil, if not primarily based on eommitments guaranteed and enforeed by 
the state or, as in ease of the European Union, by state-like institutions and agen~ 
eies. The regulative and distributive eapaeities of the governanee strueture for their 
part refleet institutional ,inheritanees and existing social power relations. In a way, 
they rest on a eomplex social (class) eompromise, whieh over and above stabilises 
the whole 'historie bloe'. 
The dimensions of soeial action will even be stressed by a third level of hegemony, 
that of 'hegemonie projeets'. In general, hegemonie projeets are politieal projeets, 
whieh have also a stabilising, however, eompared to the institutionalised soeial 
(class) eompromise, more dynamie and potentially transformative impact on the 
'historie' and 'hegemonie bloe'. By changing the forms of regulation and ereating 
widespread publie support, 'hegemonie projeets' influenee both, the material and 
ideologieal modes of soeial reproduetion. In this eontext, they have not the same 
meaning as 'eomprehensive eoneepts of eontrol', whieh, aeeording to Kees van der 
Pijl (1989: 33) 'seek to eonvey the idea that a partieular aeeumulation strategy ae­
quires relevanee for the soeial order as a whole and thus beeomes a "hegemonie 
projeet".' Instead of this primarily eeonomieally grounded, rather struetural, and very 
eneompassing view, regarding the 'great narrative' of neo-liberalism as a whole as a 
hegemonie projeet, the argument of this paper assumes that 'hegemonie projeets' , 
frequently are more partieular and more eoncrete politieal initiatives presented as 
solutions of pressing social, eeonomie, and politieal problems (e.g. the 'grand bar­
gains' of eonstitutional reform such as the EMS, the Single Market, and EMU). 
Thereby, it should not be denied that most of these reeent initiatives in the European 
Union have been neo-liberal in eharaeter. However, in order to understand the proe­
ess of neo-liberal restrueturing, it seems to be useful to analyse its sueeeeding 
phases and eonerete steps - whieh are aeeompanied by very speei'fie, partly contra­
dietory motives, strategies, and effeets - more separately. 
From a Gramscian point of view, hegemonie projeets fuse many different dimensions 
of social and politieal action: material interests, strategie orientations, diseursive and 
eultural meanings, ideologieal eonvietions, affeetions ete. Nevertheless, they are not 
merely muddled together, but artieulate themselves normally in speei'fie ways. What­
ever the eonerete pattern is, if politieal projeets beeome hegemonie, they operate as 
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a 'motivating social myth' (Augelli/ Murphy 1997), Le. they engender a mode of eol­
leetive action or behaviour whieh under the speil of a politieal vision galvanises or 
fascinates large parts of the population. Originally, this idea dates back to the writ­
ings of George Sorel (1981), who himself was inspired by Henry Bergson's 'live phi­
losophy' and praised the 'general strike' as the great imaginative politieal projeet to 
overeome the deeadent bourgeois soeial order. Of course, applying the meaning of a 
'hegemonie projeet' as a 'motivating soeial myth' does not neeessarily mean remain­
ing in the eonerete theoretieal and historieal eontext of Bergson, Sorel, and Gramsei. 
For perhaps the idea behind this interpretation is more general. It refers to the point 
that politieal, partieularly 'hegemonie' projeets never rely alone on material-based 
interests and rational strategies of soeial aetors. They always involve more: mean­
ings, interpretations, forms of eulture, ideologies, subjeetive feelings, imaginations, 
passion ete. In prineipal, all these different resources of social action ean be summa­
rised under two headings: prae1:iees of diseursive interaction on the one hand and 
forms of affeetive imagination on the other hand. Depending on the eonerete eonfigu­
ration, developments in both dimensions eomplement - Le. reinforce and/or under­
mine - the forms of interest-based rational strategies. 
To avoid any misunderstanding, affeetive imaginations are not neeessarily irrational, 
but they are not neeessarily rational either. At least in the first instanee, they follow 
eompletely other eriteria. In a way, they are more or less explieitly ineluded in the 
meaning of a 'motivating social myth'. The dimension of affeetive imagination refers 
partly to deep emotions and the unexplainable dark ground of human behaviour, and 
partly it eoneerns the innovative or better: ereative potentials of social interaction. 
Whereas emotional powers such as failed reeognition, dissatisfaetion, fear, aggres­
sion, rage, soreness but also desire, aspiration, eonsent, passion, and enthusiasm 
ean largely be subdivided into either positive or negative affeetions, whieh either 
support or rejeet politieal projeets, it seems to be more diffieult to assess and eatego­
rise their ereative potentials. On a rather abstract level, it ean be maintained that 
hegemonie projeets stimulate imaginative fantasy. For groups and individuals, who 
are enehanted by hegemonie projeets, are more or less willing to develop or at least 
to aeeept new ideas, new perspeetives, new ways of thinking, ete. 
This ereative potential is eertainly stimulated by the dimension of diseursive i nteraetion , 
sinee discourses as eognitive filters of meaningful eommunieation generate and form 
new ideas, thoughts, politieal eoneepts ete. However, it is more important that diseur­
sive interaction as a moment of politieal projeets operates as an essential resouree to 
stabilise or to transform the 'hegemonie' and 'historie bloe'. Even without providing a 
'great narrative' - religious redemption, enlightenment and soeial progress, politieal 
emaneipation ete. - discourses express and determine the meaning and eontent of 
soeial interaction and politieal deeision-making. The eonerete meanings and contents 
are by no means soeially unbounded. They are always eonneeted - more or less di­
reetly - to the interests of partieular soeial and politieal forces. If these forees are able 
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to present those discourses, whieh are representing their speeifie interests, in a way 
that they beeome aeeepted as the 'general interest', they ean be regarded as 
hegemonie. However, this understanding of hegemony is not only eonfined to the abil­
ity to generalise a speeifie world view and eoneeption. As the early Laelau (1977: 161) 
points out, it refers as mueh 'to the extent that it (a elass or class fraetion) ean artieulate 
different visions of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neu­
tralised.' 
With respeet to politiea.1 projeets, all these different resourees and dimensions out­
lined above - interest-based rational strategies, praetiees of diseursive interaction, 
and forms of affeetive imagination - do matter. In general, hegemonie projeets as a 
motivating soeial myth are eharaeterised by a eongenial interplay of all three. How­
ever, the soeial and politieal effeets of hegemonie projeets vary eonsiderably. This is 
not only due to their speeifie eontents, but also due to soeial and politieal struggles as 
weil as their course of development. Usually, several succeeding steps or phases 
ean be distinguished: initiative, agenda-setting, politieal deeision-making, generation 
of publie support, and struetural adjustments by implementation. Whereas most of 
the time the initiative is taken by only a small group of intelleetuals, politieians, and/or 
business people, the proeess of agenda-setting requires the involvement of other 
interests and the broadening of support. Nevertheless, as long as the politieal deei­
sion is not made, the forming of allianees at least insofar as European projeets with 
far-reaehing eonsequenees are eoneerned - is largely eonfined to an elite of politi­
eians and some powerful organised interests. Only after they agreed on further steps 
in the proeess of a 'new eonstitutionalism', was the nationally fragmented European 
publie involved. During the reeent deeade the publie has beeome more seeptieal and 
eritieal of European projeets; due to the fact that neo-liberal and monetarist reason­
ing intensified, large parts of the population feel more and more the diseiplinary ef­
feets of neo-liberal restrueturing (van der Pijl 1998: 43-49). However, for the time 
being, most reaetions - protest voting, demonstrations, strikes ete. - are highly emo­
tional and primarily defensive. 
3. Projects of neo-liberal restructuring 
In the fOllowing, these theoretieal refleetions should be diseussed in more detail by 
referring to the eonerete projeets and developments in the reeent history of European 
integration. Before doing this, however, two aspeets of the argument presented so 
far should be summarised: First, 'hegemonie projeets' are not only part (corner 
stones) of a proeess of social restrueturing, moreover, they are elements of a strat­
egy of 'transformismo', Le. of social and eeonomie reform 'from above' in order to eo­
opt large parts of the population by providing allegedly attraetive solutions for press­
ing eeonomie and soeial problems. This 'top down' style of governanee is even 
reinforeed on the European level, sinee at this site all sueeessful initiatives have 
38 

been taken and pushed forward by a very small circle of economic and political 
elites. A second aspect worth mentioning is the way the different resources - inter­
est-based rational strategies, practices of discursive interaction, and forms of affec­
tive imagination articulate themselves. The mode of articulation indicates the spe­
cific character of the individual projects. In analysing their internal coherence and/or 
their contradictory potential it seems to be possible to ascertain more precisely the 
prospects of a further - more or less dynamic - reproduction or crisis of the 
'hegemonic' and 'historical bloc'. In doing this, this paper still tries to answer some 
very general neo-Gramscian questions: what kind of hegemonic structures prevail, 
how are they organised and reproduced through political projects enforced, sup­
ported or tolerated by particular social and political forces, and how are the internal 
contradictions of the recent period of neo-liberal restructuring in the European Union 
to be understood? 
For this purpose we will look more closely at the main European projects of the past 
two decades (see also table 1 at the end of this chapter). We proceed from the as­
sumption that the generalisation and reproduction of neo-liberal hegemony in West­
ern Europe was mediated above all by the EMS, the Single Market program and the 
EMU (Röttger 1997). All these projects involved not only a particular interaction of 
rational strategies, discourses, and affective imaginations, but also a specific combi­
nation of permissive, consensual, and coercive elements. The coercive elements are 
primarily aimed at an improved global competitiveness of European economies. As 
cornerstones of a conditioning framework they set up two underlying logics of Euro­
pean integration, which enforce more or less explicitly neo-liberal strategies of ad­
justment: whereas the logic of 'competitive deregulation', induced by more deregu­
lated and flexible markets for goods, capital, services (and the workforce), is due to 
the program of the Single Market, the logic of 'competitive austerity', by which gov­
ernments and central banks are obligated to pursue monetarist policies (Le. accept­
ing the primacy of monetary stability and budget discipline), was established by the 
EMS and the EMU. 
3.1. Preparing the European Agenda 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early seventies and the growing 
importance of the financial sphere in the following period marked a structural change 
in the global and national reproduction of socio-economic and political relations 
(Helleiner 1994). One striking feature is the new primacy of financial capital in rela­
tion to productive capital, and the supremacy of both over labour and solidaristic na­
tional governments. This can be observed not only in terms of profit and income dis­
tribution (Holman/ van der Pijl 1996), but also in terms of the redefinition of political 
priorities. Neo-liberal and monetarist objectives came to the fore and exerted in­
creasing pressure on the national modes of regulation, above all on the Keynesian 
welfare state. Ideologically, this process was reinforced by the 'neo-liberal counter­
39 

revolution', which was prepared and pushed by a range of important (Anglo-Saxon) 
think tanks (Plehwe/ Walpen 1999; Cockett 1995), proclaiming to liberate market 
forces from regulative interventions and restrictions. The core ideas of these think 
tanks - less state intervention, supply-side economics, politics of austerity etc. ­
formed the intellectual basis for a process of social roll-back in Europe. First, in the 
late seventies and early eighties, the adoption of neo-conservative and neo-liberal 
approaches, heavily supported by transnational fractions of capital, was not con­
certed European but primarily national. The Thatcher government was the first in 
Europe to set a neo-liberal program - very fast and in a very radical manner - on the 
political agenda. However, since the mid seventies even the countries of continental 
Europe gradually introduced so me key elements of neo-liberal politics (Ziebura 1997: 
271). 
Despite these signs of modest reorientation, at the end of the seventies Europe suf­
fered from a virtual stand still of the integration process. Although the acquis com­
munautaire was not questioned, European integration entered aperiod of 'Euroscle­
rosis'. Diverse attempts to accelerate the process of political integration and to 
extend the supranational elements failed (e.g. Werner-plan, agreement on economic 
convergence, more ambitious social policy initiatives) due to a crisis-prone world 
economy and a genera.l re-nationalisation of politics, e.g. of economic and foreign 
trade policy. Additionally, these tendencies were even reinforced by the insight that 
the EC's regulating capacities and financial resources were far from being sufficient 
to react effectively to the economic crisis (Ambrosius 1996: 123). 80th elements ­
the lack of an attractive integration project and the increased political salience of 
neo-liberal ideas already translated into action in several nation states - prepared 
the ground and offered the chance to launch a neo-liberal project on the European 
level. 
Although the European Monetary System (EMS) seems to represent a rather techni­
cal measure, it played a key role in the beginnings of neo-liberal restructuring of 
European integration. Generally, with the end of the Cold War, which was in the off­
ing, and the decline of American economic and financial dominance, the question 
about the future role of Europe became more urgent. Nevertheless, the reason for a 
common European exchange system was more concrete and defensive: the break­
down of the 8retton Woods system caused the risk of high volatility rates and un­
dermined the calculation base for transnationally oriented corporations. This applied 
especially to the German export industry, but also to the other European economies 
suffering 'from fluctuating currency exchange. Hence, the common aim was to create 
reliable and less vulnerable intra exchange relations and to stern the dependency of 
the European export trade from the fluctuating D-mark/dollar relation. Moreover, the 
French government hoped to import the German 'stability culture' and simultaneously 
to gain some influence on monetary policy in Europe. However, the following period 
showed that the Franco-German compromise was asymmetric because the German 
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Central Bank, which strongly supported the creation of the EMS, could foster its 
dominance in European exchange relations. 
Besides these attempts to stabilise European export, the EMS worked as a mecha­
nism which generalised politics of austerity in Western Europe. Via EMS the interna­
tional capital market gained disciplining and even sanctioning power on the political 
orientations of national governments. In other words, the implementation of the 
European Monetary System stimulated a neo-liberal discourse which most of the 
governments inspired to pursue a politics of deregulation and privatisation. France 
realized in the early eighties that the scope for political action was already very con­
stricted. The demand-side politics of the left wing government - deficit spending, a 
reduction of working hours, wage increases, and a steady devaluation of the franc­
was contradictory to the neo-liberal framework executed by the EMS. Because he 
wanted the franc to remain in the EMS, Mitterand 'finally had to bury the strategy of 
'Keynesianism in one country', and the 'toughest nut' (HoweIl 1992) for the imple­
mentation of neo-liberal elements was cracked. 
In retrospect, on the one hand, the EMS could be seen as the starting point for 
European monetarist restructuring, as it has broken up traditional institutional struc­
tures, forced the member countries to accept budget discipline and tight money effi­
ciency and last but not least revitalised Franco-German co-operation, which was 
considered as the power-tandem for further steps of European integration. On the 
other hand, the EMS did not give yet the integration process a decisive push. It was 
regarded primarily as a technical matter, and not as a project demanding additional 
political initiatives. In other words, the EMS was not considered as an attractive pro­
ject which could get rid of its administrative character. It provoked no debates on the 
future of Western Europe. In this sense it remained in the realm of an academic or 
expert discourse. Despite the agreement on monetary co-operation the population in 
general remained indifferent towards European issues. 
3.2. Euphorie neo-liberalism 
This changed with the next step of neo-liberal restructuring and the implementation 
of the Single Market in the mid-eighties. At the beginning of the eighties, the 'internal' 
crisis of the European economies have not yet been overcome. The adjustment 
pressures executed by the transformation of the world economy cherished protec­
tionist and disintegrative tendencies within the European Community. As a result of 
the world economic crisis from 1979-82 economic restructuring seemed to be more 
urgent than ever. Since the productivity gap' widened between the EC on the one 
hand and the United States and Japan on the other, a vast deregulation prograrnme 
on the European level was considered as an indispensable prerequisite to withstand 
intensified global competition (Sandholtz/ Zysman 1989). 
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Without doubt the Single Market project represents the primacy of economic issues 
in the process of European integration. The completion of the Common Market by 
abolishing non-tariff - technical, administrative, and political - trade barriers fostered 
intra-European competition, facilitated the market access for transnational corpora­
tions, and led to a strong base for the development of the European economy in the 
nineties. Under the common aim of an improved competitiveness, the Single Market 
was backed by a broad coalition of national and supranational actors. It was above 
alt the export-oriented capital fraction, parl:icularly transnational business corpora­
tions, which not only supported the project but also strongly influenced via the Euro­
pean Round Table of Industrialists the shape of the Single Market program (Doherty/ 
Hoedemann 1997; Cowles 1995). At the same time, the European Commission 
performed and developed its role as a policy maker. It was above alt the Commis­
sioner for industrial policy, Etienne Davignon, and the president of the EU Commis­
sion, Jacques Delors, who created strong discursive and ideological ties between 
transnational big business, the Commission, and national governments. However, it 
was only successful since the Single Market program was in tune with the moderni­
sation discourse in the member states, where in the meantime governments turned 
towards neo-liberal principles of policy-making. 
The key topic of the national and European discourse of modernisation was 'com­
petitiveness' which meant in the end a strategie priority to economic integration by 
means of deregulating national markets. An expression of these efforts were the fa­
mous four liberties, Le. of capital, commodities, services and workforce, as they are 
written down in the Single European Act. Instead of positive integration', Le. the su­
pranational harmonisation of the diverse norms and institutions, 'negative integration' 
became the dominant principle of the integration modus. It describes the abolish­
ment or mutual recognition of existing national norms and standards, and by this it 
stimulates the market driven competition between the different national regimes of 
political regulation. In this sense the Single Market program provided an agenda for 
several nation states to complete their industrial, economical and social modern isa­
tion by referring to European commitments. 
The turn towards European integration was a.lso stirred up by a very optimistic prog­
nosis about the effects of the Single Market. The Cecchini-report, which was pub­
lished in 1987, proclaimed that a so-called IIdemand-shockll would lead to welfare 
gains of up to 6.4 percent, a relief of the public budgets of about two percent, and 1.8 
million more jobs for the short term. In the longer run it expected five million jobs and 
economic growth of about seven percent (Cecchini 1988). Like the EMS the Single 
Market was a project, legitimised first and foremost by economic success. And in 
fact, due to the boom during the second half of the eighties, economic growth and an 
increase in job creation covered the negative sides of the neo-liberal strategy to 
improve competitiveness: Le. via labour markets flexibility in favour of capital interest, 
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accelerated rationalisation, and a gradual dismantling of the welfare state (e.g. the 
reduction of unemployment benefits). 
In this sense the Single Market was the culmination of a functional top down adjust­
ment, which was legitimised not by an ex ante (active) consensus but by the 'good 
performance of the task' (Mitrany 1975). In other words, functionalist projects are 
(passively) legitimised by the success and efficient work of the bureauerats and not 
by democratic debate or even approval. This permissive consensus' on further inte­
gration between elites and population could be maintained as long as the projects 
bring about advantages or - in more defensive terms - do not harm directly the so­
cial and material status of wider parts of the population. The Single Market consoli­
dated this consensus to a degree, since it was accompanied by flan king policies. It 
was expected that the deregulation project would give a signal to set off to further 
integration. At least in the medium term the Single market should lead to a 'spill-over' 
on other policies concerning employment, technology, and monetary issues en­
hancing political and social integration. 
Although more ambitious social expectations proved to be false, the attractiveness of 
the '1992'-project was very strong. It worked as a double myth: With respect to global 
competition it suggested 'a more dynamic, forward-Iooking pan-European political 
and economic identity in the next millennium, implying that the twenty-first century 
will be the European century, rather than the "Pacific century".' (Gill 1992: 164). And 
with respect to internal reorganisation of socio-economic structures, it suggested a 
very convincingly presented chance to overcome the problems of sluggish economic 
growth and persistent unemployment. Obviously, it had some impact on the relation­
ship between national identity and Europeanisation. In France, for example, since 
1984 the interest-driven change of preferences about the European order lead to a 
Europeanisation of the French identity. At that time it was widely accepted among 
economic and political elites that in the long run the Single Market would contribute 
to a common European identity by establishing a distinctive European social model 
differing from the social models of the United States and Japan (Morin 1987). 
3.3. Adjustment discourse and politicisation of European integra­
tion 
The next step of neo-liberal restructuring, the EMU, was still prepared in the mael­
strom of the 'Europhorie' in the second half of the eighties. It gained momentum 
when the German reunification provoked political as weil as economic/monetarist 
challenges for the hegemonie structure of the European Union. The fragile 'balance 
of the imbalance' between France and Germany, which was based on the 'bomb and 
the D-Mark' (Moisi 1988), was strongly disturbed by the geopolitical change. In view 
of the fading importance of their security aspects, France and the United Kingdom 
feared that in the long run their status in Europe would diminish and Germany would 
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achieve more economic and even political power. Furthermore J the tight monetary 
politics of the German Central Bank after the reunification showed clearly that it be­
came more and more iIIusory that the EMS would be able to establish common con­
trol over monetary policy in Europe. Despite strong economic downswings in the 
neighbour countries, caused by a sterilisation of internal demand through high inter­
est rates, the German Central Bank pursued a strict monetarist strategy. 
Against the background of this configuration it is no surprise that in the course of the 
raUfication process competing rationalities became apparent. Beneath the common 
aim of reduced transaction costs of intra European trade, national governments 
linked different, sometimes contradictory aims with the EMU. On the one hand, it had 
the general purpose of integrating a geographically, economically, and politically 
united Germany more closely into European structures. Especially the Latin coun­
tries wanted to attain more influence on monetary politics by replacing the German 
dictate through a common policy executed by the European Central Bank. On the 
other hand Germany and, more specifically, the Central Bank were very reserved 
towards apremature monetary Union. Since the German government could not block 
the political decision, it sought to accommodate it to monetarist principles expressed 
in the convergence criteria, and thus finally intensified monetary discipline. 
In this context, neo-liberal forces still tried to depoliticise the EMU, Le. to manage it 
technocratically. For obviously, the EMU project did not provide any new sources of 
legitimacy. On the contrary, it accelerated the shift towards a more disciplinary neo­
liberalism. The coercive dimensions were strengthened by institutionalising mone­
tarist principles on the European level (treaty agreements, convergence criteria, sta­
bility pact). The EMU insulated the pressures for fiscal consolidation from democratic 
accountability, whereas the consensual dimensions - dominant during the imple­
mentation of the Single Market - were no Ionger sufficient to ensure allegiance and 
sustain neo-liberal hegemony. One consequence of this 'new constitutionalism' was 
a strengthened technocratic discourse ignoring or suppressing its social and political 
implications. However, the different rationalities and the more coercive character of 
neo-liberal hegemony already expressed the fading legitimacy of the neo-liberal dis­
course. In the early nineties, since tlle start of recession and rising unemployment, 
the attractiveness of further monetary integration decreased. In the face of social cut 
backs, unemployment and disintegrated societies the contradictory combination of 
economic integration and monetary dogmatism on the one hand and the attempt to 
absorb the social fragmentation on the national level on the other hand became 
more and more apparent. Unlike the Single Market project the EMU was not con­
sidered to contribute to a solution for the urgent problems. On the contrary: It was 
experienced even as an acceleration of the monetarist logic, which annuls the re­
maining - but alreadyvery constricted - scope for political action in the member 
states. Growing fear of severe economic crisis and an integration project which was 
hardly communicable because of its obviously devastating social consequences set 
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an end to the euphorie phase of European integration. The ratification problems in 
France and Denmark (followed by the 'NO' in Norway and Switzerland) represented 
the prelude of an incessant legitimacy crisis ('Post-Maastricht-Crisis') (Deppe/Felder 
1993). 
The legitimacy problem comprises several dimensions. Among these are the lack of 
transpa.rency and the nature of the Union's governance structure, the crisis of repre­
sentation, the weakness of politics and the absence of any European identity. e.g. 
shared values, history and culture (Obradovic 1996). However, the most salient fact 
throughout that period was the rise of unemployment and the fragmentation of soci­
ety, both undermining passive pro-European attitudes. Thus the crisis of identifica­
tion and representation was not limited to the European level. It includes also those 
national governments, which have been responsible for initiating and carrying 
through the measures of neo-liberal adjustment. For the privatisation of public ser­
vices, expenditure cuts in the realm of education and the general dismantling of the 
welfare state beg an to threat even the more privileged strata of the wage-earners. 
Also in Europe, a diffuse 'fear of falling' (Ehrenreich 1994) haunted large parts of the 
middle class, whose concerns were closely linked with the direction of European in­
tegration. Next to the general fear of 'social dumping' they did not accept the tough 
austerity measures to fulfil the convergence criteria and the stability pact. In 1995/96 
this still rather diffuse discontent was expressed in the strikes in France, where left 
wing intellectuals interfered in the basic questions about 'whose Europe' and thereby 
called into question the relationship between politics and economy (Bourdieu 1997). 
In this context, it seemed that the functionalist 'permissive consensus' dissolved. 
Since the integration process became politicised by social forces critical of the neo­
liberal projects, the affective dimension of European integration became more im­
portant. 
4. The current European configuration 
As noted above, we have identified interest-based rational strategies, practices of 
discursive interaction, and forms of affective imagination as the main components of 
political projects of European integration. At the end of the nineties it became appar­
ent that there are a range of tensions between the different components, Le. within 
the political projects. Whereas the content of discursive interaction - even if some­
times complemented or modified by communitarian ideas (Bieling 1998) - becomes 
more and more neo-liberal, large parts of the population, particularly members of the 
working class are less willing to accept the social consequences of neo-liberal re­
structuring. The impact of the interest-based rational strategies seems to be less 
clear and appealing than before. In the early nineties the loss of diffuse consent be­
came evident up to the point of open discontent and a manifest crisis of legitimacy. 
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For a long while in the past, legitimacy and the consensual elements of neo-liberal 
hegemony have been founded on the expected benefits of economic success: 
'Functionalism's construction of the future as a rational timeless extension of the 
present is coupled to avision of politics as technical efficiency. This has, of course, 
long been part of the economic aspect of functionalism in the EU: experts are by 
their very nature most suited to address questions of the market and as efficiency of 
economic integration is undisputed, there is no reason to draw representation politics 
into its regulation nor to expect legitimacy problems to occur.' (Hansen/Williams 
1999: 244). During the past decade, however, the functionalist 'discourse of depoliti­
cising' - the Monnet-method - has been called into question repeatedly (Patomäki 
1997). It is in particular the neo-liberal overstretch of the utilitarian and productivist 
narrative of European integration which produces internal disruptions. Of course, 
these disruptions are due to many causes. One of them might be the well-founded 
feeling by large parts of the population that they are bearing the cost of economic 
modernisation and adjustment while simultaneously being excluded from (suprana­
tional) decision-making. Another reason might be that the traditional arrangements 
(consent on stability, modernisation, adjustment) are weakened, because Europe 
became a contested issue of domestic debates dominated by contradictory attitudes 
of different social forces. Obviously, there are not only competing national, but also 
competing social interests in the process of European integration; and since the EU 
does not provide adequate resources, means, and strategies for satisfying the social 
needs of its population, it will remain under public criticism a.nd pressure in the years 
to come. To sum it up, in view of its internal economic, social, and institutional ­
problems, the EU seems hardly prepared to meet the 'new challenges' of the next 
decade. 
Despite varying political assessments, most observers and commentators largely 
agree on this point. On the one hand, they stress that some fundamental reforms are 
required to overcome the crisis of legitimacy, e.g. institutional reforms, new criteria 
and modes of financial redistribution (particularly in the area of regional and agricul­
tural policy), a remarkable reduction of unemployment etc. On the other hand there is 
a common view of those objectives representing the most pressing challenges for 
the EU: above a.1I the successful completion of the EMU, the definition of the new 
role of uni'fied Germany, and the process of eastward enlargement (Anderson 1997). 
However, aside from this general, rather superficial agreement about the difficulties 
in the process of European integration, most scientific analysis, inclusive of its politi­
cal recommendations, remain very restrained. In a way, they plea for some minor 
(technical, regulative, and communicative) adjustments without really combating the 
causes of current difficulties, which seem to be rooted primarily in the socio-eco­
nomic constitution of the EU, inclusive of its institutional framework and the underly­
ing power relations. In other words: since most political and scientific observers 
forego a more profound investigation and questioning of the criteria and the charac­
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ter of the integration process, they demonstrate clearly a lack of radical thinking. This 
would presuppose acknowledging that in view of the 'new challenges' , the EU needs 
a political project, which leads not merely to more flexibility of European institutions 
of multi-Ievel-governance, but first of all to changes of its inherent disciplinary mode 
of neo-liberal restructuring. 
At the moment, however, political and economic elites in the national and transna­
tional arena are neither willing to change the socio-economic course of European 
integration nor da they have a new political project at their disposal. They provide 110 
convincing vision which bundles up competing social and national interests. The 
proposition to reinforce the centralisation of political competencies by simultaneously 
allowing for greater flexibility (Moravcsik 1998) is not sufficient at all, since it repre­
sents at best a technocratic answer but no 'motivating social myth'. Obviously, it 
does not fill those parts of the population with enthusiasm who demand a changed 
European agenda for more welfare, social justice, and democratic participation. 
These issues become increasingly important as with economic and political restruc­
turing more and more people actually loose or fear to loose their job or social status. 
Besides, the social, occupational, and spatial or regional concentration of particular 
loser groups creates new conditions of protest and resistance against neo-liberal 
measures, in particular, if it induces a snow-ball-effect as happened with the protest 
wave in the rTlid-nineties. Hitherto, however, the concrete results of these protests 
can be described as insufficient, since even the electoral success of Social Demo­
cratic parties in the EU implies no real change of political strategies, neither on the 
national nor on the European level. Ta put it another way: despite persistent or even 
swelling socio-economic problems and sporadic political protest, the guiding principle 
of the current stage of European integration is not to change but to consolidate the 
neo-liberal configuration. 
From the angle of economic and political elites, the consolidation of the neo-liberal 
socio-economic order is of course a very urgent task. They regard this intention not 
onlyas an inevitable precondition for the eastward enlargement, but also as a nec­
essary step for the further adjustment or even dismantling of national welfare states. 
Thus, one might be tempted to object that all measures of consolidation represent 
parts of a wider political project, which aims to improve the very basic conditions ­
the institutional, regulative, and political infrastructure - for the sake of further social 
and economic success in the near future. Nevertheless, even if the current period is 
oriented towards a model which tries to consolidate the EU by stimulating a 'compe­
tition oriented modernisation of economic structures, social relations and institutional 
regulations', it provides no new political project in the sense of a 'motivating social 
myth'. In order to manage the coming challenges, the consolidation strategy is nei­
ther sufficient nor convincing. In relying primarily on the imperatives of economic 
power relations and the operation of market dynamics it gives at best unreliable, 
highly controversial, and technocratic answers as e.g. the stability pact and the 
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agenda 2000. Against the background of an aggravated socio-economic situation 
and deepened social tensions the lack of a new attractive project means that Euro­
pean issues - above all, if questions of redistribution are involved - become poten­
tially more contested, within European societies as weil as between the member 
states. 
In principle, the potentially increasing social contest and intergovernmental conflict is 
of course both, stimulated and balanced within the European multi-level system. On 
the one hand, the socio-economic constitution of the EU compels governments and 
other political actors to comply with the dynamics of 'competitive deregulation' and 
'competitive austerity' and thereby to accept intensified socio-economic problems. 
Despite some minor modifications of the EU-treaty - e.g. introduction of majority 
voting in the area of social policy, a new chapter on employment policy - it is likely 
that such tendencies will intensify. On the other hand, political decision-makers are 
increasingly aware of - at least after the so-called 'Post-Maastricht-Crisis' - that they 
cannot follow this path of European integration anymore without stabilising European 
societies. Hence, on the supranational and on the nationa.l level they try to stimulate 
a new politica/ cu/ture of consensus and co-operation by involving the so-ca lied so­
cial partners, Le. employer organisations and trade unions (D0lvik 1999; Falkner 
1998). It remains to be seen whether this attempt to improve and broaden public 
consent will be successful. There is some reason to believe that this largely symbolic 
form of co-operative decision making is not suf'ficient, perhaps even not durable. On 
the one hand it concerns only those areas which are at best of secondary impor­
tance, e.g. working place regulation and labour market policies. As the treaty agree­
ment lays down, the more fundamental issues of economic and monetary policy are 
still insulated from corporatist influence and democratic contro!. In being primarily 
symbolic in character, the new (supranational) type of corporatist structures varies 
considerably from the old ones: as already mentioned, it is not only restricted to 
some minor topics. Furthermore, the new corporatist elements emerge in a com­
pletely changed socio-economic environment with a less interventionist state. This is 
particularly the case with respect to the European level. In comparison to the old 
(national) forms of corporatist policy-making, it takes place in a very different institu­
tional and organisational framework. The federal organisations of capital and labour 
(UNICE and the ETUC) are fairly weak, and due to the distribution of competencies 
and resources the EU Commission as the involved state-like European institution 
has not much to offer to promote for more far-reaching and binding compromises. 
As recent developments show, the disciplinary neo-liberal content of European con­
stitutionalism is not only accompanied by symbolic corporatist elements of the su­
pranational level, but also by the emergence or redefinition of corporatist structures 
within individual member states (Rhodes 1998; Schmitter/ Grote 1997). Instead of 
improving social cohesion the new 'competitive corporatism' primarily improves the 
competitiveness of the economy by meeting the conditions of the neo-liberal Euro­
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pean agenda in a socially co-operative way. One clear expression of this tendency 
towards a 'competitive corporatism' are the 'new social pacts' in a range of EU mem­
ber states. As Anke Hassel (1998) explains, these pacts address first of all three 
objectives: 'first, with respect to collective bargaining they imply wage restraint and 
wage flexibility, second, with respect to labour market policy they are concerned with 
an improved employability of the national workforce by restricting social entitlements 
and promoting more flexible employment regulations; and third, with respect to the 
reform of social welfare they intend to relieve the burden of employers by reducing 
their contributions to social insurance. All in a.1I, these objectives should contribute to 
the reduction of public debt and budget deficits, what is seen as a precondition of a 
stable European currency. 
In a way, these 'new social pacts' may operate as a motivating myth on the national 
level. The listed objectives may produce broad public support and affective imagina­
tion, since they claim to provide a pragmatic way to reduce unemployment by simul­
taneously improving the nationa.l infrastructure and the quality of the labour force. 
However, even if the 'new social pacts' are relatively successful - as in Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and in Denmark - there remains some serious doubt that they contri­
bute to a consolidation of the European configuration. For on the one hand, 'new 
social pacts' are political projects which are primarily national in character. It is above 
all the national element, e.g. the pride in the national skill and efficiency, which gen­
erates additional public support and legitimacy. This might include that the 'competi­
tive corporatism' in the long term undermines common European objectives. One the 
other hand, as all political projects the 'new social pacts' have a particularly short 
half-life period. They are rather defensive and imply no change in the general Euro­
pean configuration. Moreover, they provide no solution to a lot of problems concern­
ing social security, and as a beggar-my-neighbour approach they produce their own 
consequential problems. 
5. The prospects of alternative projects 
Currently several member states try to consolidate the mode of neoliberal restruc­
turing by establishing a new 'competitive corporatism' on the national level. Never­
theless, since the mid-nineties we can observe increasing resistance against the 
character, content, and direction of European integration. The concerted politics of 
austerity in Europe on the one hand and the national bla.me deflection on the other 
lead step by step to a common awareness that the present European policy is re­
sponsible for 'further social cuts and increasing fragmentation of European societies_ 
In other words: in referring to the requirements of the EMU the governments of al­
most all countries in western Europe dismantled those institutions which were re­
sponsible for a certain degree of social coherence: i.e. social security systems, public 
services, education, etc. European integration is now a major theme of domestic 
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political debates and closely linked with the prospects of social development in the 
member countries. This letat d'esprit' is also expressed in most public protests and 
conflicts during the past few years. Besides the (European) marches of the unem­
ployed in 1997 and the struggle of German trade unions for the continuity of pay­
ments in case of iIIness, the protest waves in France 1995/96 are good examples for 
an extended focus of class struggles: while the conflicts in the branches about earn­
ings, pensions, and dismissals represent the core of the strikes, the protest marches 
for public services and social care stimulated resistance within wider areas of soci­
ety. Participants in this movement understood themselves not only as lemployeesl 
but also as 'citoyens' who under conditions of generalised insecurity fight for mini­
mum social guarantees provided by public agencies (Groux 1997; van der Pijl 1998: 
31-49). 
This rather diffuse - resistance to the 'neoliberal invasion' (Bourdieu) executed by 
the integration process was accompanied by an intense debate among critical intel­
lectuals (economists, journalists, sociologists, etc.) on how to combat the problems 
of mass unemployment and social fragmentation in European societies. In contrast 
to former discussions in the eighties when there was - above all in France - a clear­
cut distinction between the defenders of national integrity and the advocates for 
(passive) adjustment to supranational constraints, the current debates refer to a 
range of different proposals and projects for a socially responsible Europe. All critical 
interventions stress the need to put the economy back in service of society. More 
concrete: the priority of financial, economic, and social politics should be the struggle 
against unemployment without relapsing into nationalistic patterns of political action. 
Apart from these common objectives the particular projects differ in terms of the re­
lationship between the national and supranational level, the influence on current de­
bates, and the utopian content. The different proposals reach from common meas­
ures to launch an economic boost up to a break with the stability handicaps and the 
creation of a European Welfare State. In this sense we can currently distinguish 
grosso modo three alternative projects: 
1. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu - since the strikes of 1995/96 an important 
intellectual advocate of social achievements in continental Europe - considers a 
European Welf are State as the only possibility to avoid both a Itrue nationalism and a 
false internationalism which is only the mask of a veritable imperialism' (Bourdieu 
1996: 178). From this point of view a renewed political definition of Europe has to be 
developed in four central fields concerning the future of the welfare state, transna­
tional trade unionism, the harmonisation of the education and training systems as 
weil as the relationship between economic and social policy (Bourdieu 1998: 129). 
Bourdieu suggests a mode of gradual development - so-called (generative politics' ­
in the form of vague projects supported by intellectuals, trade unions and other pro­
gressive organisations. Eventually, this should lead to an (International of intellectu­
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als and social movements'. One of his main intentions is to rehabilitate utopian 
thinking. 'Reasoned utopianism ( ...) is undoubtedly what is most lacking in Europe 
today. The way to resist this Europe - the one that bankers' thought is trying to rail­
road us into accepting - is not to reject Europe itself from a nationalist position, as 
some do, but to mount a progressive rejection of the neoliberal Europe .... (Bourdieu 
1998,128). 
Bourdieu hardly explains a concrete strategy of his vague concept of a European 
Welfare state. His suggestions are not founded on an analyses of the political and 
structural problems which prevent a substantial supranational regulation and substi­
tution of national welfare systems. For apart from some exceptions - like the protest 
in Vilvorde - until now unions and social movements largely remain captured within 
the context of national public policies. So far they have failed to formulate so me con­
crete political objectives, which may stimulate a common European consciousness 
up to the organisation of a European social movement. His 'reasoned utopianism' 
rests in a way too abstract Le. above and beyond - even progressive - debates on 
the future of European integration. Bourdieus' intervention can therefore perhaps 
strengthen a certain general idea of social Europe. However, within the foreseeable 
future it is very unlikely that it will stimulate a powerful discourse among progressive 
social forces, and thus becomes an attractive and mobilising project forming an alli­
ance of 'social movements and intellectuals'. 
2. The current strategy of the European trade unions, which playa key role in the 
concept of Pierre Bourdieu, is less ambitious, however reflecting the huge obstacles 
to build up a coherent supranational collective bargaining system. In view of national 
institutional diversity, the traditional differences of social systems and the resistance 
of the employers to re-establish a kind of regulation on the supranational level which 
substitutes the national regulations seems to be blockaded. 
An alternative approach currently pursued by the trade unions is the so-called 'co­
ordination approach'. Instead of centralised European collective bargaining this ap­
proach stresses the transnational co-ordination of national trade union strategies. 
While the focus of political action is still on the national level, the improved co-ordi­
nation should lead to agreements on some minimum standards in order to avoid 
competitive social dumping. This concept is already part of concrete trade union 
strategies. At least in some sectional trade union committees, particularly in the 
metal industry and between trade unions of several EU countries (see for example 
the declaration of Doorn) general guidelines for national collective bargaining in 
terms of wages and working conditions are achieved (Schulten/Bispinck 1999). 
Compared with the supranational approach, the transnational co-ordination approach 
has the advantage that it is not dependent on a substantial reorganisation of collec­
tive bargaining systems. At first glance it weakens also the logic of competitive dete­
rioration of wages and working conditions between member countries and symbol­
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ises a 'first step to overcome the dichotomy between the European and national level. 
However, whereas the reasoned utopianism in the concept of Bourdieu is ha.rdly 
linked with concrete aspirations, the very pragmatic approach of the trade unions 
lacks any utopian momentum and ofters no comprehensive vision of an alternative 
European project. Still focusing on national strategies, trade unions are in a way 
outside all initiatives and struggles concerning the development of the European 
Union. Moreover they run the risk that in case of severe economic crisis the relatively 
weak institutionalised 'obligation' of transnational co-ordination erodes and the much 
stronger ideology of national competitive pacts succeeds. 
3. Therefore, in the long run, the minimum consent of the co-ordination approach can 
only be successful if it is embedded in a substantial change of the macro-economic 
European framework. Some trade unions and national governments are at least 
implicitly in favour of this. While lacking the material and political capacities to put a 
change of macro-economic conditions on the European agenda, they regard such a 
reorientation as a pre-condition to overcome pressing social problems and the 
ongoing crisis of politicallegitimacy. In short, the necessity for supranational change 
is stressed by several political and scientific advocates. Alain Lipietz (1997), for 
example, argues in favor of a European energy tax in the context of a general 
harmonisation of the main principles of the national tax systems. Furthermore, he 
makes the point that further reductions in working hours should be co-ordinated on 
the European level to avoid competitive disadvantages between the different coun­
tries. A concrete agenda transcending the neo-liberal configuration is also presented 
within a 'Memorandum of European Economists' (1997), which argues for an alter­
native macro-economic approach considering above all four dimensions: 
• 	 with respect to monetary policy, the tight criteria of monetary stability should be 
released to stimulate growth and employment; 
• 	 with respect to fiscal policy, on the one hand a tax harmonisation should prevent 
fiscal dumping and on the other hand the budget of the EU-Commission should 
be enhanced to invigorate investment, infrastructure, and employment pro­
grammes; 
• 	 with respect to labour markets, a further reduction of working hours is suggested; 
• 	 and finally with respect to welfare policy, the memorandum demands more su­
pranational regulation - minimum standards, social rights of par1:icipation etc. ­
and areversal of social redistribution, which in the past decades has been in fa­
vour of profits, interest, and high income groups; 
These proposals comprise both pragmatic elements - like the question of the con­
vergence criteria - and a utopian thinking which might be combined with discourses 
of progressive social forces, e.g. the initiatives for a reduction of working hours. 
However, the debates on an 'alternative constitutionalism' are far from being he­
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gemonic. The power of neo-libera.l principles inherent in the international economic 
configuration and the process of European integration as weil as the broad accep­
tance of the neo-liberal discourse show clearly that it is a long way from alternative 
proposals to an emerging alternative bloc of social forces. In recent decades one of 
the biggest obstacles to raising the question of 'Social Europe' was the lack of public 
awareness of its necessity. At the end of the nineties it seems that this is beginning 
to change. Once conceptualised as a matter of economic and political elites, Euro­
pean integration is now a major theme of domestic political debates. However, so far 
the discourse of an alternative macro-economic approach has not reached or in­
spired any lasting diffuse protest against neo-liberal Europe. Partly this is due to the 
fact that neoliberalism seems to be very strong in terms of discursive interaction. Yet, 
also relevant is that the alternative proposal represents itself in a technocratic way. It 
neither takes up explicitly the motives of the protest movements nor shows it how to 
democratise the EU. Such an embedding in a more corrlprehensive strategy of the 
transformation of the EU, however, might give alternative projects a more appealing 
character. 
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Table 1: Hegemonie projeets of neo-liberal restrueturing 





Break down of the Bretton Woods 
system; world economic crisis; 
uncertainties of exchange-rate­
fluctuation 
Weakness of the European economy 
in global competition with the North 
America (US) and Southeast Asia 
(Japan) 
dictate of the financial markets and the Ger­
man Bundesbank; political control of Germany 
after reunification 
rationalityl interest- Asymmetric compromise between productivity gains, improved competi­ different interests and strategies: 
based rational 
strateg i es 
France and Germany based on 
the common objective to avoid 
high volatility of currencies 
tiveness, and economic growth as a 
consequence of market deregulation 
within the EC 
a) completion of the Single Market less 
transaction costs (TNC's) 
b) influence on European monetary politics: 
breaking the dominant role of the D-Mark (F) 
c) securing a stable currency and tight mone­
tary and fiscal policies (FRG) 
d) legitimising sound budget policies 
practices of dis­
cursive interaction 
Technocratic expert discourses on 
international currency relations 
and monetary stability 
relatively consensual discourse of 
neo-liberal modernisation; modest 
dispute on the character of market 
flanking policies (market generating 
and/or market correcting) 
a) discourse of economic adjustment (top 
down) 
b) discourse of social welfare (bottom up) 
forms of affective IDisinterest, apathy, indifferenee 
imagination 
euphorie visions about the future 
of Europe; positive attitudes due 
to expeeted eeonomie and soeial 
benefits 
Diffuse diseontent and eoneerns about the 
soeial eonsequenees and the eharaeter of 







Towards a Neo-Gramscian Theory of European 
Integration -The Example of the Tax Harmonisation 
Question 
1. Transnational Historical Materialism and European Inte­
gration 
There is no comprehensive theory of European integration from the perspective of 
transnational historical materialism or 'neo-Gramscianism'. There are, as a matter of 
fact, very few comprehensive treatises on European integration from an (even 
vaguely) Marxist perspective. The debates in the early 1970s (Mandel 1968, Pou­
lantzas 1974, Galtung 1973) still produced what may be considered a comprehen­
sive Marxist textbook on European integration (Deppe 1975). The relaunch of Euro­
pean integration in the mid-1980s with the Single European Act revived a 'critical' 
interest (e.g. Grahlffeague 1990). 
From a broadly conceived 'neo-Gramscian' perspective, countless contributions to an 
understanding of European integration in the 1980s and 1990s have appeared in the 
form of articles and conference papers. There have also been some excellent book­
length studies (e.g. van Apeldoorn 1999, Bieler 1999, Holman 1996, Röttger 1997). 
These however are, notwithstanding their great merits, still only partial studies which 
make no claims to present a comprehensive 'critical' theory of European integration. 
This state of affairs, this lack of an attempt to break the monopoly of neo-realist and 
institutionalist approaches on the textbook market, is the more remarkable and in­
deed deplorable if one realises that the study of European integration in fact has 
stood at the cradle of (at least one core strand of) transnational historical material­
ism, na.mely the 'Amsterdam' school (cf. van der Pijl 1978, 1989), and remained a 
central element in other works of this group as weil (e.g. van der Pijl 1984, Overbeek 
1990, Holman 1996, van Apeldoorn 1999). 
The present conference challenges us to take stock of the state of affairs and to re­
examine our understanding in light of the most recent developments in the process 
of European integration. Which problems does our approach have, how valid still are 
its core propositions, how can they be reformulated to deepen our understanding of 
the present stage of European integration? It is the objective of this paper to raise 
some of these questions, and to attempt to suggest answers on the basis of a case 
study of an issue which recently moved to the top of the political agenda in the EU, 
namely the issue of tax harmonisation. 
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This paper will proceed as folIows. First it will identify the key elements of the Am­
sterdam approach and survey the criticisms to which this approach has been sub­
jected (section 2). It then reviews the 'Amsterdam' account of neo-liberal restructur­
ing both at the global and at the European level (section 3). Then, we will make a 
detour and analyse the recent conflicts in the European Union over the issue of tax 
harmonisation (section 4). In this case study we are specifically concerned to see 
whether the core propositions of the 'Amsterdam approach' are still valuable in the 
analysis of contemporary developments. Finally, section 5 will atternpt, by way of 
conclusion, to draw out the implications of the previous sections for the future con­
struction of a more comprehensive critical, neo-Gramscian account of the process of 
European integration. 
2. Essentials of the Amsterdam School of Transnational 
Historical Materialism 
The Amsterdam School can be distinguished by its adherence to four key elements, 
namely historical materialism, a transnational perspective , 'neo-Gramscianism', and 
'fractionalism' . 
The first element is shared with all those approaches in political economy which situ­
ate themselves in the broadly defined Marxist tradition. A much smaller range of ap­
proaches, particularly in international political economy, subscribes to the transna­
tional and Gramscian components while others separately also use each of these 
perspectives. Finally, within 'neo-Gramscian IPE (or preferably, Transnational Histori­
cal Materialism, cf. Overbeek forthcoming) the so-called 'capital fractions approach' 
specifically distinguishes the Amsterdam tradition. We will briefly discuss each of 
these. 
2.1. Historical materialism 
The historical materialist approach consists of 
• 	 a materialist phi/osophy of history (to be found particularly in such classic texts by 
Marx and Engels as The German Ideologyand the Preface to Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy) which leads to the ontological primacy of 'social 
relations of production'; 
• 	 a rejection of the separation between subject and object which is characteristic of 
'positivist' social science and the adoption of a dialectic understanding of reality 
as adynamie totality and as a unity of opposites: in the words of Lucien Seve, 
"when the attempt to grasp the essence of things leads us invariably to contradic­
tion, it is because contradiction is the essence of things" (Seve 1975, 676 [my 
translation, HO]); 
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• 	 the method of abstraetion as outlined by Marx in the Introduction to the Grund­
risse. 
Any analysis of the world we live in must, from the standpoint of historical material­
ism, be grounded in an understanding of the way in whieh human beings have or­
ganised the produetion and reproduetion of their material life. For Marx, this is the 
meaning of 'social': the totality of all activity undertaken by human beings towards 
the (re-)produetion of their existence. 
The most explicit attempts to eonstruet a theory of the contemporary global political 
economy based on this departure point are to be found in the works of Robert Cox 
(1987), Kees van der Pijl (1984, 1998) and Mark Rupert (1995). In his study of class 
formation at the Atlantic level in the years between 1945 and 1973, building on ear­
lier work on European integration published in Dutch (van der Pijl 1978), Kees van 
der Pijl organises the analysis around the "suecessive levels of deereasing abstrae­
tion" (van der Pijl 1984, 1), Le. the labour process, the level of circulation relations 
and the level of the profit distribution process at which conerete class fraetions form. 
It is in the labour proeess where the real subordination of labour to eapital takes 
plaee, the precondition for extended capital aecumulation. Van der Pijl assigns spe­
cial importance to the shift from the production of absolute surplus value to the pro­
duetion of relative surplus value, i.e. the introduction of new management teehniques 
and production technology to improve the produetivity of labour, whieh took place in 
the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century. In van der Pijl's later 
work (most elaborately in his 1998 book) the dynamies of contemporary social rela­
tions are traeed to the eontradictions engendered by two processes, commodification 
and socialisation (or Vergesellschaftung). Commodifieation entails the incorporation 
of more and more dimensions of the lives of ever more people into "tendentially 
world-embraeing market relations" (van der Pijl 1998, 8). Socialisation is the proeess 
(driven by the division of labour and the extension of eommodification) in which indi­
vidual 'integral' labour is transformed into 'functionally differentiated specialised la­
bour and in which individuals are drawn out of closed self-sufficient kin-ordered 
communities into wider eircles of social interdependence and 'imagined' eommuni­
ties. 
2.2. Transnationalism 
Secondly, transnational historical materialism is charaeterised by the consistent treat­
ment of social relations as being constituted transnationally, Le. in a spatial domain 
which is not defined in terms of 'national boundaries'. This perspeetive is not univer­
sally shared among all strands of historical materialism, but has nevertheless become 
widespread sinee the late 1970s. 
The foundations for this transnational perspeetive are to be found in scattered frag­
ments in the work of Marx on the world market. In Marx' view, the history of capitalism 
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has been, in the Hegelian sense, the history of the dialectical process of the realisation 
of this global nature, the history of the process of the globalisation of capitalist class 
relations. Capitalist expansion from Europe partly took place through the subordination 
(not: displacement or destruction) of non-capitalist economies to the needs of capital 
accumulation in Europe. Marx recognised that trom the very beginning, the introduction 
of slavery and of the plantation system in the New World played a central role in the 
development of industrial capitalism in England: 
"Uverpool grew fat on the basis of the slave trade. This was its method of 
primitive accumulation." (Marx 1867,924). 
Not only was the rise of industry in England predicated upon the slave trade; more fun­
damentally, the break-through of capitalism as such had been conditioned by the wid­
ening of international exchanges from the end of the fifteenth century onward (Marx 
1894,450-451 ). 
The understanding of capitalism as a global system, significantly weakened under the 
impact of Stalinism, was greatly enhanced by the rise of world-systems theory (cf. 
Wallerstein 1974,'1979, 1980, 1989). The greatest promise of the world-system ap­
proach has been this recognition that capitalism and capitalist class relations were 
from their very inception located in a global context (i.e. the world-economy) and not in 
national economies.1 The dynamics of that global system are for Wallerstein to be 10­
cated in the process of the international division of labour and the resulting patterns of 
trade and productive specialisation. One of the earliest, but still most forceful, state­
ments of the basic hypothesis of the world-system approach is that by Andre Gunder 
Frank: 
"In fact, though there are state generated organizational discontinuities within 
the world capitalist system, there are in a very real and important sense no 
'national economies' at aWI (Frank 1963, 93). 
Capitalist development is thus conceptually, and has been historically, agiobai process 
of class formation since the rise and expansion of European capital in the sixteenth 
century. The bourgeoisie has tended to define itself as the universal class, and impor­
tant sections of it have, through the ages, attempted to organise themselves politically 
as a transnational class (Wallerstein 1974, 352; Cox 1987, 360). However, political 
power is organised within national states, and since the rise of industrial capital espe­
cially, classes 'tür sich' are constituted on a national level (cf. Pooley 1991). Thus, the 
Important contributions to the revival of this quintessential Mandan perspective were made in the German de­




globalisation of capital and the continued relevance of the state are one. In fact, the 
contradiction between the global and the national is the manifestation at the level of 
capitalism as a global system of the basic contradiction between the socialisation of 
productive forces and the private appropriation of surplus. If we restate the problematic 
in this manner, we put the notion of class in the centre of the analysis. This enables us 
to cut across the boundaries between state and globe: 'class' transcends the distinction 
between the national and the international The international division of labour can be 
conceived as the social network through which production relations spread and class 
formation is 'nationalised', Le. the process through which global class formation is ar­
ticulated with the processes of nation-building and state formation. Such a more dia­
lectical view of the relation between "external" and lIinternal" factors is essential for a 
better understanding of the nature of international relations. 
2.3. Neo-Gramscianism 
The Marxist debate on the politica.l articulation of class interests was long dominated 
by an instrumentalist understanding of the Communist Manifesto on the one hand (e.g. 
Miliband 1973), a.nd a structuralist one on the other (e.g. Poulantzas 1968). 80th of 
these views in their own way were rather deterministic, allowing little autonomy to the 
political and ideological spheres. The adoption of Gramsci was of crucial importance in 
overcoming this dichotomy.2 Gra.msci was concerned to rethink political strategy in light 
of the very different experiences of the Russian and the West European revolutions of 
1917-1919. It is really in the context of this project that all the concepts that have come 
to serve as keys to recognise "neo-Gramscian work" were developed (civiI society, he­
gemony, historic bloc, organic intellectuals, passive revolution, trasformismo, war of 
manoeuvre and war of position).3 In the West, the political power of the ruling class 
does not rest (exclusively or primarily) on the control of the coercive appa.ratus of the 
state, but is diffused and situated in the myriad of institutions and relationships in civil 
society. This form of class rule, hegemony, is based on consent, backed up only in the 
last instance by the coercive apparatus of the state. Ideological and moral elements 
playa crucial role in cementing the historic bloc (in Cox's words, it is 'a configuration of 
social forces upon which state power rests' [Cox 1987, 105,; also 6, 409 n. 10]) and its 
2 	 Gramsci's work was 'rediscovered' in France, particularly after 1968. In the English-speaking world the New 
Left Review published aseries of articles by Tom Nairn and Perry Anderson in 1964-1965 making use of 
Gramsci's work to reinterpret British history, but it was not until the appearance of the translation of the 
Prison Notebooks (cf. Gramsci 1971) that the wider dissemination of Gramsci's thought picked up pace 
(see also Anderson 1977). Of course it is not possible in this paper to go into the debates that the discovery 
of Gramsci has engendered, and to which Germain and Kenny (1998) refer extensively in their critical as­
sessment of the contribution of the 'new Gramscians' to international relations theory. 
3 	 The first coherent exposition of these concepts, particularly in terms of their relevance to understand inter­
national politics, can be found in Cox (1983). More extended disclJssions are Cox (1987), Augelli and Mur­
phy (1988), Gill (1990,1993) and Rupert (1995); see Tooze (1990) for a review of Augelli/Murphy and Gill. 
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hegemony in wider society (Gramsci 1971, 161, 168). Organic intellectuals of the 
dominant social groups formulate and disseminate these intellectual and moral ideas, 
transforming them into 'universal' ones which bind subordinate groups into the existing 
social order (e.g. Gramsci 1971, 181-2).4 
More than anything else, the notion of 'organic intellectuals' and their role in cementing 
and spreading the ideas of the historic bloc brings into view the importance of agency. 
It is precisely in the consideration of the strategic dimension of agency that the 'Am­
sterdam' approach differentiates itself from other neo-Gramscian approaches. 
2.4. Fractionalism 
What determines the content of the hegemonic ideology, or at least the overall strate­
gic orientation of the historic bloc of any particular period? The most systematic at­
tempt to develop an understanding of the relationship between the substance of 
hegemonic ideas and the underlying dynamics of capital accurnulation from a non-de­
terrninistic standpoint is the 'capital fractions approach'. The starting point for this 
analysis is taken 'from Volume 2 of Capital in which Marx considers the different func­
tional forms capital assumes in the circuits composing the overall reproductive circuit of 
capital: commodity capital, money capital, and productive capital. In terms of concrete 
firms, merchant houses, financial firms, and industry approximate these 'fractions re­
spectively.5 
In turn, this process of fractionation of capital shapes class fractions which share 
common orientations, interest definitions, and collective experiences providing ingredi­
ents for a coalition of interests aspiring to represent the 'general interest'. These for­
mulations of the Igeneral interest' are called comprehensive concepts of control (van 
der Pijl 1984, 1989; Overbeek 1990). Van der Pijl has defined comprehensive con­
cepts of control as folIows: 
"A concept of control represents a bid for hegemony: a project for the conduct 
of public affairs and social control that aspires to be a legitimate approxima­
tion of the general interest in the eyes of the ruling class and, at the same 
time, the majority of the population, for at least a specific period. It evolves 
through aseries of compromises in wh ich the fractional, 'special' interests are 
arbitrated and synthesized." (Van der Pij11984, 7). 
Concepts of control are constituted around two prototypes, the money capital concept 
and the productive capital concept. The latter reflects the particularities of the produc­
4 	 The focus on dominant social groups and on the mechanisms of hegemony have often led to criticisms of 
an eJitist bias in neo-Gramscian work (cf. Drainville 1994). The criticism will be addressed below. 
5 	 Cf. Van der Pij11984, 1-20; idem 1998,49-63; also Overbeek 1990, 23-29,176-181. 
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tive proeess and its social eontext. Usually those groups assert themselves most effee­
tively whose speeific group interests at a given juncture most closely correspond with 
the prevailing objective state of capital accumulation and class struggle (van der Pijl 
1984,33-4). 
Comprehensive concepts of control express the ideological structure of particular his­
torical configurations of capital, and function to organise and direct bourgeois hegem­
ony. The notion of 'concepts of control' thus provides a clue to understanding the na­
ture of the relation between structure and agency: the structure defined by the process 
of the accumulation of capital, the ageney of the conerete social forces which originate 
from the sphere of production relations and which struggle continuously over the direc­
tion of the accumulation process, over the role and nature of the state, and over the 
world order. To put it another way, concepts of control capture the strategic element in 
the construction of a historic bloc by linking the construction of politico-ideological pro­
jects in a non-reductionist manner to the structural underpinnings of the social order. 
This approach can interestingly enough be subjected to two diametrically opposite cri­
tiques. On the one ha.nd, 'fractionalism' has been equated by what one might term 
'fundamentalist' Marxists with voluntarism and pluralism.6 The other view is that frac­
tionalism is deterministic and elitist (see footnote 4). Without immediately discarding 
this critique, it is important to distinguish between two forms of 'elitism'. Elitism can be 
seen as unduly deterministic if it is assumed that elite (or ruling class, or fractional) 
thinking and behaviour shape and condition the political process, irrespec1:ive of th(3 
agency of other (subordinate) social forces. In such a case one accords, at the level of 
theory, primary explanatory power to elite rationality. Alternatively, elitism can also refer 
to a focus in empirical analysis on the agency of elites, in which case there is no nec­
essary prioritisation· of elite ageney in theoretical terms. 
In the case of the work of the 'Amsterdam school', mueh of the focus in empirical work 
on elite agency has come trom dissatisfaction with the state-centric discourse in inte­
gration theory on the one hand, and of structuralist determinism in Marxist theories 
(e.g. the work of Althusser) in the 1970s on the other. However, the major works in this 
tradition (cf. van der Pijl 1984, 1998; Holman 1996; van Apeldoorn 1999) clearly and 
unambiguously situate elite agency within the dialectic of class struggle. What remains 
is a lack of attention, at the level of empirical analysis, for the agency of subordinate 
social forces, which explains the relative incapacity of the approach to formulate 
See tor instance Peter Burnham: 'The neo-Gramscian analysis [ ...] simply ofters a pluralist analysis of 
global capitalism which overemphasises the role of ideology in economic policy and regime formation, iIIe­
gitimately invokes the dominant ideology thesis and fails to specify its implicit fractionalist theory of the 
state. " (Burnham 1991, 90-1; see also Clarke 1978 for an early critique of fractionalism). Rather than ex­
trapolating Gramsci, Burnham teils us that we must understand that "the culmination of 'scientific political 
economy' is to be found in a critical reading of the work of Man{" (Burnham 1994, 222). 
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meaningful conclusions towards the formation of a counter-hegemonic bloc (again, cf. 
Drainville 1994). 
3. Neo-Liberal Restructuring and European Integration 
European integration in the view of the 'Amsterdam School' refers not just to the pro­
cess of political integration in the form of the European Communities, but more broadly 
to the process of transnationalisation of economic, social and political processes in the 
European space. 
Patrick Ziltener (1999) distinguishes between two modes of integration. In the first one, 
which he calls the 'Monnet mode' (see also Wallace and Wallace 1996), he places the 
process of European integration in the context of what he calls keynesian-corporatist 
statehood. This mode was dominant in the period from the early 19505 to the mid-sev­
enties. It was succeeded by the 'competition-state mode', placing European integration 
in the context of the rise of the post-keynesian 'Schumpeterian workfare state' (a 
phrase first introduced by Bob Jessop). 
In fact, although not spelled out in so much explicit detail, the Amsterdam theorists 
have developed a very similar schema of European integration, where the first phases 
of the project are understood in the context of the rise of an integrated Atlantic econ­
omy with an increasingly integrated market to accommodate the transatlantic expan­
sion of corporate liberalism. US-initiated processes overdetermined these episodes of 
European integration. The foundation work here is Kees van der Pijl's study of the 
Schuman Plan, which he calls an 'American Plan for Europe' (Van der Pijl 1978). In 
these early days van der Pijl's thinking was influenced, amongst others, by the debates 
about the processes of capital interpenetration and the political implications. The ques­
'lion was poignantly put by Robin Murray who spoke of the IIterritorial non-coincidencell 
between the global reach of capital and the territoriality of the nation-state (Murray 
1971). Murray argued that the internationalisation of capital in fact eroded many of the 
func'lions that astate is supposed to fulfil in a capitalist society, providing a powerful 
stimulus to international co-operation and integration. For Mandel, thinking along simi­
lar lines, this provides the clue to understanding European integration (Mandel 1968; 
see also Galtung 1973). The European Community is seen here as an emergent fed­
eral state serving the needs of an increasingly tightly knit European monopoly capital. 
Nicos Poulantzas addressed the same issues, but approached them from a different 
angle (1974). His central thesis was that the American dominance established after 
1945 was a new form of imperialist domination in which the dominant capital had es­
tablished itself directly in the dominated economies themselves, Le. in Western 
Europe. Important sections of the European bourgeoisie had become dependent on 
American capital to such an extent that they had become support bases for American 
capital within the European political and social arena. The European bourgeoisies 
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were as it were carved up in layers, which either became appendages of American 
interests, or were increasingly marginalised because they lacked access to the tech­
nological resources monopolised by the American corporations. 
Kees van der Pijl took the debate further in his book on The Making o(an Atlantic Rul­
ing Class (1984). He analysed the rise of American hegemony at three levels: that of 
the social relations of production, that of the state and the relations between 'fractions 
of the bourgeoisie, and that of international relations. For a starting point he posited the 
thesis that after World War Two there has been a process of economic integration at 
the level of the Atlantic region. Van der Pijl partly follows Poulantzas, but criticises him 
for seeing Atlantic integration too much as a one-sided process, acknowledging the 
fractionation of European capital but viewing American capital as undifferentiated. 
Referring to research into international interlocking directorships (Fennema 1982), Van 
der Pijl argues that the process of Atlantic integration must be analysed in terms of 
transatlantic class configurations. In his view, the post-war era can be seen as a suc­
cession of periods in which specific class coalitions on both sides of the Atlantic dom i­
nated American and European politics and shaped the contours of Atlantic integration. 
Imperialist rivalry, in this view, can no longer simply be conceptualised as rivalry be­
tween states, but must be understood as the rivalry between competitive strategies of 
transnationally constituted coalitions of social forces. The process of international inte­
gration in Western Europe, primarily the origins and development of the European 
Communities, is equally understood as being subject to the dynamics of transnational 
political struggle between competing concepts of control, with the corporate-liberal 
concept being hegemonic. The process of further integration in Europe could be tem­
porarily obstructed by a coalition of political forces opposed to the corporate-liberal 
consensus (as by the French government under De Gaulle), but the process of under­
Iying structural change in the transatlantic economy continued. 
The beginnings of the second era of European integration (the transition to the 'com­
petition state mode' in Ziltener's words) can be traced back to the mid-1970s, aperiod 
of organic crisis in the post-war order. This is not the place to develop a detailed ac­
count of the factors contributing to this crisis, and the structural changes it set in motion 
(for this, see Van der Pijl 1989, Overbeek 1990, and Overbeek 1993). We must 
however shortly mention the crisis-ridden developments in the international sphere to 
contextualise the world-wide rise of neo-liberalism and the transformation of the Euro­
pean integration process. Of course one essential dimension of the crisis is the derail­
ment of the virtuous circle of Fordism and the decline of Keynesianism. But without the 
inclusion of the global dimension, important aspects of this transformation will escape 
uso In the mid-seventies it is the decline of American hegemony - highlighted by the 
monetary crisis of the years 1967-1973 which culminated in the permanent adoption of 
floating exchange rates, the Middle East war and the oil crisis, and the American de­
feat in Vietnam - wh ich sets in motion a rethinking in ruling European circles of the 
transatlantic relationship. The first tangible manifestation of this is the foundation of the 
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European Monetary System by Giscard d'Estaing and Schmidt, creating a momentum 
that by 1984 had built up to an 'extended relaunch of European integration' (cf. Holman 
1992). By the early 1980s leading European multinational corporations, organised in 
the European Roundtable of Industrialists, are able to leave a clear mark on these 
developments. Initially, the strategie orientation of the ERT was neo-mercantilist in the 
sense that their main objective was to acquire the support from stronger European in­
stitutions in their struggle with American and especially Japanese competitors. By the 
early 1990s the process of restructuring of European capital was so far advanced that 
the orientation of the ERT became outright neo-liberal. The European integration pro­
ject became primarily one of what has become known as 'open regionalism' , the com­
bination of liberalisation and deregulation in a regional context, and open to a global­
ising world economy. The institutional arrangements within the European Union are 
increasingly geared towards these goals, and the initial tendencies towards something 
akin to 'Euro-Keynesianism' under the 'first Delors presidency have all but disappeared. 
In van der Pijl's later work on integration, the concept of a Lockean 'heartland' has 
become central. This 'heartland' is characterised by a particular pattern of relations 
between the state and an emancipated and largely self-regulating civil society. The 
first Lockean state/society complex came into being in England: its essence however 
was transnational. Emigration and colonisation projected 'English' civil society across 
the seas, and the coherence of this emerging transnational civil society was ce­
mented by the rise of cosmopolitan banking families such as the Rothschilds and 
transnational elite networks such as the Round Table Society. Through this gradual 
expansion there emerged a hegemonie Icorel of the state system, or a Lockean 
Iheartlandl The infrastructure of the heartland has two crucial features: the transna­• 
tional spread of civil society, and the establishment of a single state, or a group of 
states with quasi-state structures, serving as the world's banker and providing the 
power to safeguard capitalist relations of production around the globe. This Lockean 
heartland is the sphere where comprehensive concepts of control circulate: 
"The struggle for hegemony between fractions of the bourgeoisie, through 
which the general tendency of the transnational ruling class asserts itself na­
tionally, and between different states within and outside the Lockean heart­
land, replaces the traditional forms of world politics ever more by 'global do­
mestic politics'." (van der Pij11989, 19). 
The expansion of the heartland has historically taken place in confrontation with a 
variety of 'Hobbesian' contender states where the state/society complex is based on 
mobilisation by one single dominant class. The 'Hobbesian' state/society complex is 
characterised by a 'fusion of ruling class and governing class into a single 'state class' 
which is constrained in its capacity to articulate [its] interests in the transnational 
space dominated by the Anglo-Saxon ruling class (van der Pijl 1998, 78-83). Hob­
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besian states are thus forced to a continuous catch-up drive (revolution from above) 
that mostly ends in failure, collapse, or violent defeat by the Lockean heartland. This 
defeat is followed either by gradual incorporation into the heartland (as with Germany 
after 1945) or by disintegration (as has so far been the case with the Soviet Union). 
Van der Pijl calls this incorporation 'hegemonie integration' in the context of an ana­
lysis of how the dynamics of capital accumulation, institutional developments and 
ideological processes combine to produce a truly transnational society. 
So here is a new understanding of 'European integration' as a process of the spread 
of a Lockean pattern of state/society relations in areas which were hitherto charac­
terised by a non-hegemonie or even 'Hobbesian' state/society configuration. This 
conception is useful not just for an understanding of the original European integration 
process that incorporated France and Germany into a Lockean mould. Its relevance 
has been shown by Holman (1996) for an understanding of the Mediterranean en­
largement of the European Community in the mid-1980s, and is underscored very 
vividly by the current process of the 'Eastern' enlargement of the European Union.7 
The money capital concept embodied in neo-liberalism has been victorious in Europe. 
In two distinct steps, the process of political and economic integration has been 
relaunched, first in the form of removing the legacy of obstacles to further integration 
left by the 1960s against the background of a restructuring race of European capital in 
the face of intensified global competition, then in the form of a full-scale neo-liberal of­
fensive of liberalisation, deregulation and flexibilisation (cf. HolmaniOverbeek/Ryner 
1998). If not hegemonie, neo-liberalism since the early 1990s definitely rules supreme 
in Europe, regardless of the nominal political traditions of the parties in power. The 
scope for contestation by proponents of a rival concept of control has become very 
restricted. Nevertheless, as an excursion into the politics of European tax harmonisa­
tion will make clear, European politics is still structured bya bifurcation between strate­
gie conceptions underpinned by a money capital perspective and rival conceptions 
which reflect, at least to some extent, the logic of productive capital, be it in the context 
of a thoroughly globalising world economy. 
4. The Debate on Tax Harmonisation in the EU 
This section looks in a very tentative manner at the politics of taxation in the EU. 
Early attempts to increase the co-ordination of tax policies in the EC include the 
agreement on a minimum VAT rate, and later the abolishment of tax free shopping 
Otto Holman is preparing a number of publications on the Eastern enlargement of the EU, among them a 
major study provisionally entitled Integrating Central Europe. Van der Pijl's current work focuses on the re­
surgence of strategie conflict within the West over the form of relations between the West and Russia. De­
velopments such as the war in Kosovo and other Balkan conflicts, and the struggle for control over the en­
ergy resources of the Caucasus must be seen in this Ilght. 
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as a result of the implementation of the Single Market. Another issue that has been 
on and off the table for a long time is the introduction of a common 'withholding tax' 
on interest from savings and bonds (first introduced in 1989). The issue was revived 
in 1998 and has become a serious bone of contention, which will have to be decided 
at the December 1999 summit in Helsinki. In the course of 1998, the new German 
government, and particularly the Minister of Finance Oskar Lafontaine, added the 
issue of 'unfair tax competition' to the political agenda, arguing that income tax rates 
and particularly corporate tax rates vary too widely and are used too often by gov­
ernments to lure foreign investors, thus both eroding employment and undermining 
the capacity of national governments to raise revenue. 
The politics of taxation in Europe cannot be understood in terms of inter-state bar­
gaining alone. The faultlines really run between transnationally constituted coalitions. 
These coalitions are made up of a range of actors (to a certain extent varying from 
issue to issue), from political factions to private companies, from ruling governments 
to sectoral business associations, from international organisations to global business 
forums. The recent debates in the EU regarding tax harmonisation and the imposi­
'lion of a common withholding tax on interest are ca ses in point. 
4.1. Tax Harmonisation 
The issue of harmonisa'lion of ta~ policy in the European Union, especially of (corpo­
rate) income tax, was put forcibly on the pOlitical agenda by the incoming new Ger­
man government after the summer of 1998. Harmonisation of taxation in the EU had 
been restricted to the levy of indirect taxation, primarily the value-added tax, which 
was harmonised in 1977 (Grahl and Teague 1990, 35-37). This had been followed in 
1990 by an agreement on a common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divi­
sions and transfers of shares involving companies of different member states as weil 
as to parent companies and subsidiaries of different countries. In 1992 agreement 
was reached (in the context of the cornpletion of the I nternal Market) on the estab­
lishment of a 15 % minimum VAT rate as weil as on the harmonisation of various 
excise rates, including the abolishment per 1 July 1999 of intra-EU duty free sales 
(FT 9/12/98). 
In the area of direct taxation there was growing unease during 1997 over what is 
called 'unfair tax competition', especially in the rates for corporate profits (The Econ­
omist 5/4/97). Globalisation, it is feared by many, undermines the capacity of the 
state to raise taxes and induces tax competition.8 Those concerned with the negative 
effects of tax competition, such as former German Finance Minister Oskar Lafon­
taine, point to the reduction in the state's capacity to raise revenue and in the conse-




quent shift in tax burden from mobile to fixed assets, from capital to labour and from 
high incomes to low incomes. According to data from the European Commission, the 
share in the total tax take of taxes on capital and self-employed labour has declined 
from around 430/0 in 1980 to about 350/0 in 1996. In the same period, the share of 
taxes on wages and salaries has increased from 350/0 to 43% (The Economist 
5/12/98). A study of the Institute for Fiscal Studies for Britain corroborates these 
findings: it concludes that during the 1980s there has been a shift from direct to indi­
reet taxation, resulting in gains for those with high incomes and losses for those at 
the bottom of the income distribution (Giles and Johnson 1994, 21). 
Neo-liberals argue that tax competition is a good thing because it lowers tax rates. 
When faced with tax evasion and erosion of the tax base, governments should not 
tighten their tax rules and increase their rates, but instead should lower their rates. 
This would result in a more competitive tax climate and would eventually raise in­
stead of lower the total tax take (e.g. Bracewell-Milnes 1999; Ellis 1999). A survey 
carried out by the Dutch government shows that in practice almost all European gov­
ernments are putting this neo-libera.l logic into practice: the deviation of effective cor­
porate tax rates from statutory rates varies 'from 1.88 percentage points in France 
and 3.2 % in the Netherlands to 11.5 % in Germany, 150/0 in Italy, 19 % in Belgium 
and over 22% in Portugal (FT 28/4/99). 
Given that the logic of this form of competition would be the complete elimination of 
corporate taxation in the long run, governments in the OECD area agreed that 
something must be done to eradicate the worst abuses and protect the legitimacy of 
the tax system. Both in the EU and in the OECD this resulted in discussions over a 
'voluntary' code of conduct for governments. The OECD published areport on the 
issue in 1998 (OECD 1998), and held a conference in December 1998 to consider 
measures to curb 'harmful tax competition' in the form of a voluntary code of conduct 
(cf. Nettinga 1999, and Weiner and Ault 1998). 
In December of 1997, the EU finance ministers had already agreed on the principles 
of a non-binding and restricted 'code of conduct' for tax policy to be drawn up by In­
ternal Market Commissioner Mario Monti.9 The 'Monti package' was finally presented 
in December 1998. It included tl1e proposal for a directive imposing a minimum 20% 
withholding tax on income from savings and investment, a proposal to eliminate 
withholding taxes on payments between associated companies of different member 
states, and a voluntary code of conduct on business taxation aimed at eliminating 
'unfair' tax competition (FT 3/12/98). German and French Finance Ministers Lafon­
taine and Strauss-Kahn added fuel to the fire flaring up by calling for majority voting 
in the EU Council on taxation matters. This proposal was immediately opposed by 
Given the overlap in membership it is of course no surprise that there is a e10se correspondence in sub­
stance between the two codes of conduct. 
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Britain, Luxemburg and Sweden (FT 2/12/98), while the new Internal Market Com­
missioner Frits Bolkestein also declared that he was opposed to tax harmonisation 
(FT 7/9/99). 
The ensuing months saw an increasingly vehement debate on these issues both in 
the Council and also within several of the member states. 
In the case of Britain both the New Labour government and the 'financial world in the 
City consistently opposed the idea of majority voting on tax matters, as weil as the 
introduction of harmonised taxation. In December of 1998 CBI Director-General 
Adair Turner, the spokesperson for British multinational non-financial corporations, 
on the contrary announced that British companies would not be opposed to EU 
measures directed at 'unfair' tax practices (FT 28/12/98), although a later survey of 
European business opinion showed that most European employers' organisations, 
including the CBI, would not support tax harmonisation (FT 1/3/99). 
Sweden joined Britain in its opposition to tax harmonisation from the beginning (FT 
10/12/98). The Swedish Social-Democratic government went much further in late 
February, announcing a far-reaching tax cuts programme based on the argument 
that the prevailing Swedish tax regime penalised senior executives and was driving 
Swedish business abroad (FT 27-28/2/99). The Swedish telecom and electronics 
giant Ericsson in particular repeatedly threatened that it would move its headquarters 
to London in case the Swedish government would not be more forthcoming (FT 6­
7/3/99). The new budget announced in September accommodated Ericsson and de­
livered big income tax cuts (FT 21/9/99). 
In Germany tax politics played a crucial role in the ousting of Finance Minister and 
SPD party leader Oskar Lafontaine. Early on in the game it did not look like this: the 
British were disappointed when Chancellor Schröder backed Lafontaine's plan (pro­
posed with Strauss-Kahn) for majority voting (FT 3//12/98). However, when Lafon­
taine subsequently launched his proposals for domestic tax reform the storm gath­
ered steam. Lafontaine pushed simultaneously for domestic legislation closing 
loopholes used by companies to 'avoid' taxation (without a 'compensating I reduction 
in the rates applied to corporate income) and for European harmonisation of corpo­
rate taxation to reduce 'unfair competition' from countries levying little or no corporate 
taxes. Early in March German business applied strong pressure. Allianz (the biggest 
European insurer), RWE and Veba all threatened to transfer (part of) their operations 
abroad if Lafontaine's proposals went through and scheduled a meeting with 
Chancellor Schröder to discuss proposals to lift the tax burden (FT 2/3/99). 
Schröder's willingness to talk to the CEO'S of these companies clearly indicated that 
Lafontaine was losing ground. Later that week a letter by 22 bosses of German com­
panies to Chancellor Schröder on the same issue was leaked to the press. The revolt 
of the bosses clearly had other motives behind it than the tax issue: after all, arecent 
study by the London-based Institute for Fiscal Studies had shown that in the mid­
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1990s Germany had the lowest level of corporate income tax revenues as % of GDP. 
in the G-7 countries (FT 6-7/3/99). As John Plender rightly concluded: "The revolt is, 
in reality, as much about clipping Mr. Lafontaine's wings as tax" (ibid.). 
On the 9th of March, Schröder held a meeting with representatives of the energy 
sector protesting the proposal for an energy reserves tax, who simultaneously an­
nounced a puli-out of separate talks on a schedule for closing 19 nuclear power sta­
tions. On the 10th, the Finance Ministry conceded that its forecasts concerning the 
energy reserves tax had been misleading. Oskar Lafontaine stepped down as Fi­
nance Minister and party leader on the 11 th, and in the following weekend SPD 
leaders moved to quell the left wing of the party (as the caption of a FT article read, 
FT 16/3/99). 
"In a letter to the government made public yesterday [Le. on the 15th of 
March, HO] DaimlerChrysler, one of Germany's biggest companies, under­
lined the continuing sensitivity of tax issues even after Mr Lafontaine's depar­
ture. Manfred Gentz, DaimlerChrysler's finance director, warned the govern­
ment that high taxes could result in job losses at the German-US group by 
making Germany less attractive." (Ibid.) 
It is clear from these developments that the struggle over taxation policy within the 
German government was to a certain extent a proxy fight, pitching the sole remaining 
representative of a more 'traditional' , collectivist social democracy against the over­
whelming neo-liberal majority in the new government. It took repeated interventions 
from the outside, by employers and by tlle (international) media, to decisively tip the 
balance of forces against Lafontaine. 1o Lafontaine's successor, Hans Eichel, wasted 
no time in addressing the grievances of Germany's business elite. In the plans for a 
new system of corporate taxes a prominent place was taken by an annual 'give­
away' of eight billion D-mark, and a rate cut to 25% by 2001 (FT 24/6/99). 
An important boost to those propagating a harmonisation of corporate taxation in the 
EU was given by a ruling of the European Court of Justice in October 1999. In a pro­
cedure against the German state started by the French chemical conglomerate 
Saint-Gobain the ECJ ruled that Germany may not discriminate (in terms of applying 
different tax regimes) between a Saint-Gobain branch (of the French parent com­
pany) and a Saint-Gobain subsidiary incorporated in Germany. The potential impli-
Of course, the tax issue was not the only issue over which Lafontaine and Schröder collided. They for in­
stance also fell out over the German poliey vis-a-vis the Kosovo erisis and over the new NATO strategy to 
be approved in April at NATO's 50th anniversary. Unconfirmed rumours even imply that American and 
German government and security circles have collaborated to force Lafontaine to resign. In this paper, 
however, we will only note that the pressure which German big business brought to bear on the govern­
ment, and the remarkable ease with which Chancellor Schröder sided with the German employers against 
his own Finance Minister, might have been enough to force Lafontaine out. 
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cations of this ruling may be momentous and the occasion underscores the impor­
tance of the ECJ in extending the reach of Community law and to reduce the scope 
for member state autonomy (cf. Wallace and Wallace 1996, 61-63). 
4.2. Withholding tax 
In 1963 the US Federal government levied an 'interest capitalisation tax' on interest 
received on bonds. The result of this imposition, as the neo-liberal press does not tire 
pointing out, was to drive the bond business out of New York. It settled in London, 
making the City the prime global market place for the international bond business 
(FT 9/12/99). 
Withholding tax (tax on interest income on savings and bonds withheld at source) 
became an issue in the European context after the 1987 EC Directive on the elimi­
nation of capital controls. Germany, which introduced anational withholding tax in 
January 1989, was the main driving force behind the February 1989 proposal by the 
European Commission for the introduction of a common 15% withholding tax on in­
terest trom savings and bonds. The rationale for the introduction of such a tax is the 
erosion of the tax base, and with that of overall state revenue, resulting trom the lib­
eralisation of international capital movements. The proposal was supported in the 
Council by Germany and Italy, but opposed by Britain and Luxemburg in particular 
(and also by the Netherlands, Greece and Denmark), and later in the year the idea 
was laid to rest. 
The German introduction of anational withholding tax meanwhile led to arecord out­
flow of funds (in excess of DM 100 bn), putting such pressure on the D-Mark that the 
tax was abolished (Dehejia and Genschel 1998, 17, 20; see also Grahl and Teague 
1990, 121). In January 1993 Germany "reintroduced anational withholding tax, and, 
again, suffered from a massive outflow of funds. The main beneficiaries were Lux­
emburg and the German banks doing business there" (ibid., 18). As a result, the 
number of foreign banks in Luxemburg jumped from 187 in 1992 to 213 a year later, 
mostly by the influx of German banks (ibid., 25). Early in 1993, and again in the 
Spring of 1996, Belgium and Germany relaunched the plan for a common EC with­
holding tax, but they failed both times to gain the necessary unanimity: Britain and 
Luxernburg maintained their opposition, supported by the Netherlands. Throughout 
1997, the issue of withholding tax remains on the political agenda. 
Dehejia and Genschel argue that the best explanation for the positioning of govern­
ments on the issue of a common withholding tax is given by the 'small is competitive' 
hypothesis. Small countries within the EU tend to lure savings by private and institu­
tional investors from big countries by offering low tax rates and privacy protection. 
This hypothesis explains the behaviour of France, Germany and Italy, who all are in 
favour of a common withholding tax, and it explains the behaviour of Luxemburg, 
Denmark and the Netherlands, who oppose it. Belgium, which also supports the 
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withholding tax, seems to fall out, but its position is primarily explained by its rela­
tionship to Luxemburg, in comparison with which Belgium can count as a 'big' coun­
try. The inexplicable anomaly for Dehejia and Genschel is Britain, which is 'big' but 
opposes the common withholding tax nevertheless (Dehejia and Genschel 1998, 22­
26). 
The account of Dehejia and Genschel raises a number of questions. First, the dis­
course of the analysis is strictly state-centric. The role of some of the relevant actors 
in this matter (esp. banks, institutional investors, private investors, and transnational 
business) is not systematically discussed. Secondly, the discourse is European cen­
tred and fails to brjng in the global context. The failure to consider these dimensions 
in particular accounts for the difficulty Dehejia and Genschel have in understanding 
the British opposition to a common withholding tax, but they also fail to raise ques­
tions with regard to the German position, and particularly with regard to the role of 
German banks who have profited greatly from the abolition of capital controls by re­
locating operations to Luxemburg. The subsequent developments in 1998 and 1999 
make it clear that these dimensions must be brought into an analysis of the politics of 
European taxation policy. The debate on the withholding tax makes it abundantly 
clear that the taxation issue has become an important battleground for competing 
concepts of control. The proposal to introduce a common withholding tax represents 
what Pollard has called the 'regulated capitalism' perspective (cf. Pollard 1998). It is 
supported not so much by 'big countries' as by (forces within) governments sub­
scribing to the idea that rentier and speculative capital mobility must be restrained in 
order to protect the tax base. In Britain, a 'big' country, the government is guided by 
neo-liberal concepts favouring the position of internationally mobile capital. This ori­
entation has been shaped by historical structures and reproduced by the interaction 
between political and business actors for more than a century (cf. Overbeek 1990). 
The German government, no matter how far some of its leading members have 
moved ideologically to a neo-liberal position, nevertheless continues to represent a 
position that is structurally shaped by the predominance of productive capital in 
Germany (cf. Van der Wurlf 1993). The fact that the German government pushes so 
hard for the withholding tax even though it is German banks profiting from the capital 
flight from Germany to Luxemburg iIIustrates this. 
In December 1998, when the 'Monti package' was announced, Britain slightly modi­
fied its opposition by changing from an all-out rejection of the withholding tax to the 
proposal of an exemption for all Eurobonds (FT 10/12/98). During most of 1999 the 
discussion on the EU withholding tax has dragged on without any major changes in 
position taking place. Attempts to formulate compromises have failed consistently. 
The British a.nd Luxemburg governments consistently represent the viewpoint of the 
rentier interest. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer (Minister of Finance) Gordon 
Brown (of the Labour Party, sic) even announced a plan (for domestic political 
purposes no doubt) to "appoint a personal representative who will bring financial 
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market opinions into the discussion" (FT 9-10 October 1999). A month later, the 
sectoral associations organising the City firms involved ( the London Investment 
Banking Association UBA and the International Primary market Association IPMA) 
added fuel to the fire by expressing their support for the UK government: the pro­
posal for a common withholding tax is seen as a "grave risk" (FT 19/11/99). 
In the days surrounding the Ecofin meeting of 29 November the neo-liberal position 
was expounded once more in editorials in the financial press (e.g. The Economist of 
the 27th and the Financial Times of the 30th). On the other side, the pressure on the 
British government to give in was stepped up as weil, by the governments of France 
and Germany, by the European Commission and most recently by the Italian finance 
minister, who linked Britain's position on the withholding tax to future EMU member­
ship for the UK (FT 18/11/99). The Ecofin meeting of 29 November predictably failed 
to reach an agreement, leaving the last chance for aresolution to the Helsinki Sum­
mit in December 1999. 
5. Towards a Critical Theory of European Integration 
The discussion in sections 2 and 3 of this paper on the 'Amsterdam' approach to the 
study of European integration, and the analysis in section 4 of the politics of tax har­
monisation in the EU prompt me to formulate five tentative conclusions. These con­
clusions are intended to serve as hypotheses to be examined in further research , 
and hopefully as building blocks for a more comprehensive 'critical', transnational 
historical materialist theory of European integration. 
The first point is to underline the complex and dialectical relationship between neo­
liberalism as process and neo-liberalism as project. The capital fractions approach 
has been accused both of pluralism (i.e. there being no relationship between struc­
ture and agency) and of determinism (Le. of seeing politics as being determined by 
the 'economy'. Crucial to a dialectic understanding of the relation between structure 
and agency, however, is the notion that a hegemonic project or comprehensive con­
cept of control is shaped, and continuously reshaped, in the process of struggle, 
compromise and re-adjustment. In the words of Andre Drainville, " ... neo-liberalism is 
both a broad strategy of restructuring and a succession of negotiated settlements, of 
concessions to the rigidities and dynamics of structures as weil as the political possi­
bilities of the moment." (Drainville 1994, 116). More explicit attention on the agency 
of subordinated groups and their ability to make an irrlpact on the shaping of con­
cepts of control is badly needed: "the analysis of concepts of control must beget 
original concepts of resistance" (ibid. 125). 
Secondly, and following from this, we must take into account the phasing of the pro­
cess of global restructuring and the neo-liberal ascendancy. Elsewhere I have devel­
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oped this point further (cf. Overbeek 1999). In fact, for our purposes here, it seems 
useful to distinguish three distinct moments in the trajectory of neo-liberalism, namely 
• 	 neo-liberalism as a de-constructive project (neo-liberalism emerges as the con­
cept with the most convincing analysis of the crisis of Keynesianism and defeats 
corporate liberalism and social democracy in one country after another); 
• 	 neo-liberalism as a constructive project (the phase of the imposition of structural 
adjustment, liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation; corporate liberalism is dis­
credited, no new alternative can be articulated, and the tenets of neo-liberalism 
are increasingly accepted as valid and legitimate); 
• 	 neo-liberalism in its consolidation phase (internationally as weil as within the 
countries of the Lockean heartland, any notion of an alternative to the global rule 
of capital has become utterly 'unrealistic' and discredited and neo-liberal reforms 
are 'Iocked-in' or 'normalised' in the Foucauldian sense. 
The third conclusion is that the process of European integration must be situated in 
the context of transatlantic and transnational class formation, not as an autonomous 
process (as is so often the case in 'mainstream' theories of European integration). 
The foundation, development, and periodic extension of European integration are 
fundamentally moments of the expansion of the Lockean heartland. This process 
itself, although its rhythm is dictated up to a point by the dynamic of American capi­
tal, is contradictory. The transatlantic linkage therefore fundamentally influences 
European integration, but it is not simply subject to or deterrrlined by American con­
trol. 
This brings me to the fourth point, namely to emphasise the need for a better under­
standing of what we mean by 'transnational' . Much space has been devoted in nu­
merous writings to discuss the distinction between international and global, or be­
tween the international economy and the world economy, but one is hard pressed to 
find a good definition of transnational. Transnational, I would put forward, must not 
be juxtaposed to 'national' (as if it is synonymous to international or supranational). 
Rather, I submit, the notion of simultaneity is crucial to an understanding of what is 
specifically transnational. Transnational processes are those that take place simulta­
neously in subnational, national and international arenas: their dynamic is not fun­
damentally defined by the existence of national boundaries (although these do exist 
and continue to remain important). 
Finally, this conceptualisation of transnationality must also be brought into a funda­
mental rethinking of the concepts of sovereignty, governance and statehood in the 
era of globalisation. This is true for an understanding of what is called 'global gov­
ernance' but equally applies to our understanding of the exact nature of the emerging 
European polity, which is neither a federal superstate nor a stage for intergov­
ernmental bargaining, but something fundamentally new. It is a system of multilevel 
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governance, yes; but the theories of MLG in Europe so far have been marred by a 
strang institutionalist bias, which ignores the embeddedness of the institutional struc­
tures of governance in the forcefield of social, economic, political and ideological 
interests and conflicts. This is precisely where the challenge lies for a critical theory 
of European integration. 
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Bastiaan van Apeldoorn 
Transnational Class Agency and European 
Governance - the Case of the European Round 
Table of Industrialists 
Introduction1 
This article analyses the political and ideological agency of an emergent European 
transnational capitalist class in the socio-economic governance of the European Un­
ion (EU) by examining the case of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). 
It seeks to show that the ERT - as an elite forum mediating the interests and power 
of the most transnationalised segments of European capital - has played a signifi­
cant role in shaping European governance inasmuch as it has successfully articu­
lated and promoted ideas and concepts that have at critical times set the political 
agenda, and, beyond that, has helped to shape the discourse within which European 
policy-making is embedded. Here, the increasingly neoliberal orientation of the ERT 
reflects, and at the same time is a constitutive element in the construction of a new 
European order in which governance is geared to serve the interests of a globalising 
transnational capitalist elite, and hence to the exigencies of global 'competitiveness'. 
Although in recent years some detailed work has been done on the role of the ERT 
in the internal market programme, there has yet been little attention to (and interpre­
tation of) the content of the ideas promoted by the ERT, and hence to the ideological 
power that this forum of transnational capitalists exercises.2 
For useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper I am grateful to Colin Crouch, Ste­
phen Gill, Otto Holman, Thomas Risse, and Wolfgang Streeck. 
An exception is formed by Otto Holman, 'Transnational Class Strategy and the New Europe' , International 
Journal of Politieal Eeonomy, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1992), pp. 3-22. For the best documented study of the role of 
the ERT in the Europe 1992 programme, see Maria Green Cowles, The Polities of Big Business in the 
European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ameri­
can University, 1994. See also Maria Green Cowles, 'Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: the ERT and 
EC 1992', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1995), pp. 501-526; Nicola Fielder, Western 
European Integration in the 19805: The Origins ofthe Single Market(Peter Lang, 1997), and Wayne Sand­
holtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Polities, Vol. 42, (1989), pp. 95­
128. The research on the ERT presented in this article has been conducted for the authors' Ph.D. Disserta­
tion (Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Order, unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, The European University Institute, 1999). The lion's share of the research material con­
sists of about two dozen interviews with (former) members, senior officials, and so called 'associates' of the 
ERT. Unless indicated otherwise, all interviews cited have been conducted by the author. The interviews 
were conducted in the native language of the interviewee (either English, German, French, Dutch, or Ital­
ian), translations (of quotations) into English are my own. 
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The article is divided into four main parts. The first briefly elaborates the theoretical 
framework that informs my analysis. Drawing upon what has come to be labelled the 
'neo-Gramscian school' in International Relations (IR), I will advance a historical 
materialist understanding of the dynamics of European integration, emphasising in 
particular the role of transnational social forces - as engendered by the capitalist 
production process - in the political and ideological struggles over European order.3 
The second part introduces the case of the European Round Table. I will claim that 
the ERT is neither a simple business lobby nor a corporatist interest association, but 
must rather be interpreted as having developed into an elite platform for an emergent 
European transnational capitalist class from which it can formulate a common strat­
egy and - on the basis of that strategy - seek to shape European socio-economic 
governance through its privileged access to the European institutions. It is this latter 
role of the ERT that will be the focus of the 'final two parts. The third part presents an 
analysis of the evolution of ERT's strategic project and the initiating role the Round 
Table played in the relaunching of the integration process from Europe 1992 to 
Maastricht. Following this, the fourth part will analyse the ideological orientation and 
strategic outlook of today's Round Table and its current role in shaping what I will call 
the neoliberal discourse of competitiveness, which, I argue, increasingly underpins 
European governance. 
Transnationalisation, capitalist class strategy, and Euro­
pean governance 
In its focus on the strategic role of a transnational capitalist class in shaping Euro­
pean socio-economic governance, the following analysis goes beyond the estab­
lished approaches to the study of European integration - in particular the still domi­
nant rival perspectives of intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism - in several 
respects.4 First, conventional integration theories tend to focus largely on the institu­
tional form of the integration process, thus ignoring the question of its socio-eco­
3 	 A good introduction to the 'neo-Gramscian school' of IR is provided by Stephen Gill (Ed.), Gramsci, Histori­
cal Materialism and International Relations. See also Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and Interna­
tional Relations (Routledge, 1998) and Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
4 The intergovernmentalist perspective has been most developed by Andrew Moravcsik, see his The Choice 
tor Europe (Cornell University Press, 1998). Arecent collection of essays by authors working from a supra­
nationalist perspective - which draws at least in part on earlier neo-functionalist theories - can be found in 
Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Sweet Stone (Eds.), European Integration and Supranational Governance (Ox­
ford University Press, 1998). 
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nomic content, or the 'social purpose' underlying European order.5 Whereas inter­
governmentalists and supranationalists quarrelover the relative power of, respect .. 
ively, national and supranational public authorities in the decision-making process, a 
focus on the social purpose of European integration, I suggest, calls for an under­
standing of the social power underpinning public power, and thus for an analysis of 
the underlying social forces. 
Second, established integration theories tend to suffer 'from a narrow rationalism that 
disables them to acknowledge the power of ideas and ideological practices in the 
construction of European order and in defining its social purpose.6 There, however, 
our analysis cannot stop as we have to examine how, by whom, and for what pur­
pose that discourse has been constructed. From a Gramscian perspective it is em­
phasised that ideas must be located in social practice, and thus cannot be separated 
from the (social) structures in which actors are located and that shape their agency. 
Ideas are produced by human agency in the context of social power relations, and 
are as such bound up with the strategic action of social actors. 
Third, whereas in intergovernmentalist accounts the transnational level is ignored 
altogether, supranationalist approaches do explicitly acknowledge the role of trans­
national actors but tend to see that role as subservient to the alleged functionallogic 
of the integration process and/or to the supranationalleadership of the European 
Commission, thus denying the autonomy of these actors.7 Point of departure for the 
present analysis is that the social forces underpinning European order are not nec­
essarily internal to the EU nor to its member-states but must rather be located within 
agiobai political economy in which capitalist production and finance are undergoing 
a sustained transnationalisation and globalisation, reflected inter aHa in the increas­
ing dominance of the transnational corporation (TNC) as an actor in the world econ­
omy, and the concomitant growing structural power of transnational capital. 8 This 
5 	 Borrowing the words of John Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liber­
alism in the Postwar Economic Order', International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), pp. 379-416, esp. 
p.382. 
6 	 The rationalist assumptions are strongest and most explicit in the (liberal) intergovernmentalism of Moravc­
sik (see his The Choiee tor Europe). Neo-functionalists and later supranationalists have always been drawn 
from time to time to the role of ideas and values in supporting the European integration process, but without 
asking the question what kind of ideas support what kind of European order. 
7 	 See for instance Sandholtz and interpretation of the ERT - with regard to its role in the 1992 process - as a 
'political interest group [constituted] by community action' and used as such by the Commission to push 
through its programme (Sandholtz and Zysman, '1992, Recasting the European Bargain', p. 117). 
8 There are now about 45.000 TNCs in the world (up trom 7000 in 1970), together controlling US$ 3.2 trillion 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) stock (up from US$282 million in 1975). Indicating the present centrality of 
TNCs in the world economy it is estimated that the 600 largest TNCs are producing more than a fifth of the 
world's real net output of industrial production, whereas about 40% of employment in the industrialised 
world depend directly or indirectly on TNCs. See World Investment Report 1997: Transnational Corpora­
tions, Market Strueture and Competition Poliey (United Nations, 1997). 
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transnationalisation of global capitalism can be argued to engender a transnationali­
sation of social forces, and in particular of those forces bound up with trans national­
ising and globalising capital. In what, following the pioneering work of Kees van der 
Pijl and others, could be conceptualised as a process of transnational class forma­
tion, we witness the rise of transnational capitalist elites as key actors in global poli­
tics.9 
In its focus on class agency, this article also aims to contribute to a research agenda 
that reclaims the centrality of class agency in the study of political economy. The 
class-theoretical premise underlying this agenda is that the class domination by 
which capitalist societies are characterised, cannot be understood from a structuralist 
perspective that merely focuses on the structural domination of capital over labour, 
but that the reproduction of this power of capital - and of the capitalist class - has to 
be explained also in terms of collective human agency within concrete social power 
struggles taking place on the structural terrain of the accumulation process. As Leslie 
Sklair puts it: '[ capitalist] class hegemony does not simply happen as if by magic. 
The capitalist class expends much time, energy and resources to make it happen 
and to ensure that it keeps on happening,.10 
The transnational capitalist class engendered by the globalisation of capitalist accu­
mulation is not conceived here as a unitary actor. In fact, significant differences in 
ideological and strategic orientations may exist within the ranks of this class, differ­
ences related to structural (but not fixed) divisions within capital. 11 The important 
point for the purpose of this article - which focuses on the role of transnational class 
strategy in European governance - is that through the politicalorganisation of capi­
talist class elites these differences can be (temporarily) transcended and a unity of 
purpose and direction achieved, a unity that may then be elevated to a higher plane, 
that is constituting an appeal across different groups and classes (and class frac­
tions), thus entering into the struggle for - to use a Gramscian term hegemony.12 In 
this process of capitalist class formation transnational elite groups and their (infor­
9 	 The two most important works of Van der Pijl in this respect are his Transnational Classes as weil as his 
earlier The Making of an Atlantic Ru/ing Class (Verso, 1984). 
10 	 Leslie Sklair, 'Social movements for global capitalism: the trans national capitalist class in action', Review of 
International Political Economy, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), pp. 514-38, p. 520. 
11 	 Most fundamental are the functional difference between financial and industrial capital as weil as differ­
ences in what we could call the geographical scale of operation of capital, where, even within the elite of 
large transnational corporations, we find important differences as some firms are more global than others 
(who may limit their trans national activities only to a single region of the global economy. Cf. Van der Pijl, 
Transnational Classes. 
12 	 For Gramsci hegemony signified a mode of governance that rests upon a set of institutionalised practices 
and norms 'freely accepted' by subordinate groups but nevertheless expressing a structure of domination 
(see Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsei (Lawrence and Wishart, 
1971), pp. 169-170, and passim). 
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mal) organisations are seen as playing a key role. 13 This article interprets the Euro­
pean Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) as one such organisation with respect to 
the process of transnational class formation in Europe. 
The political agency of the ERT must be located, however, within a wider configura­
tion of social forces dominated and cemented by a globalising transnational elite 
consisting primarily of the top managers and owners of transnational capital, but also 
of politicians and civil servants occupying key positions in transnationalising state 
structures. In the emergent transnational state-society complex of the EU we may 
thus, I suggest, start to discern the contours of a transnational power bloc at the 
apex of which we find a transnational capitalist class elite allying with the more out­
ward-Iooking elements of 'EU government', the European Commission in particular. 
As the case of the ERT will show, parallel to the relaunching of the integration pro­
cess - and marking a sharp contrast with the relatively antagonistic relations of the 
1970s - the mid-1980s and 1990s witnessed the development of what has been de­
scribed as a 'partnership' between big business and the Commission. The other side 
of the coin of this partnership is the extreme weakness of organised labour within the 
Euro-polity, where it can make for less of a counter-veiling force than it could at the 
national level at which capital was to some degree 'Iocked into' (neo-) corporatist 
14structures.
The strategic alliance between the corporate executives of Europe's leading TNCs 
and the political executives of the Commission that will transpire from our analysis of 
the ERT can be seen as indicative of the growing power of transnational capital and 
is further facilitated both by the position of the Commission within the overall struc­
ture of EU governance as weil as by the nature of the EU polity in general. With re­
gard to the first point, the fact that although the Commission has the right of initiative 
(and can thus to an important degree shape the EU agenda) its policy-making is de­
pendent upon the decision-making power of the Council of Ministers, and hence of­
ten upon the veto-power of individual member-states, means that it is often crucial 
for the Commission to enlist the support of powerful social groups. 
With regard to the second point, the undemocratic nature of the EU polity in general 
- including its underdeveloped system of political parties and lack of other institu­
tions, strong organised interest for instance, that can generate not just legitimacy but 
indeed also the demand for legitimacy and (democratic) accountability - makes it 
easier for the Commission to rely rather exclusively on 'business advice' without 
needing to legitimate this. Indeed, one could argue that the democratic deficit of the 
13 	 Here I draw upon the work of Van der Pijl (Transnational C/asses, esp. Chapter 4) as weil as that of Ste­
phen GiII, American Hegemonyand the Tri/atera/ Commission (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
14 	 CL Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism', 
Po/ities and Society, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1991), pp. 133-164. 
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EU on the one hand, and the increasing dominance of social forces bound up with 
transnational capital and its largely neoliberal project on the other, are two sides of 
the same coin inasmuch as the former can be seen as reflecting a wider phenome­
non that Stephen Gill calls the 'new constitutionalism', which cis the politico-Iegal di­
mension of the wider discourse of disciplinary neoliberalism' seeking 'to separate 
economic policies from broad political accountability in order to make governments 
more responsive to the discipline of market forces and correspondingly less respon­
sive to popular-democratic forces and processes' .15 It is within this context that we 
must place our analysis of the ERT and its role in European governance. 
The European Round Table: an elite platform for Europe's 
transnational capitalist class 
I would consider the Round Table to be more than a lobby group as it helps to shape poli­
eies. The Round Table's relationship with Brussels is one of strong co-operation. It is a 
dialogue which offen begins at a vety early stage in the development of policies and di­
rectives. 
Wisse Dekker, former Chairman of the ERT16 
The ERT is not a lobby, but rather a group of European citizens who express their opin­
ions on the best ways to make Europe and European companies competitive on a world­
wide basis to pOliticians, governments, the Commission, and other institutions. 
Jeröme Monod, former Chairman of the ERT17 
The ERT is partially a lobby, but not for the interests of individual sectors, but for the com­
petitiveness of Europe. As this is a fundamental concern, which the European public 
authorities share with us, we are also a privileged partner in the dialogue about these 
concerns. 
Helmut Maueher, current Chairman of the ERT18 
When integration was at a low-point in the early 1980s and growing global (mainly 
Japanese and US) competition threatened the position of large sections of European 
industry, leading members of Europe's business community began to perceive the 
need for a European-Ievel political initiative. As Europe's official employers' organi­
15 	 Stephen GiII, 'European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alter­
natives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe' . New Political Economy. VoL 3, No. 1. pp. 5-26, p. 5.. 
16 	 Wisse Dekker, quoted in 'Industrialists Drive for aStronger Europe. Interview with Prof. Dr. Wisse Dekker', 
Europe 2000, VoL 2, No. 2 (1990), pp. 17-19, p. 18. 
17 	 lVIonod in: ERT, European industry and the Developing World: A Dialogue between Partners (European 
Round Table of Industrialists, 1994), p. 1. 
18 	 Letter from Dr. Helmut O. Maueher to the author, dated 12 June, 1997. 
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sation, UNICE, was deemed to be i neffective , it was at the initiative of Pehr Gyllen­
hammar, the cosmopolitan CEO of Volvo, and with the support of Etienne Davignon, 
the European Commissioner who had been instrumental in creating the new rap­
prochement between big business and the Commission in the preceding years, that 
17 industrialists of major European companies came together in 1983 to found the 
Roundtable of European Industrialists (Iater ERT).19 The self-proclaimed aim of the 
new organisation was 'to revitalise European industry and make it competitive again, 
and to speed up the process of unification of the European market'2o, two goals that 
became part of a single strategy in which 'Europeanisation' was seen as the answer 
to European industry's lack of global competitiveness. 
Today, the ERT consists of 45 CEOs and chairmen of Europe's most transnational 
and biggest industrial corporations, with almost all EU countries as weil as most in­
dustrial sectors 'represented' (see table 1 for current membership).21 The member­
ship of the ERT is personal (rather than corporate) but is at the same time depend­
ent on the member's continued position as the CEO or chairman of his company. As 
a senior official22 of the ERT explains: 'we insist that it is the chief decision maker 
who is the member, for the sirnple reason that eventually these great men, when 
they have decided something at the table, have to go home and put their mouth and 
their money to the policies.,23 Looking, then, at the capital behind the private 'Euro­
pean citizens' (see quotation from Monod above), we find that 36 companies of the 
current 45 (see table 1) members appear on the Financial Times Europe 500 (which 
ranks Europe's companies by market capitalisation and therefore excludes compa­
24
nies that are not publicly quoted), of which 20 are amongst the top 100. On agiobai 
level, Fortune's Global 500, wh ich ranks companies by total sales, lists 27 compa­
19 	 On ERT's formation, and the role of Davignon, see also Cowles, The Po/ities of Big Business, chapters 3 
and 4. As Cowles and others have also stressed, UNICE's relative weakness, was one background factor 
against which we have to understand the formation of the ERT. Davignon, who for years had been trying to 
strengthen the ti es between business and the EC executive, also did not find UNICE a suitable interlocutor 
for the Commission as he regarded it more a traditional lobby club than as a 'partner with which a dialogue 
could be developed' (Interview with Etienne Davignon by author and Otto Holman, Brussels, 6 June, 1993). 
20 	 These are the words of co-founder Wisse Dekker, quoted in 'Industrialists drive for a stronger Europe', p. 
17. 
21 	 The ERT meets in a Plenary Session twice a year, but the existence of a Steering Committee (the organi­
sation's leadership); a Brussels-based secretariat; numerous working groups on different policy themes, 
and the assistance of so called 'associates' (also often senior managers from ERT companies) ensure a 
more continuous activity of the group. 
22 	 In terms of organisation the ERT is very sm all and non-bureaucratic but a key role is played bya Secretary­
General and an Assistant Secretary-General. 
23 	 Interview, Brussels, 24 May, 1996. 
24 	 Finaneial Times's Europe 500, http://www.ft.com/ftsurveys/ft5_eur.htm. 
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nies 01 ERT members.25 We are thus dealing here with a group 01 Europe's largest 
non-1inancial enterprises. As such, the ERT membership makes up a substantial part 
01 Europe's corporate elite, the internal coherence 01 which is established and 
maintained through a process 01 networking, inter aHa through organisations like the 
ERT.26 
TABLE 1: MEMBERS OF THE ERT AND THEIR COMPANIES, MAY 1999 
NAME COMPANY COUNTRY SECTOR 
Americo AMORIM Amorim Group Portugal cork products 
Percy BARNEVIK Investor AB Sweden holding company 
Jean-Louis BEFFA Saint-Gobain France building materials 
Peter BONFIELD British Telecom UK telecoms 
Cor BOONSTRA Philips Netherlands electronics 
Antony BURGMANS Unilever Neth./UK (Neth.) agro-alimentary 
Bertrand COLLOMB Lafarge France building materials 
Francois CORNELIS Petrofina Belgium oil 
Alfonso CORTINA Repsol Spain oil 
Gerhard CROMME (Vice-C.) ThyssenKruPQ Germany mech. engineering 
Dimitris DASKALOPOULOS Delta Dairy Greece agro-alimentary 
Etienne DAVIGNON Societe Generale de Bel- Belgium conglomerate 
gique 
Carlo DE BENEDETTI Cofide-Cir Group Italy holding company 
i Thierry DESMAREST Total France oil 
Jean-Rene FOURTOU Rhone-Pouelenc France chemieals 
i Paulo FRESCO Fiat Italy motor vehicles 
i Jose Antonio GARRIDO Iberdrola Spain utilities 
i Fritz GERBER Hoffmann-La Roche Switzerland chemieals 
Ulrich HARTMANN Veba Germany conglomerate 
Daniel JANSSEN Solvay Belgium chemieals 
@ainJOLY Air Liquide France chemieals 
Jak KAHMI Profilo Group Turkey electronics 
David LEES GKN UK engineering 
Andre LEYSEN (Vice-Chair) Gevaert Belgium chemieals 
Flemming LlNDEL0V Carlsberg Denmark agro-alimentary 
Helmut MAUCHER (Chair) Nestle Switz. (Ger.) agro-alimentary 
Charles MILLER SMITH ICI UK chemieals 
Jerome MONOD Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux France utilities 
Mark MOODY-STUART Shell Neth./UK (UK) oil 
Egil MYKLEBUST Norsk Hydro Norway oil 
Jorma 0LLlLA Nokia Finland electron ics 
Heinrich VON PIERER Siemens Germany electron ics 
Lars RAMQVIST Ericsson Sweden electronics 
Frank Riboud Danone France agro-alimentary 
Nigel RUDD Pilkington UK building materials 
Richard SCHENZ OMV Austria oil and gas 
25 	 Fortune's 1998 Global 500, http://cgLpathfinder.com/fortune/globaI500. 
26 	 One indicator of this internal coherence and the networking by which it is supported can be found in the 
high number of ERT members that are 'outside directors' of other ERT companies, see Van Apeldoorn, 
1999, Chapter 4. 
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Manfred SCHNEIDER Bayer Germany chemicals 
Jürgen SCHREMPP Daimler-Benz Germany motor vehicles 
Louis SCHW EITZER Renault France motor vehicles 
George SIMPSON Gen. Electric Company UK electronics 
Michael SMURFIT Jefferson Sm urfit Ireland forestry & paper 
Peter SUTHERLAND BPAmoco UK (lrish) oil 
Morris T ABAKSBLAT Reed Elsevier UKiNeth. (Neth.) publishin~ 
Marco TRONCH ETTI 
PROVERA 
Pirelli Italy rubber products 
Cees VAN LEDE Akzo-Nobel Netherlands chemicals 
Mark WÖSSNER Bertelsmann Germany media 
Sourees: Names of members and companies: ERT website (http://www.ert.be). Country and sector: 
own research. Note: If the nationality of the member differs from that of his company, the former is 
given in parentheses. 
Although but one of many European business groups, the ERT occupies a unique 
place within the EU's evolving landscape of 'transnational pluralism' .27 The agency of 
the ERT falls neither under the logic of pluralist lobbying nor under that of corporatist 
interest intermediation28, but should be interpreted as that of an elite organisation of 
an emergent European transnational capitalist class, articulating and defending the 
long-term interests of this class.29 As such, the ERT must also be distinguished from 
the kind of 'functional' interest groups that early integration theorists expected to be 
instrumental to the 'functional logic of the integration process, and in which category 
we would for instance find UNICE. Whereas UNICE is the official European federa­
tion of national employers' associations that as such has a public and formal ('corpo­
ratist') role to play vis-a-vis the Commission, and as a 'social partner' in the dialogue 
with the European trade union federation (ETUC), ERT is not an interest association 
at all. In contrast to corporatist organisations, the ERT has no members either to rep­
resent or to discipline. Rather, the ERT is its members. As Vice-Chairman of the 
ERT, Gerhard Cromme, who formerly also had a leading position within UNICE, puts 
it: 
27 	 Streeck and Schmitter, 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism'. The number of 'interest 
groups' seeking to influence European policy-making has grown dramatically since Europe's relance in the 
mid-1908s, and is now estimated by the Commission to total about 3000, including over 500 European and 
international federations (Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union (MacMillan, 
1997), p. 3) 
28 	 In the growing literature on organised interests in the EU part of the debate has come to revolve around the 
question whether these emerging supranational patterns of interest representation are either {neo-)corpora­
tist or pluralist (see, e.g., Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (Eds.), Lobbying in the European Commu­
nity (Oxford University Press 1993, and Justin Greenwood et al (Eds), Organized Interests and the Euro­
pean Community (Sage, 1992). I maintain that the ERT fits neither 'model' weil. 
29 	 It should be pointed out that in fact this was a gradual development and that what follows is an interpreta­
tion of the ERT of today. Moreover, as we shall see later on, the early ERT could not yet function as an elite 
organisation for Europe's transnational capitalist class because initially its membership was too narrowly 
concentrated in certain sectors of European industry. 
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The European Round Table is a forum in which European business leaders 
meet ( ..) we are not an association, we are not an interest group ( .... ) and we 
also do not engage in lobbying in that sense but leave that to the relevant in­
stitutions ( ... ) UNICE is an association of interest representation whereas ERT 
is not .. [but is] a.private gathering of people who discuss themes and then try 
to arrive at a common opinion.30 
As many ERT members and associates emphasise, these organisational character­
istics of the ERT - a private and relatively small club of heads of Europe's largest 
corporations - give the ERT a number of advantages over formal associations.31 
First, compared to big cross~sectoral associations representing several 'constituen­
eies', the Round Table has less diverging interests to balance and can act with rela­
tive speed and flexibility. Moreover, unlike UNICE which as the official voice of busi­
ness has to respond to the details of all proposed EU regulation, the ERT is free to 
'set the political highlights' according to its preferences.32 
Second, the fact that the members themselves are the Round Table, and that these 
members control Europe's biggest companies, gives the ERT apower that in at least 
its immediacy cannot be matched by any interest group in which that power is medi­
ated through a bureaucracy of representation. It is thus that according to another 
prominent ERT member, who also had aleadership position within UNICE, the 
Round Table 'tends to be taken more seriously', precisely 'because it are the big in­
dustrial leaders [themselves] who go and talk with the Commissioners, [the ERT] has 
a more direct access'. 33 The ERT, then, has a privileged political access directly de­
riving from the power positions of its individual members, as is also underlined by the 
following quote from Peter Sutherland, now ERT member, but also a prominent for­
mer Commissioner (for competition) under the first Delors's Presidency: 
I think that the importance of the ERT is not merely in the fact that it co-ordi­
nates and creates a cohesive approach amongst major industries in Europe 
but because the persons who are members of it have to be at the highest 
level of companies and virtually all of them have unimpeded access to gov­
ernment leaders because of the position of their companies ... That is exactly 
what makes it different [from other organisations]. The fact that it is at head of 
company level, and only the biggest companies in each country of the Euro­
30 Interview, Essen, 4 September 1996. 
31 Interviews. 
32 Interview with senior German ERT associate, Brussels, 30 May 1996. 
33 Interview, Antwerp, 21 May 1996. 
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pean Union are members of it. So, by definition each member of the ERT has 
access to the highest level to government. 34 
Third, ERT's elite character allows it to playa more strategie and pro-active role, one 
that transcends lobbying or interest representation in a more restricted sense. The 
ERT does more than defending relatively clear-cut (narrow) corporate interests but 
rather seeks to define the general el ass interests of transnational (industrial) capital, 
that is, to formulate a relatively long-term and forward-Iooking strategy oriented to­
wards the shaping of European socio-economic governance.35 As former ERT Vice 
Chairman, David Simon, explains, precisely because it brings together around '45 
bosses who run businesses, they [the ERT members] will tend to take a more strate­
gic view than an association ... because after all that's what they're responsible for, 
they're responsible for direction and strategy. [The ERT thus] tries to concentrate on 
strategy and direction for the economy at large'. 36 
The political agency of the ERT 
Although occasionally also engaging in more conventionallobbying activities as weil, 
ERT's agency normally transcends that level inasmuch as it seeks to set political the 
agenda, and beyond that, to shape the discourse in which European decision-mak­
ing is embedded.37 Such an exercise of ideologieal power is what distinguishes the 
ERT most clearly from more traditional business lobbies. 
The ERT communicates its ideas in different ways. It regularly publishes reports on 
either specific themes or of a more comprehensive nature, and frequently sends let­
ters and communiques to individual politicians or to collective bodies such as the 
European Council. Sut, as Keith Richardson, ERT's former Secretary General, points 
out: 'the most influential mode of all is perhaps still face-to-face communication' be­
tween the CEOs of the ERT and Europe's leading politicians and policy-makers.38 
34 	 Telephone interview, 27 January 1998. 
35 	 Or, as in the words of one long-serving ERT associate, who drew the comparison with the US Business 
Roundtable, (which has four times as many members as the ERT), ERT is 'Iess interested in specific 
themes ( ..) within the life of the firms rand more] interested ... in themes of the medium-Iong term, that is to 
say, themes that concern the future of Europe' , whereas its US counterpart is 'much more lobbyistid (Inter­
view, Ivrea, 2 December 1997). 
36 	 Interview, London, 12 September 1996. 
37 	 On the concept of agenda-setting see Cowles, The Politics of Big Business. 
38 	 Keith Richardson, 'Europe's Industrialists Help Shape the Single Market', Europe, EC Commission Office, 
Washington D.C., December 1989. Direct contacts between ERT members and political leaders have ac­
cording to one ERT official been especially developed under the chairmanship of Jeröme Monod (from 1992 
to 1996), who with his own political past and continuing strong links to French politics and politicians, further 
fostered this mode of communication: it was 'under Monod that the idea of going to see Juppe, Kohl, and so 
on [became normal practice] that was very much Monod's habit, to pick up the phone rand say] OK, we go 
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With regard to the intergovernmental level, the ERT first of all operates through its 
individual members. In this respect it is significant that the ERT consciously recruits 
its members from all member-states. Furthermore, in conjunction with its biannual 
plenary session, the ERT also always meets (usually in the form of a dinner) with 
several prominent members (normally including the prime-minister) of the govern­
ment then taking over the Council presidency on the eve of the Council summit. At 
the supranational level, this trans national elite interaction is probably even more sig­
nificant. A Round Table delegation generally meets the Commission president about 
twice a year rather forma.lly.39 In addition, ERT members often have more ad hoc 
meetings with various Commissioners. The direct personal access to the Commis­
sion is probably facilitated by the fact that the Round Table has always had one or 
two former Commissioners amongst its membership, most notably Davignon from 
1986 onwards, and more recently Peter Sutherland who joined as chairman of BP 
(while also serving as the chair of the European arm of Wall Street's quintessential 
investment bank, Goldman Sachs).40 At the national level, former ERT Vice Chair­
men, David Simon, recently made the reverse step, that is, from business (and 
membership of ERT ) to government by becoming a minister for Trade and Competi­
tiveness in Europe in the new UK government, making him, in the words of one sen­
ior ERT associate, 'a very useful contact,.41 
In sum, what we see developing around the ERT is a transnational elite network that 
ties together the elite of European business with key policy-makers and politicians at 
both the national and supranational levels of the European polity. In the remainder of 
this article I will examine how the ERT has used this position to shape European so­
cio-economic governance. 
ERT's evolving strategie projeet and the relaunehing of 
Europe 
The relaunching of European integration with the internal market programme has 
been interpreted by intergovernmentalists as the result of a convergence of national 
policy preferences enabling successful intergovernmental bargaining and by supra­
nationalists as driven by the policy-entrepreneurship of the Commission, operating in 
alliance with transnational business (but the latter playing a merely supportive role), 
and see somebody, we go and see Balladur to get the Uruguay Round tied up' (Interview, Brussels, 24 May 
1996) 
39 	 This tradition has been first estabJished with Delors and is now continuing with current Commission presi­
dent Santer (Interview with senior ERT official, 24 May, 1996). 
40 	 Former Commission President Franyois-Xavier Ortoli was also a member for a short period in the early 
1990s. 
41 	 Interview, Ivrea, 2 December, 1997. 
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and responding to Europe's perceived economic decline after the end of the 'golden 
age' ,42 I maintain that if we want to understand the socio-economic content of the 
relaunched integration process we have to understand it as the outcome of political 
struggle, not so much between states but between social forces (who may be 'repre­
sented' by a variety of actors) developing strategies and engaging in a struggle over 
European order at all levels of Europe's pOlity,43 As indicated, the most dominant of 
these social forces increasingly operate within a transnational setting, in particular, 
an emergent transnational capitalist class bound up with the transnationalisation of 
capital. 
In the remainder of this article I seek to show that the ERT as (gradua.lly evolving 
into) an elite organisation defining and propagating the interests of this class has 
played a significant role in not only giving the integration process a new boost by 
mobilising big business behind the completion of the internal market, but also in de­
veloping and promoting ideas and concepts that have helped to shape Europe's 
emergent regime of socio-economic governance, Of course, the ERT is only one of 
many actors active within the transnational arena of European integration (albeit one 
with exceptional clout) and to understand its role, and to understand the changing 
content of its strategy, we have to place it within a wider context of the evolving 
struggle over European order. 
Taking the relaunching of Europe trom the mid-1980s onwards as the historical con­
text, I claim that one can identify three rival projects within the subsequent transna­
tional struggle over Europe's social purpose,44 In the neoliberal project - which first 
found ideological expression in the early 1980s in the 'Eurosclerosis' discourse - the 
relaunching of the integration process was conceived as an opportunity to 'further 
open up the European region to the globalising world economy, and moreover to ac­
celerate the deregulation and privatisation of the European economies, thus liberat­
ing the 'beneticial' forces of the market trom the fetters of government intervention 
and other 'rigidifying' institutions impeding the necessary adjustments to achanging 
global environment. The benefits of the internal market project were thus seen as 
principa"y deriving from the freer market it would create, emphasising its deregula­
tory effects and expected efficiency gains, 
42 	 See, respectively, Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conven­
tional State Craft in the European Community', InternationalOrganization, Vol. 45, Winter (1991), pp. 19-56, 
and Sandholtz and Zysman, '1992', 
43 	 A somewhat similar approach has been recently advocated by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 'The Mak­
ing of a Polity: The Struggle over European Integration', in: Herbert Kitschelt et al (Eds.), Continuity and 
Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 70-97. Hooghe and Marks, 
however, do not propose a theoretical 'framework to understand which actors play what role in the struggle 
over European integration and what might account for the outcome of that struggle. 
44 	 For a more elaborate analysis of these three projects and of the context in which they developed, see Van 
Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism, Chapter 3. 
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Advocates of the neo-mereantHist projeet, in contrast, blamed Europe's loss of inter­
national competitiveness less on labour market rigidity, trade union power, or the 
welfare state, and more on the fragmentation of the European market, insufficient 
economies of scale, and the perceived technology gap vis-a-vis the US and Japan, 
all in a context of intensifying global competition. This project thus constituted a more 
defensive regionalisation strategy in which the internal market was conceived as the 
creation of a European 'home market' in which (would-be) 'European champions' 
would be able - thanks to the larger economies of scale - to successfully confront 
the growing non-European competition. Such aregeneration of European industry 
was to be further promoted by an active pan-European industrial policy, in particular 
in the area of new technologies, of which a protectionist European trade policy was 
often advocated as a (temporarily) necessary complement. 45 
The soeial demoeratie projeet, finally, sought to re-embed the new European market 
in a supranational framework of social regulation and thus protect and consolidate 
the so called 'European social model'. This project developed within the context of 
the initial success of the internal market programme as social democrats came to 
see European federalism as the answer to the dilemmas of the European Left in an 
era of globalisation, and was advocated most prominently by Jacques Delors, who as 
President of the Commission sought to move the integration process beyond market­
integration and towards state-building, hence promoting his vision of an 'organised 
capitalism' .46 
Neoliberalism and neo-mercantilism can be interpreted as contending strategies on 
the part of rival groups or 'fractions' within the ranks of Europe's emergent transna­
tional capitalist class. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s the main dividing line 
within this transnational elite was between on the one hand a 'globalist' fraction con­
sisting of Europe's most globalised firms (including global financial institutions), and 
on the other hand a 'Europeanist' fraction made up by large industrial enterprises 
primarily serving the European market and competing against the often cheaper im­
ports from outside Eu rope.47 The perspective of the former has tended towards neo­
liberalism, whereas the latter came to promote the neo-mercantilist project. 
Although they aspired to become more global, in the 1980s many of Europe's large 
industrial firms were still more regional TNCs. The ERT in this period was also domi­
nated by this Europeanist fraction, and its strategie orientation thus tended towards a 
45 	 See for an account of this strategy Joan Pearce and John Sutton, Protection and Industrial Policy in Europe 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). 
See George Ross, Jacques Oelors and European Integration (Polity Press, 1995). 
47 	 This division of European capital is an adaptation from one proposed by Holman, 'Transnational Class 
Strategy and the New Europe'. 
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defensive regionalism, the heart of which was the promotion of a big (and if neces­
sary protected) European ho me market.48 
From Europe' 92 to Maastricht 
ERT's campaign for a completion of the internat market was launched right after its 
founding in 1983 with a memorandum to Commissioner Davignon in which the 
Roundtable stated that: 'Europe remains a group of separated national markets 
[which] prevents mahy firms from reaching the scale necessary to resist pressure 
from non-European competitors. The European market must serve as a unified 
"home" base necessary to allow European firms to develop as powerful competitors 
in world markets'. 49 
Although plans for the completion of the internal market had been circulating within 
the Commission for years, concrete progress was not made and it was in this respect 
that the pro-European offensive on the part of the Roundtable had a very significant 
impact.50 Indeed, ERT members such as Gyllenhammar and Wisse Dekker of Philips 
were among the first within Europe's elite to publicly propose a European solution ­
in contrast to the then dominant national (champion) industrial strategies - to 
Europe's economic woes. Whereas up to the mid-1980s Europessimism was still 
pervasive, the ERT warned in a 1985 report against the danger of the idea of 
Europe's decline 'being etched permanently into a new European consciousness', 
and concluded that 'Europe is not locked into decline - the exit doors are wide open. 
It remains only to go through them,.51 
The basis of ERT's agenda-setting role with regard to what came to be the Europe 
1992 programme had been a plan presented in the autumn of 1984 and in January 
1985 by the then CEO of Philips, and founding member and later chairman of the 
Round Table, Wisse Dekker, which laid out a detailed programme for the creation of 
a 'European Community Home Market' by 1990. Dekker's 'agenda for action' - which 
was quickly adopted by the whole Roundtable - has been said by many to have di­
rectly inspired the Commission White Paper of June 1985.52 Indeed, in this respect 
48 	 For a more elaborate analysis of this early ERT strategy and how it was bound up with the structural com­
position of its membership, see Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism, chapter 5. 
49 	 ERT, Foundations for the Future of European Industry, Memorandum to EC Commissioner Davignon, 10 
June 1983. 
50 An argument that is a.lso made more elaborately by Cowles, The Polities of Big Business, chapter 4 {see 
also Cowles, 'Setting the Agenda'. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, chapter 5, denies the initiating role of 
the ERT in this respect but fails to come up with convincing evidence contradicting that of Cowles. 
51 	 ERT, Changing Seales (Roundtable of European Industrialists, 1985), pp. 3, 15. 
52 	 See Cowles, The Po/ities of Big Business, chapter 4. See also Alex Krause. Inside the New Europe 
(HarperCollins, 1991). 
97 
the ERT has been acknowledged as playing a critical role by several of the actors 
involved. Former Commissioner Peter Sutherland for instance stated that: 
I believe that it [the ERT] did playa significant role in the development of the 
1992 programme. In fact one can argue that the whole completion of the in­
ternal market project was initiated not by governments but by the Round Ta­
ble, and by members of it, Dekker in particular, and Philips playing a signi'fi­
cant role and some others ( ...) And I think it played a fairly consistent role 
subsequently in dialoguing with the Commission on practical steps to imple­
ment market Iiberalisation.53 
Although the ERT was thus instrumental in relaunching the European project by ral­
Iying around the idea of a unified European market, the internal market that was cre­
ated on the basis of the White Paper in many ways did not turn out to be the kind of 
home market that many of the early Round Table members (of the Europeanist frac­
tion) had envisaged, that is a relatively protected market in which Euro-champions 
could prosper in order to confront the global competition. The internal market did fa­
vour the creation of further economies of scale, and did make the European market a 
home market more comparable to that of the US and Japan. In the end, however, 
the internat market programme was hardly supported by the kind of 'flan king' policies 
that the neo-mercantilists had advocated. Responding to the demands of, among 
others, (members of) the ERT, the Commission did launch intra-European co-opera­
tion programmes in R&D such as ESPRIT, and also later started to promote the de­
velopment of trans-European infrastructure networks (so called TENs). Such poli­
cies, however, fell far short of any neo-mercantilist industrial relance. The fears of a 
protectionist Europe also turned out to be unfounded. Although those sectors of 
European industry - in particular cars and electronics - that lobbied the hardest for 
protectionist measures54, had their demands partially met, these limited protectionist 
policies have since gradually been ended, accelerating the integration of the EU into 
the global economy.55 
In the transnational struggle over Europe's relaunching, neoliberal social forces were 
thus gaining the upper-hand over those that had favoured a neo-mercantilist inter­
53 	 Telephone interview with Peter Sutherland, 27 January 1998. In order to help to keep momentum behind 
the implementation of Europe '92 the ERT set up a 'watchdog' committee, the Internal Market Support 
Committee (IMSC), whose members (all prominent Roundtable members) had many private consultations 
with both the Commission and with national government leaders, top-level meetings that were supported by 
'thousands of contacts on an ad hoc basis' between ERT associates and Community officials (Interview with 
Wisse Dekker by author and Otto Holman, Eindhoven, 6 September 1993). 
54 	 Including CEOs from these sectors within the ERT (Interviews). 
55 	 See Brian T. Hanson, 'What happened to Fortress Europe?: External Trade Policy Liberalisation in the 
European Union", InternationalOrganization, 52, 1 (1998), pp. 55-85. 
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pretation of the internat market. This struggle had also been fought out within the 
ranks of Europe's transnational business elite as united within the ERT56 - in which 
the Europeanist fraction was slowly losing its dominant position and moreover itself 
gradually abandoned its earlier neo-mercantilist perspective. Not only did many glob­
alist companies join the Round Table, the older ERT companies that were formerly 
still more oriented towards and dependent upon the European market became more 
global themselves.57 This shifting balance of power between the globalist and Euro­
peanist camps must, however, also be seen in the context of the rising dominance of 
neoliberal ideology within the European political economy and the appeal neoliberal­
ism gained as an alternative strategy after the political failure of the neo-mercantilist 
project. Concomitant, then, to the changing composition of its membership, the 
ideological and strategie orientation of the ERT gradually shifted away from a protec­
tive Europeanism and towards a neoliberal globalism. The broadening of ERT's 
membership with many prominent exponents of the globalist fraction (such as the 
heads of global giants like Unilever, Shell, BP and La Roche) also allowed the Round 
Table to develop more into an elite forum for the whole of an emergent European 
transnational capitalist class. The ERT of the 1990s has thus become a forum within 
which this class came to redefine its interests along neoliberallines and from which it 
has sought to shape European governance accordingly. 
A first testimony of ERT's shift away from its earlier protective regionalist orientation 
can be found in its September 1991 report Reshaping Europe - even if this still also 
contained many elements that revealed an as yet uneasy compromise between 
globalists and Europeanists - in which it presented its blue-print for the post-1989 
European order in the run-up to the Treaty of Maastricht.58 In the report the ERT 
called for both a widening and a deepening (and in this sense still going beyond a 
neoliberal conception) of the European integration process, with monetary union sin­
gled out as the most important next step. Support for the single currency was not 
equally strong amongst all members, however. 59 The French and Italian members 
were strongly in favour of it, whereas most Germans and British were still only luke­
warm. Reshaping Europe - reflecting part of the old neo-mercantilist agenda, albeit 
56 	 One prominent representative of ERT's neoliberal wing at that time, the then chairman of Unilever, Floris 
Maljers, in fact indicated that the 'struggle between liberals and protectionists' became a constant feature of 
the internal policy debates at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s (Interview by Otto Holman 
and author, Rotterdam, September 3,1993). 
57 	 For evidence on the "globalisation" of ERT's membership see Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism, 
chapter 6. The biggest sudden change in the composition of membership was due to a merger in 1988 with 
another, but largely ineffectual, transnational business forum, the Groupe des Presidents, whose member­
ship included more of truly global TNCs, and thus had a more liberal and free-trade orientation (Interviews). 
58 	 ERT, Reshaping Europe (European Round Table of Industrialists, 1991). 
59 Interviews. 
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in recast form - furthermore advocated an 'effective industrial policy', giving 'top pri­
ority' to Trans-European Infrastructure Networks (TENs). 
In contrast to the 1992 project, ERT's direct involvement in the Maastricht process 
was limited inasmuch as the initiative now seemed to have been taken over again by 
Europe's politicians, no longer needing business interests to prod them along the 
path of deepening integration. Indeed, one can argue that Maastricht was partly the 
result of a kind of 'spill-over' effect from the success of Europe 1992 and the tempo­
rary 'Europhoria' to which it had led.60 Inasmuch then as the ERT has played an initi­
ating role with regard to the internal market programme one can argue that it by that 
very fact has also helped to set the stage and create the pre-conditions for the sec­
ond phase in Europe's 'relaunch'. Moreover, when we analyse the (socio-economic) 
content of the Maastricht treaty, we encounter several of the ideas that the ERT, or 
at least part of the ERT membership, had been pushing for years, in particular the 
idea of monetary union as a necessary complement to the internal market, as weil as 
an enhanced European role in infrastructure and resea.rch and technology. Moreo­
ver, other parts of the treaty, most notably the social protocol, were not only testi­
mony to the efforts of social-democratic forces to put this on the agenda, but as 
much, if not more, to the role of transnational capital - represented inter aHa by the 
ERT - in watering it down, and seeing to it that this minimal programme would only 
be minimally implemented.61 
The ERT also had made quite extensive use of its high-level contacts to promote its 
agenda. Delors got an advance copy of the Reshaping Europe report,62 and there 
have been several consultations between the ERT and important Commissioners like 
Frans Andriessen, Ray MacSharry, Sir Leon Brittan and Delors himself, that is with 
people 'to wh ich we [the ERT] could explain our views on the Maastricht process,.63 
On the national level there have been similar consultations between individual mem­
bers of the ERT and key policy-makers of their respective national governments.64 
60 	 See for a detailed analysis of these and other factors Wayne Sandholtz, 'Choosing union: monetary politics 
and Maastricht', International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-39. 
61 	 Apart from communicating its neoliberal views through its reports and through other channels, at several 
critical moments the also ERT intervened directly to halt the construction of 'Social Europe' . For instance, 
as chairman of the ERT, Wisse Dekker send a letter to Commission President Delors and all 12 EC ambas­
sadors rejecting the proposed European Company Directive, arguing that industrial relations should remain 
at the national level (Martin Rhodes, 'The Social Dimension of the Single European Market: National versus 
Transnational Regulation', European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp 245-80, p. 260. 
62 	 Interview with senior ERT Official, Brussels, 27 April 1993. 
63 	 Interview with Maljers (by Otto Holman and author), Rotterdam, 3 September 1993. 
64 	 Ibid. A senior official of the ERT's also recalls a lengthy meeting between an ERT delegation and the then 
prime minister Ruud Lubbers at the time of the Dutch presidency under which Maastricht was concluded 
(Interview, 24 May 1996). 
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With regard to monetary union it has to be pointed out that as a strang consensus 
was lacking, the ERT could not push so strongly for EMU as same members would 
have liked. However, these members did organise themselves in a separate organi­
sation called the Association for Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE). Amongst the 
core membership of AMUE we 'find many ERT companies such as Fiat, Philips, 
Siemens and Total, whereas prominent (former) ERT members such as former Vice 
Chairman Andre Leysen, Giovanni Agnelli (Fiat), and Etienne Davignon are long­
serving members of AMUE's governing board.6S From the start, the industrialists of 
AMUE had close contacts with the Commission and in particular with Deiars in their 
efforts to promote monetary integration. At a joint press conference of adelegation of 
AMUE (consisting of the CEOs of Fiat, Philips, Solvay and Total) and Deiars, the 
latter expressed his appreciation for the 'very important' support of AMUE and stated 
that 'company managers not only follow us, but often precede us'. 66 Already in April 
1988 - two months before the Deiars Committee was set up, which subsequently 
prepared the way for EMU - AMUE presented a detailed blueprint for monetary un­
ion and in the following years published annual surveys indicating wide business 
support across Europe.67 On the eve of the Hannover summit, at which the Deiars 
Committee was created, AMUE sent a communique to the government leaders ex­
pressing their support for the creation of an independent European Central Bank.68 
Although more research needs to be carried out on the role of AMUE, it is at least 
evident that a large section of transnational business had effectively organised itself 
to help to set the agenda with regard to monetary union. Moreover, the close con­
nections between the ERT and AMUE da suggest that it is by and large the same 
elite of European transnational capital that has constituted at least one powerful in­
terest pushing for both Europe 1992 and EMU. 
At a more abstract level, the (socio-economic) content of Maastricht can be inter­
preted as reflecting the transnational configuration of social and political forces within 
the European political economy at the end of the 1980s. The Round Table here rep­
resented important sections of the ruling elite within that configuration, and as such 
was one important forum from which that elite could shape the debates that at the 
ideological level conditioned the political bargaining process. However, it was in the 
run-up to Maastricht that the social-democratic project led by Deiars also temporarily 
gained momentum and at least partly helped to set the agenda for Maastricht, even if 
65 http://amue.lf.net. 

66 Agence Europe, No. 4728,22 February 1988. 

67 Moravcsik, The Choice tor Europe, pp. 393, and 434. 

68 Agence Europe, No 4811,25 June 1988. 
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that agenda at the end largely failed to materialise.69 Maastricht was neither a tri­
umph for Thatcherite hyper-liberalism, nor for the social-democratic vision, nor, for 
that matter, for the neo-mercantilist strategy, but in fact contained elements of all 
three rival projects, even though it was biased in favour of the neoliberal project 
given the neoliberal orthodoxy underpinning the convergence criteria of EMU. Since 
Maastricht, however, the evolving European regime of socio-economic governance 
has witnessed a further shift towards 'disciplinary neoliberalism' as the austerity race 
to meet the convergence criteria put even more people out of work and put further 
strains on the welfare state, as the EU further integrated itself into agiobai free trade 
regime under the new WTO, and as 'competitiveness' - increasingly narrowly de­
fined as the freedom for transnational capital to maximise (short-term) profit - be­
came the primary 'benchmark' for European public policy. Below I will argue that in 
the construction of this new European order we can once more observe the political 
and ideological agency of the ERT. 
ERT's neoliberal offensive: shaping the discourse of Euro­
pean socio-economic governance 
After Maastricht, ERT's neoliberal shift has been further consolidated as transpires 
from its reports, which have increasingly come to focus on deregulation, labour mar­
ket flexibility, downsizing the public sector, etc., while the commitment to global free 
trade is expressed more unequivocally than ever.70 
With regard to ERT's strengthened free trade orientation, the crucial battle was 
probably that over the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT trade talks (in 
December 1993), which in retrospect probably signalled the final defeat of the Euro­
protectionists, both within the Round Table and the European capitalist class more 
widely.71 After having reached internat unity on this point, the Round Table subse­
quently intensified its lobby campaign for a speedy conclusion of the trade negotia­
tions, and was probably one of the more important actors instrumental in changing 
the position of the French government.72 According to the then director of the GA TI, 
69 	 See for a more elaborate discussion, Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capita/ism, chapter 7. See also Ross, 
Jacques De/ors. 
70 	 See for instance ERT, Beating the Crisis: A Charter tor Europe's /ndustria/ Future (European Roundtable of 
Industrialists, 1993). 
71 	 This was at least the perception of former ERT Vice-Chairmen Floris Ma.ljers (Interview by Otto Holman and 
author, Rotterdam, 3 September 1993) and David Simon (Interview, London, 12 September 1996). 
72 	 At least according to a senior ERT official who related that the ERT, then chaired by Frenchman Jeröme 
Monod, met with French prime minister Balladur to discuss with him how the French government could say 
yes to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round [which is what it wanted but did not know how to given domes­
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Peter Sutherland, 'the ERT was active and supportive of the Uruguay Round at the 
later stage when I was at the WTO,.73 
The post-Maastricht period also witnessed a deepening of the consensus in favour of 
monetary union, with the Round Table becoming more active in supporting this pro­
ject.74 The crises of the EMS in 1992 and 1993 convinced in particular the Germans 
that the Deutschmarkzone did not provide sufficient stability. Moreover, the neolib­
eral wing of the Round Table has also come to be more convinced of the virtues of 
EMU, principally because of the 'salutary' disciplinary effects the EMU criteria so far 
have had and continue to have on the socio-economic policies of Europe's national 
75governments.
The emphasis on the positive role of market forces has never been so strong as in 
current Round Table discourse. The ERT of today stresses that we live in a new 
world, in which 'nothing can be done today the same way as we did it yesterday; that 
is what we mean by 'flexibility' and 'freedom,.76 It is in the area of social and labour 
market policies that ERT's current discourse is most explicitly neoliberal. Weil aware 
of the negative employment effects of the cost-cutting accumulation strategies that 
their companies have now adopted, the ERT capitalists in a 1993 report gloomily 
warn that 'a hard core of persistent unemployment will remain into the next century', 
but add that this core might yet be reduced if Europe is willing to 'flexibilize and up­
grade the supply of labour.,77 The former is de'fined primarily in terms of external 
flexibility, which hence means that the burden of adjustment will have to be carried 
by labour as the ERT itself is in fact frank to admit: '[al very large amount of the effort 
to adjust European labour markets will rely on labour' .78 In the end, the desired 'ad­
aptation' of labour implies a fundamental restructuring of state-society relations. 
tic opposition) without angering public opinion, and particularly the farm lobby too much (Interview, Brus­
sels, 24 May 1996). 
73 	 Telephone Interview with Peter Sutherland, 27 January 1998. 
74 	 Thus, in a letter send by the ERT to all the heads of state and govemment on the eve of the Madrid Euro­
pean Council of December 1995, the ERT reiterated its full support for monetary union and asked the gov­
emment leaders to ensure 'monetary stability based on economic convergence and financial discipline'. 
(Mimeo., Letter dated 17 October 1995 and signed by Jerome Monod, then Chairman of the ERT. A copy of 
the letter was also send to Commission president Jacques Santer, and the issue was discussed with him a 
few weeks later). 
75 	 As a current prominent ERT member notes: 'Maastricht already has had its biggest effect. It would never 
have come to such a convergence if it had not been for the Maastricht criteria. Belgian politics [for instance] 
is unthinkable without Maastricht, then we would not have any break on making big deficits'. Interview, Ant­
werp, 21 May 1996. 
76 	 ERT, Beating the Crisis, p. 28. 
77 	 ERT, European Labour Markets. An Update on Perspectives and Requirements tor Job Generation in the 
Second Half otthe 1990s (European Round Table of Industrialists, 1993), pp 8, and ii. 
78 	 Ibid., p. 16. 
103 
Again the ERT is weil aware of this, and, speaking the language of hegemony, it ap­
peals for the creation of a 'new social consensus': 
Enabling Europe to return to high employment growth requires more than re­
placing policy instruments, it calls for a change of our economic and social 
structures. But governments are only able to change structures when there is 
a new social consensus, Le. the convergence on principles and, ultimately, 
agreement on the goals for that change among the social partners, govern­
ments, the opinion leaders and ultimately, population .... We need a consen­
sus on the European level that onlya healthy, efficient and competitive private 
sector is able to provide sufficient jobs, and that markets should be lett to al­
locate labour efficient/y.79 
Creating this new consensus means that the existing 'distorted [sie] social balance,80 
has to be changed. A key concept in the discourse in which this nascent hegemonie 
project of Europe's transnational capitalist class is a.rticulated is that of 'competitive­
ness'. Competitiveness has been able to come to function as such a key concept 
because of its potential to represent the 'general interest' as it appeals equally to 
neoliberals, neo-mercantilists, and social-democrats alike. But what competitiveness 
actually means, and how it has to be achieved, is an open question decided in con­
crete struggles. Below I argue that competitiveness is increasingly being defined in 
neoliberal terms and that the ERT has been one important forum promoting such a 
definition. 
The new competitiveness discourse 
Competitiveness has become the keyword not only in ERT's discourse, but in socio­
economic discourse at large. The argument put forward here is that the ERT has 
been one of the more important 'authors' of this competitiveness discourse within the 
European context. The first testimony (at the EU level) of the power of this discourse 
was the Delors's White Paper on 'Growth, Competitiveness and Employment', which 
since then has become one of the main intellectual reference points in the socio­
economic policy debate within the EU.81 Different pieces of evidence suggest that the 
ERT had a significant input into the development of this key Commission docu­
82
ment. At the press conference after the December 1993 Brussels summit at which 
79 	 Ibid, p. 9 (original emphasis). 
80 	 Ibid., p. ii. 
81 	 European Commission, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 
21st Century. White Paper (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1994). 
82 	 In the view of former ERT Vice-Chairman Andre Leysen the White Paper can be taken as a good example 
of ERT's influence (Interview, Antwerp, 21 May 1996). 
104 
Delors had presented his White Paper, the then Commission president recalled his 
consultation with industry and the support he had received for his proposals by the 
ERT.83 The week before, Delors had also participated in the press presentation of 
the ERT report Beating the Crisis that was meant as its contribution to the Commis­
sion's future economic strategy.84 As a senior ERT official commented upon the rela­
tion between these two reports: 
It was very parallel, and we saw their drafts and they saw our dra.fts. And one 
of my 'friends, a very senior of'ficial in the Commission, he said to me, there is 
basically no difference between them ... : very similar, growth, investment, 
competitiveness, and employment. What we have tried to do is to get these 
things fixed together in people's minds ( ...) the message is the same, these 
things all go together, you won't 'fight unemployment, if you don't fight for 
competitiveness, you won't get growth if you don't have investment.85 
Indeed, careful reading of the two reports does reveal some striking similarities. Most 
importantly, they share the basic premise that higher growth and employment can 
only be achieved through promoting the competitiveness of European industry. 
Moreover, the strategy (with regard to these objectives) outlined by the White Paper 
also echoes that of Beating the Crisis. In the Commission document, the road to 
higher employment follows a strategy based on the three 'inseparable elements' of, 
one, a 'macro-economic framework which instead of constraining market forces ( ..) 
supports them', two, structural adjustment of policies 'aimed at increasing the com­
petitiveness of European industry and at removing the rigidities which are curbing its 
dynamism' , and, three, 'active policies and structural changes in the labourmarket 
and in the regulations'. 86 Just as the concept of industrial policy is recast in a more 
liberal frame, so the Delorist vision of a 'social Europe' is further watered down in the 
paper. 
Notwithstanding this, Delors's Paper was still largely an attempt at a compromise 
between neoliberals and social democrats.87 Since then, however, competitiveness 
is increasingly being defined in neoliberal terms within the Commission's policy dis­
course. As indicated, the ERT has constituted a key forum within which this neolib­
eral competitiveness discourse has been articulated. A senior ERT official explains 
the wayin which competitiveness has become the key concept as folIows: '[t]he 
83 Agence Europe, No. 6127, special edition, 12 December 1993. 

84 Agence Europe, No. 6122,6 December 1993. 

85 InteNiew, Brussels, 24 May, 1996. 

86 European Commission, Growth, Competitiveness, Emp/oyment, p.61. 

87 This point is also made by Ross, Jacques Oe/ars, pp. 224-225. 
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members of the European Round Table perceive it as their role to make some input 
into policy making at a European level on those issues which are of crucial impor­
tance for the economic strength of Europe, what we are now calling the sort of gen­
eral term of competitiveness. And competitiveness is now a useful word but it is 
really like a paper bag into which you put things'.88 What the ERT has been trying to 
put in the bag - that is, the meaning it has sought to attach to the concept of com­
petitiveness - is, I contend, increasingly of neoliberal origin. 
Although competitiveness as a political catchword has only recently risen to its cur­
rent heights, competitiveness was already much talked about in the 1980s, not in the 
last place by the ERT. However, then the meaning of competitiveness was still pri­
marily bound up with a neo-mercantilist ideology in which competitiveness meant 
being able to compete in the global market place by first shielding oneself from the 
forces of global competition, in order to then enter the fray on the basis of increased 
strength achieved partly through non-market means. Now competitiveness is about 
survival of the fittest in a fully open environment of agiobai free market in which 
competitive performance is what the market measures it to be. 
ERT's promotion of the concept of competitiveness has certainly contributed to the 
rise of that concept within European governance. A first testimony to this was the 
setting-up by the EU of a 'Competitiveness Advisory Group' (CAG) in the beginning 
of 1995, just over a year after the ERT had first proposed the creation of such a 
group.89 The CAG membership consists of CEOs, as weil as leading trade union rep­
resentatives and other 'eminent persons' (usually former politicians) but is dominated 
by the former group.90 At the time of its founding, three ERT members (Barnevik, 
Maljers, and Simon) joined the 13 member council, and at present Marco Tronchetti 
Provera (of Pirelli) maintains the links between the two groups. It should not surprise 
us therefore that the 'advice' this group has so far given (biannual reports to the 
European Council) closely resembles that of the ERT, with both the Round Table 
and the CAG spreading the new competitiveness gospel. 91 As a senior official of the 
ERT remarked: 'One thing that is quite important in this whole scenario, is multiplicity 
of messages and delivery systems around the whole theme'. 92 
As an operationalisation of its competitiveness ideology, the ERT has, in tandem with 
the CAG, started to promote the concept of 'benchmarking' vis-a-vis the Commission 
88 	 Interview, Brussels, 24 May, 1996. 
89 	 ERT, Beating the Crisis, p. 27. 
90 	 For a list of present and former members as weil as other information on the GAG, see http://europa.eu.int! 
comm/cdp/cag. 
91 	 See its first four reports as collected in Alexis Jacquemin and Lucio R. Pench (Eds.), Europe competing in 
the global economy. Reports of the Competitiveness Advisory Group (Edward Eigar, 1997). 
92 	 Interview (Brussels, 24 May, 1996). 
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and the member-states. Benchmarking means 'measuring the performance' of indi­
vidual firms, sectors, but also of nations against that of the 'best competitors' in the 
world.93 After launching the idea, the Round Table has organised several seminars 
with Commission and government officials to promote the concept. 94 
In its report Benchmarking for Policy-Makers, the ERT is very explicit about how pol­
icy-makers should 'measure' competitiveness: the country or (macro-) region that is 
most competitive is the country that is most successful in attracting mobile capital: 
'Governments must recognise today that every economic and social system in the 
world is competing with all the others to attract the footloose businesses' .95 That the 
expected outcome of this competition for transnationally mobile capital will be a 
deepening of neolibera.l restructuring transpires from the kind of 'benchmarks' that 
are for instance proposed with regard to the policy goal of creating employment: the 
level of 'Iabour costs ( ..), the flexibility of labour; working and factory hours ( ..) termi­
nation costs'. 96 The Maastricht criteria are also mentioned as a successful applica­
tion of the benchmarking concept. 97 
At the same time, the ideological potential of a concept like benchmarking, and in­
deed its capacity to appeal to a wider set of forces within society and to incorporate 
them into the emergent hegemonic bloc, is also not lost on the Round Table capital­
ists as the report stresses that benchmarking is 'not just an analytical device' but also 
'carries a symbolic message': 
At a time when the European model of society is experiencing some difficul­
ties, and change may be perceived as painful (though not nearly so painful as 
the results of not changing), the role of symbols in mobilising human effort 
may become more important, and benchmarking can be part of this.98 
Competitiveness and benchmarking have also become the key concepts within the 
public (socio-economic) policy discourse of the EU. Analysing the policy documents 
of the Commission one a.lso sees how these concepts are mobilised to promote a 
programme of neoliberal restructuring aiming to remove, in the words of the Director­
General for Industry, the still remaining 'rigidities and distortions ... that prevent 
93 ERT, European Competitiveness, p. 4. 

94 Interviews (see also Agence Europe, 23 November 1996). 

95 ERT, Benchmarking tor Policy-Makers: The Way to Competitiveness, Growth and Job Creation. (European 

Round Table of Industrialists, 1996), p. 15. 
96 Ibid, p. 13. 
97 Ibid, p. 18. 
98 Ibid, p. 17. 
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Europe from fully exploiting its potential,.99 ERT's promotion of the concept of bench­
marking vis-a-vis the Commission has been particularly successful. In the same 
month that the ERT published its report on benchmarking the Industry Directorate­
General came out with a document entitled Benchmarking the Competitiveness of 
European /ndustry in which it suggested that benchmarking should be used as a 
central policy-guideline at all levels of EU governance.100 In a follow-up Communica­
lion the Commission explicitly acknowledges the input of the ERT as the first busi­
ness organisation to draw the Commission's and the Council's attention to the 
benchmarking concept. 101 In this Communication - and at the request of the Council 
of Ministers 102 - the Commission launched a number of concrete initiatives to put the 
concept of benchmarking into practice, including the establishment of a 'High Level 
Group on Benchmarking' - made up by 'experts' from industry - and the initiation of 
a number of so called pilot projects in different member-states to start identifying 
Europe's 'weaknesses and inefficiencies' at the enterprise, sectoral, and public policy 
level (or what is referred to as 'framework conditions,).103 
I nvoking the inevitability of globalisation and 'hence' the need for adaptation the 
Commission defines benchmarking as a tool for improving competitiveness and with 
that as 'a tool for promoting the convergence towards best practice' .104 This involves 
the global 'comparison of societal behaviour [sic], commercial practice, market 
structure and public institutions' .105 As the 'High Level Group on Benchmarking' ­
chaired by a board member of Investor, the investment company controlling the 
Swedish Wallenberg empire - makes clear in its first report, the object of all these 
'comparisons' is to promote rapid 'structural reforms' that will allow Europe to adapt 
to the exigencies of globalisation: 'this involves further liberalisation, privatisation ... , 
more flexible labour laws, lower government subsidies, etc.,106 Similarly, the Com­
mission idenlJfies labour market reform as a 'vital factor for the competitiveness of 
99 	 Director-General for Industry, Stefano Micossi, in the 'Preface' of: European Cornmission, The Competitive­
ness of European Industry (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997), p. 5. 
100 	 European Commission, Benchmarking the Competitiveness of European Industry, (Com (96) 436 final, 9 
October 1996), p 16, and ff. 
101 	 European Commission, Benchmarking: /mplementation of an Instrument Available to Economic Actors and 
Pub/ic Authorities (Com (97) 153/2, 16 April 1997), p. 3. 
102 	 At the Industry Council of 14 November 1996. The Council recently called again upon the Commission 'to 
ensure the ongoing development of benchmarking' at a/llevels (see European Commission, Bulletin EU, 4­
1999, point 1.3.79). 
103 	 Commission,lmplementation. 
104 	 Commission, Benchmarking, p. 16, and Commission, Implementation. 
105 	 Commission, Implementation, p. 3. 
106 	 High Level Group on Benchmarking, 'First Report by the High Level Group on Benchmarking', Benchmark­
ing Papers, No. 2 (1999), European Commission, Directorate-Generallll, p. 13. 
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European industry', calling for 'a radical rethink of all relevant labour market systems 
- employment protection, working time, social protection, and health and safety - to 
adopt them to a world of work which will be organised differently' .107 
Conclusion 
To sum up, then, the social purpose of the new Europe is increasingly oriented to 
serve the interests of a globalising transnational capitalist class. This article has ar­
gued that the European Round Table has developed into a key elite organisation 
articulating and defining the interests of this class and propagating them vis-a.-vis the 
European institutions and within public debate. As such, then, I claimed that the ERT 
has played a significant role in mediating the material and ideological power of this 
transnational class and thus in contributing to the neoliberal transformation of Euro­
pean order. Nevertheless, capital too, and in particular industrial capital, 'cannot live 
by the logic of what Karl Polanyi called the self-regulating market alone, but needs 
supporting government policies and social (non-market) institutions in order to accu­
mulate wealth.108 These conflicting requirements of capital may work themselves out 
in different ways, depending on the prevalent configuration of social forces. 
Given the preponderance of globalising transnational capital within that configuration 
the conflict for now is settled in favour of 'the principle of economic liberalism,109 and 
all its socially uprooting effects. Still, at least within continental Europe, the neoliberal 
project has yet to Jully disembed the European market economy from its post-war 
social and political institutions. On the one hand, the primacy lies with freedom of 
capital and of markets, implying that the post-war 'European model' needs to be fun­
damentally restructured. On the other hand, it is recognised that this restructuring 
process cannot take place overnight, that it will have to be a gradual process, in 
which a high degree of social consensus is maintained. These limits to a full-fledged 
(Iaissez-faire) neoliberalism are even acknowledged by the ERT, which after all is 
predominantly a club of transnational industrial capitalists110, who tend to be more 
aware (than financial capitalists) of the social requirements of the reproduction of 
capital. Thus, notwithstanding its neoliberal competitiveness discourse the ERT also 
still calls for a European Ordnungspolitik clearly more in tune with the German model 
of Rhineland capitalism than with the (UK) neoliberal model. Moreover, in spite of the 
107 	 European Commission, Benchmarking., p. 11., see also European Commission, Competitiveness of Euro­
pean Industry, chapter 4. 
108 	 Karl POlanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon, 1957). 
109 	 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 132. 
110 	 Although in the case of some key ERT members the phrase 'finance capitalists' would be more correct 
given the links these industrialists have (via interlocking directorates) to financial institutions. 
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opposition that the ERT has waged against EU social policies, it is also keen to pre­
serve the ideology and practice of 'social partnership, thus rejecting a full-fledged 
neoliberal (Anglo-Saxon) model of ind ustrial relations. 111 
Still, this articulation of the original neoliberal project with some elements of what 
were originally opposing projects (neo-mercantilism and transnational social-democ­
racy) thus far seems to be more of a hegemonic strategy of incorporation that seeks 
to further the neoliberal agenda than one that offers genuine prospects for a sub­
stantive 'embedding' of the new European market. That is to say, the limited ele­
ments of 'embeddedness' that we may discern in, for instance, ERT's discourse 
seem to be primarily oriented towards the interests of globalising transnational capi­
tal. The question remains then to which extent the social purpose of the emergent 
European order may yet be constructed on a different ideological basis than that 
contained in the idea that the ultimate 'benchmark' for the 'performance' of a society 
is its ability to accumulate wealth in private hands. The answer to this question de­
pends at least in part upon the extent to which labour as weil as other groups that 
lose out in the neoliberal globalisation process, will be able to form a stronger coun­
tervailing power at both the national and European levels. From a critical perspective, 
examining these possibilities, however remote they may presently seem, should be a 
necessary complement to the research agenda that has informed this article on the 
ideological power of Europe's transnational capitalist class. 
111 	 For a more elaborate analysis of these 'limits to neoliberalism' in ERT's current discourse, see Van Apel­
doorn, Transnational Capitalism, chapter 8. 
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Magnus Ryner 
Recent Discourse on the "Third Way": On the 
Dynamics of Social Democratic Neo-Liberalism 
European social democracy is undergoing a fundamental ideological transformation, 
which somewhat unoriginally has been coined 'the politics of the Third Way'. This 
transformation is best interpreted in terms of an attempt to integrate social democ­
racy into an emerging transnational neo-liberal intersubjectivity (GiII, 1998). 
Using the Gramscian master-concept 'historic bloc' a set of works has recently been 
written that show how this politico-ideological phenomenon fuses with material de­
velopments in various parts of the European Union today (Hay & Watson, 1998; Ry­
ner & GiII, 1998; Waringo, 1999; Ryner, 1999). These works contribute to critical re­
search by treating the intellectual tendency in question as an external phenomenon, 
subject to social-scienHfic analysis. From this vantage point, the logic of internat co­
herence of this bloc is analyzed, as is also the social stratification and exclusions it 
implies, as weil as its socio-political contradictions. The general diagnosis of these 
works is that, by consenting and even identifying with a policy of market discipline, 
Social Democratic governments of today do not represent an alternative to neo-lib­
eralism, but tend to actively promote neo-liberal restructuring in Europe. Possibly, the 
representational and mobilizational channels of Social Democratic parties and trade 
unions might stabilize neo-liberal restructuring by making 'competitive austerity' and 
further re-commodification of labour markets acceptable in societies that had be­
come disillusioned with the 'euphoric' neo-liberal phase of the early 1980s. Serious 
questions are raised, however, over not only the economic, but also the political 
contradictions that this implies, including a vacuum of social representation. As social 
democratic governments affirm that 'There is No Alternative' (TINA), serious ritts are 
provoked within its own internal (party and trade union) structures. In society at large, 
this tends to breed apathy and cynicism towards democratic politics. Paradoxically, 
by demobilizing welfare state constituencies and nurturing a kind of 'anti-politics', the 
political failure of social democratic neo-liberalism is likely to further enhance the 
'deregulatory' thrust of neo-libera.l politics. At the same time, democratic forms and 
content are further hollowed out. Against this backdrop, the critical works in question 
point to the inherently political nature of neo-liberal restructuring and thereby 
indirectly refute the TINA arguments of social democratic elites. In this sense, like 
Gramsci and Machiavelli, they fuse their political analysis with advocacy in their 
conclusions. 
This paper approaches the same subject-matter 'the other way around', as it were, 
and as such it constitutes a complementary and alternative method of critique to the 
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one just outlined. It begins by engaging the ideological discourse of the 'Third Way' 
from 'within' and subjects it to a critique from the common vantage point of social 
democratic politico-philosophical commitments and common sense, that also the 
Third Way - however neo-liberal it may be - must invoke. It then works itself 10Ut' to­
wards real concrete developments in order to iIIustrate, validate and enforce its 
points. 1 
This strategy is based on Gramsci's conception of ideology as an intellectual activity, 
that at the same time is a material practice. Ideology in this sense is a multi-Ievelled 
phenomenon that contains and fuses a wide range of - more or less coherent - dis­
cursive forms trom 'corTImon sense' to 'philosophy'. These discourses are fused 
through political practice by organizations in political society(such as state appara­
tuses, political parties and the mass-media). The tunction of ideological discourse as 
a whole is to cement (or better, interpolate) rTlultifarious segments of society, to a 
broad political direction. Politicians and mass-parties playa strategic role in this in­
tellectual activity as 'organic intellectuals'. Their role is to integrate multifarious social 
segments and interests, by elaborating and mediating different interpretations of 
'common sense', with a coherent and operational political strategy in the state (and 
other public authority agencies), that also is consistent with material developments 
(Häusler & Hirsch, 1989). The recent joint statement issued by Bla.ir and Schröder 
(1999) on the IThird Way' attempts to set the framework for such a mediation. 
But also social scientists and philosophers may under certain conditions playa cru­
cial role in ideological activity. They may provide ideological discourse with a special 
logical coherence, direction, and authority, by drawing on 'scientific' and philosophi­
cally grounded arguments. Hence, the capacity of politicians to fuse social interpola­
tion with operational unity is enhanced. It is obvious that economic corps has played 
a role for neo-liberalism in this context, by giving public policy a certain direction and 
authority. However, after the end of the 'euphoric' (Thatcherite) stage of neo-liberal­
ism, it seems as if this economistic discourse has not successfully provided ade­
quate for social legitimation (see also Bieling, 1998). In this context it is interesting to 
note that the cosmopolitan intellectual of the Third Way per excellence is a sociolo­
gist, whose past lies in the intellectual milieux of the 'New Left', and who seeks to 
fuse neo-liberal economics with more 'social' and communitarian sentiments. I am 
referring to Tony Blair's 'allegedly favourite intellectual', the Director of the London 
School of Economics, Anthony Giddens. His The Third Way: The Renewal of Social 
Democracy (1998) has the stated aim to be an ideological treatise for a 'modernized' 
social democracy, and it is quite clear that it is the main source for the aforemen­
tioned Blair-Schröder document. 
This distinction between 'inside' and 'outside' is of course a bit overdrawn. All types of critical theory funda· 
mentally deny the ontology of a subject·object division. 
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In this paper, I will critique the discourse of the 'Third Way' exactly on the level where 
Anthony Giddens seeks to pitch it as a social-scientific/philosophical justification for 
a neo-liberalization of social democracy. Hence, his book is the focus for the first part 
of the paper. This strategy of critique has two merits: First, the self-reflexivity and 
logical coherence of the intellectual discourse of an academic intellectual allows me 
to specify exactly in what sense the 'Third Way' is neo-liberal, and how it attempts to 
articulate social-democratic principles. Second, a critique pitched at this level be­
comes a direct antithesis to the academic intellectual version of the 'Third Way' dis­
course. This, it is hoped, will provide a fruittul basis trom wh ich one can develop a 
coherent left alternative. There is a grave need for such an alternative today. The 
limitationof the alternative critical method described earlier, which focuses on the 
analysis of historic blocs, is due to the indirectness of its critique. It is often unclear 
exactly what its implications are for an alternative political strategy. 
I will argue that Giddens' proposals for a democratization, de-bureaucratization, and 
pluralization of public policy contradict his proposed agenda for a more market-ori­
ented 'supply-side' form of economic regulation. The former proposals, reminiscent 
of arguments that have been pursued by the New Left since the late 1960s, are ac­
tually weil founded, and ought to be part of a renewed European left politics. How­
ever, they are not likely to achieve any meaningful content, given the kind of market­
and supply side-oriented economic structure that is the likely result of Giddens' prin­
cipie of 'no rights without responsibilities'. Giddens demands too much from the citi­
zen. S/he should be an active, responsible and ethical participant in the public 
sphere, and a nurturing parent, while at the same time s/he is to be a rugged and 
mobile risk-manager on the labour market and in the management of her/his assets. 
This underestimates the extent to which the commodity-economic logic needs to be 
checked in order to create sufficient leisure for meaningful democratic participation. 
The likely outcome is a further exacerbation of the contradictions of capital accumu­
lation, distribution and democratic legitimation. Giddens' ideological construct does 
not face up to this, because it is fundamentally based on a conflation of three differ­
ent types of risk. Giddens incorrectly treats ecological, social and economic risk as 
synonymous. 
In order to rescue Giddens' conception of a democratized public policy, therefore, 1 
suggest that we continue to consider ways of using public authority to restrict the 
commodity-economic logic of the market economy (de-commodification). Giddens, of 
course, would counter that this is exactly the type of 'traditional social democracy' 
that has been rendered obsolete by the intensifying processes of globalization and 
technological change. However, here my paper leaves the realm of textual exegisis 
and enters debates about the nature of real concrete developments in 'post-indus­
trial' and 'post-Fordist' political economy. Here, invoking recent research in compara­
tive political economy on 'models of capitalism', Ichallenge the stylized characteriza­
tion of these developments that one finds in the work of Giddens as weil as in the 
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recent work of Esping-Andersen (1996). Drawing especially on developments in 
Sweden, I will show that Giddens underestimates the continued salience of the 'tra­
ditional social democratic' project of a 'humanization of capitalism', and the extent to 
which traditional social democratic institutions might provide appropriate institutional 
forms for such humanization in the present phase of capitalist development. 
At the same time, Sweden did enter aperiod of crisis in the 1990s and no doubt 
'globalization' had a lot to do with this. However, this crisis, as weil as the general 
thrust of globalization that we presently experience, was in a decisive way socio-po­
litically constructed. In this construction, the type of ideology that Giddens prornotes ­
insofar as it had permeated the commanding heights of economic regulation in Swe­
den - was very much part of the problem. In other words, as the work of the Gram­
scians just quoted has shown, by rendering the contingent necessary through a pol­
icy of 'new constitutionalism', the politics of the Third Way became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy as it undermined a 'humanization of capitalism' approach in favour of neo­
liberalism. The implication of this is that the crisis of social democracy is not due so 
much to the dysfunctionality of the welfare state in an era of global competititon. 
Rather, the crisis is fundamentally political and ideological. Social democracy does 
not at present seem to possess the virtu to tap the potential that exists to further de­
velop its project of a democratic welfare state. 
It should be made clear from the beginning that when it is here suggested that An­
thony Giddens contributes to the hegemony of neo-liberalism, it does not imply that 
his views are identical to Thatcherism/Reaganism. In fact, for Giddens, there is a 
significant role for welfare state inteNention. In addition, his critique of bureaucracy 
and arguments in favour of a democratization and pluralization of the welfare state 
are reminiscent of those of the 'New Left' in the early 1970s (eg. Habermas, 1976; 
Offe, 1985). But then, hegemonic politics is not primarily about articulating a common 
vision, but rather about '[articulating] different visions of the world in such a way that 
their potential antagonism is neutralized' (Laclau, 1977: 161). It is exactly this that 
Giddens does. The effect of his particular variant of a politics of commodification, 
and a politics of no alternatives would be to interpolate the outlook of the New Left 
generation of intellectuals into the neoliberal bloc. There would be contest in such a 
bloc, but there would be agreement about the necessity and desirability of 
commodification. 
Giddens' intention of integrating social democratic ideology with the inherently neo­
liberal conception of commodification becomes especially clear in his discussion of 
the meaning of 'Ieft' and 'right' in pOlitics, adopted from Norberto Bobbio. 
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When parties and political ideologies are more or less evenly balanced [ ... ] 
few question the relevance of the distinction between left and right. But in 
times, when one or the other becomes so strong that it seems 'the only game 
in town, both sides have interests in questioning that relevance. The side that 
is more powerful has an interest, as Margaret Thatcher proclaimed, in de­
claring 'there is no alternative'. Since its ethos has become unpopular, the 
weaker side usually tries to take over some of the views of its opponents and 
propagate those as its own opinions. The classic strategy of the losing side is 
to produce a 'synthesis of opposing positions with the intention in practice of 
saving whatever can be saved of onels own position by drawing in the op­
posing position and thus neutralizing it'(cf Bobbio, 1996: 16). Each side rep­
resents itself as going beyond the old left/right distinction or combining ele­
ments of it to create a new and vital orientation, rand thereby a new left-right 
polarity]. (Giddens: 41, cf Bobbio, 1996). 
Hence, Giddens proceeds to layout a 'new left polar-position'. But this is to be un­
derstood as a polarity within the 'politics of no alternative' as defined by Thatcher: 'a 
synthesis of opposing positions, which draws in the opposing position and neutral­
izes it, to save whatever can be saved'. It is exactly in this neutralization, however, 
that the hegemony of the opposing position is reaffirmed. It has become "common 
sense'. 
What, then, more specifically is Giddens' understanding of the 'politics of no alterna­
tive'? And, especially, in what sense can one say that he accepts the politics of a 
neo-liberal common sense? The neo-liberal aspects of Giddens' argument pertain 
specifically to issues of economic rationality. Quite plainly, he states that the 'old 
style' social democratic claim that capitalism can be humanized by public intervention 
has been rendered passe by the 'death of Marxism', sealed by the collapse of the 
East Bloc. Social democratic theory - also in its Keynesian variant - was always 
inadequate in terms of its conceptualization of 'supply-side' aspects of markets, such 
as issues of innovation and productivity (Marx and Keynes took productivity for 
granted). It was also inadequate due to its underestimation of the importance of 
markets as informational devises. These inadeqaucies were revealed in the 1980s, 
'with intensifying processes of globalization and technological change'(Giddens, pp. 
4-5). 
Giddens' economic critique of 'old style' Social Democracy centres on a particular 
conception of risk, and its role in society. The welfare state, as advocated by Social 
Democrats, has until now been based on the minimization of risk for the individual, 
based on the idea of social pooling. Individuals have been able to unconditionally 
claim social entitlements from public programmes in the case of iIIness, unemploy­
ment, old age, and so forth. While Giddens does not argue for the abolition of this 
type of risk-pooling altogether, he does argue that such protection of risk cannot and 
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should not be absolute and unconditional. Welfare policy should not only minimize 
risk, but also: 
harness[..] the positive or energetic side of risk and provide [ ... ] resources for 
risk taking. Active risk taking is recognized as inherent in entrepreneurial ac­
tivity, but the same applies to the labour force. Deciding to go to work and 
give up benefits, or taking a job in a particular industry, are risk infused activi­
ties - but such risk taking is often beneficial both to the individual and to the 
wider society (Giddens, p. 116). 
Risk taking is, for Giddens, essential, given the logic of technological innovation in 
the competitive globali,zed economy. With respect to this point, he is particularly criti­
cal of unconditional social citizenship entitlement, that traditionally have been advo­
cated by social democrats, and that have been institutionalized in the Nordic coun­
tries. On this point, he invokes the argument of moral hazard of the Swedish 
economist Assar Lindbeck, who has been at the forefront arguing for neo-liberal re­
forms in Sweden.2 According to the moral hazard thesis, public insurance protection 
(against unemployment and iIIness for example), make people alter their behaviour 
in a way that makes them sub-optimal market actors, engendering, for example, 
higher levels of absenteeism and lower levels of job-search (Giddens, pp 114-15, cf 
Lindbeck, 1995). This is, of course, held to undermine economic competitiveness, 
and the economic basis for the welfare state. In place of the risk-minimizing welfare 
state, Giddens wants to promote a 'social investment state' of 'positive welfare', 
where there are 'no rights without corresponding duties', and where the 'fra.mework of 
action of social subjects is thus regulated so as to make them healthy risk-takers. 
This means, above all, that welfare expenditure should be switched las far as possi­
ble' towards human capital investment. 
Included as measures of 'positive welfare' and 'social investment' is active labour 
market policy ([re]-training of the labour force and 'Iife-Iong education'). But proactive 
encouragement of entrepreneurial initiatives is also included. The premise here is 
that 'Europe still places too much reliance upon established economic institutions, 
including the public sector, to produce employment' (Giddens, 1998: p. 124). Under 
social investment heading comes also the idea of abolishing statutory pension-ages. 
Due to the general improvement of health, the elderly should not be forced into re­
tirement, but should be allowed to continue to work. Giddens envisages a more indi-
Assar Lindbeck, a member of the McCracken Group in the 19705, with their 'narrow path to growth'thesis, 
chaired a major public commission in Sweden in 1992, that was appointed by the Conservative-Ied govern­
ment of Carl Bildt. In this report, Lindbeck and his colleagues provided comprehensive prescriptions for a 
neo-liberal transformation of Swedish society, including the curtailment of union power, labour market dere­
gulation, and a move towards a residual welfare state. The Final Report of the Lindbeck Commission has 
been translated into English (Lindbeck et.a!., 1994). 
116 
2 
vidualist and flexible type of pension savings. Pensions should be individualized both 
on the savings and withdrawal side, in order to allow people to organize their work in 
the life-cycle as it suits their individual needs. This means that a larger proportion of 
private pensions savings must be allowed in European pension systems, although a 
certain public component rnust be maintained to ensure some form of safety net, and 
a sense of obligation also by the better-off to the public sector This type of arrange­
ment would mobilize the old as aresource, and would serve to prevent the fiscal cri­
sis associated with an increase of pensioners today (Ibid.: pp. 118-20). 
More generally on the theme of flexibility of entry and exit to the labour market, Gid­
dens advocates measures that allow people to pursue individual strategies to com­
bine work with reproductive functions and life-Iong learning (through 'family friendly 
workplace policies' such as child-care, telecommuting, work-sabbaticals). (pp. 118­
26). ), Further, since Giddens agrees that it is doubtful that we can return to full em­
ployment in the postwar sense, he also envisages 'active redistribution of work'. But 
this, for hirn, should be left to the practices in the private sector, as public legislation 
is unlikely 'without counterproductive consequences' (Ibid. pp. 126-27),s In this con­
text it should also be pointed out that Giddens is not adverse to labour market regu­
lations ('Iabour market rigidities like strict employment legislation do not strongly in­
fluence unemployment'). But they can only be accepted if they do not encourage 
moral hazard (Giddens, p. 122). 
As indicated above Giddens insists that 'adequate' state-pensions will remain a ne­
cessity (though it is unclear what 'adequate' might mean when risk minimization is 
replaced with risk management). This is connected to a continued commitment of the 
view that it is necessary to have programs that are universal, in the sense that basic 
entitlement should ensure that those on the bottom of the social income-hierarchy do 
not become so destitute that they are 'excluded from the mainstream of society', 
while programs also provide those on the top with a certa.in utility, so they do not 
'exit' public schemes altogether, or lose their 'Ioyalty' to thema Exarrlples of programs 
that should be configured for this end are education and health (Ibid.: pp. 107-08). 
Anti-poverty programs will also continue to be necessary, but they should be de­
signed so as to facilitate 'community care' (p. 110). It should be emphasized, how­
ever, that the most signi'ficant measure available for the pre-emption of social exclu­
sion in a 'society where work remains central to self-esteem' are labour market 
policies. And, given the technological revolution on the labour market with its secular 
reduction of the demand for unskilled labour, the answer to this problem must be the 
aforementioned investments in lifelong learning, and retraining, where the individual 
takes responsibilities in order to assert this right. 
Giddens invokes in th is context the Hewlitt Packard plant in Grenoble, which is kept open 24 hours, seven 
days a week, but the average working week has been reduced to 37.5 hours, without lass of weekly in­




Contrary to the Thatcherites, Giddens does not want to abolish the welfare state. 
Rather, he wants to reform it so as to subject it and make it serve market-econornic 
rationality. In his justification of this position, Giddens pursues arguments that are 
strikingly reminiscent of neo-Marxist arguments 'from the 1970s, such as those of 
Jürgen Habermas (1976) and Claus Offe (1985). The problem with Thatcherite lais­
sez faire arguments, advocating a total abolition of the welfare state, is that it rests 
on a nostalgia of 19th century free market liberalism. But 19th century liberal society 
necessarily presupposed a substructure of tradition. The patriachial extended farnily, 
and quasi-feudal community was important in this context. It served important repro­
ductive functions, such as child rearing, health care, care of the elderly, and care for 
the poor. It provided informal networks that made sure that exposure to life-risks did 
not threaten social order. This particular construction of a communal lifeworld also 
ensured the reproduction of 'self evidenf norms (especially through religion), that 
provided for motivational inputs for the economy ('work ethic') and for the cementing 
of consent to public authority ('Iawand order'). This substructure was in fact under­
mined by the process of market-driven restructuring itself, and the welfare state has 
taken over many of these essential functions. There is no going back to this pre­
modern society, and in this sense the welfare state serves necessary functions that 
the market itself cannot provide for, and in this sense the wefare state is 'irreversible' 
(Giddens, 1998: pp. 70-77). 
At the same time - and this was also the argument of neo-Marxists as weil as that of 
Giddens - also the full employment conception of Keynesian social democracy pre­
supposed a 'traditional' form of farnily, with a male 'breadwinner' and housewife 
(more to the point, this is to be understood as a transitory form of family). Further, its 
bureaucratic, uniform and centralized solutions to social service provision, also relied 
on an undemocratic, authoritarian welfare-state form, that is rendered increasingly 
anachronistic. Moreover, apart from these issues, that pertain mainly to(inner) so­
cialization of human nature, both neo-conservatives and social democrats have been 
inadequate in their treatment of outer-socialization: the relationship between human 
activity and ecology. 
Discussing these developments under the heading 'individualism', Giddens argues 
that the effect of recent socialization processes and transformations has been a 'pro­
liferation of lifestyles' requiring more cultural pluralism (Giddens, p. 34). Another im­
portant dimension of this development has been the undermining of the patriarchial 
family structure, with a stay-at-home housewife. There has also emerged a kind of 
anti-politics, where people abandon their involvement and loyalty to mass-political 
organizations, like parties. The latter does not mean that people have become ego­
tistical and apathetic. Present generations show a greater sensitivity towards moral 
concerns than previous generations, 'but they do not accept traditional modes of 
authority and legislation of lifestyles' (lbid. p. 36) associated with the parties and in­
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terest group organizations that emerged in the early part of the 20th century. Rather, 
they tend to engage in single-issue politics (Ibid. pp. 49-53). 
These developments pose threats to social solidarity as organized through present 
institutions and policies especially the conditions of the homogenous working class 
community have been undermined. But at the same time they suggest that new 
forms of solidarity are possible, and a politics of the third way should seek to devise 
the appropriate institutions and policies to foster this. (Ibid. p. 37). For Giddens (as 
weil as the neo-Marxists of the 1970s), the general formula in this context is to de­
mocratize political authority structures, including the welfare state, in order to create 
spaces for human self-fulfilment. 
Social cohesion cannot be guaranteed by the top-down action of the state of by ap­
peal to tradition. We have to make our lives in a more active way than was true of 
previous generations, and we need more actively to accept responsibilities for the 
consequences of what we do and the lifestyle habits we adopt (Ibid. p. 37). These 
themes of self-fulfilment and economic rationality, as weil as a politics of environ­
mental sustainability are tied together by Giddens, through the theme of democracy 
(rights) but responsibility. 
Underlying Giddens argument on economic rationality, the welfare state and civic 
involvement and their relationship is a conception of 'risk society'that he adopts from 
Ulrich Beck. This notion of risk is most clearly developed in relation to ecological 
questions. The basic idea is that the ecological sphere has been so socialized that 
there is no 'original nature' to which to return anymore. Hence, we have to cope with 
the question of how we 'construct' ecology and manage ecological risk. At the same 
time the interventions and their human implications are so complex that we can no 
longer rely on experts and an unambigious objective science to establish objective 
regulatory norms that can be straightforwardly encoded in the regulations of the bu­
reaucratic state. There are always scientific controversies, that in fact only can be 
mediated through active civic involvement in ecological risk assessment (Giddens, p. 
59 cf. Beck, 1994). 
Giddens extends this argument to arguments about the spheres of subject formation 
and representation, and to the socio-economic management of allocation and distri­
bution. 
Providing citizens with security has long been a concern of social democrats. 
The welfare state has been seen as the vehicle of social security. One of the 
main lessons to be drawn from ecological questions is that just as much at­
tention needs to be given to risk. The new prominence of risk connects indi­
vidual autonomy on the one hand with the sweeping influence over scientific 
and technological change on the other. Risk draws attention to the dangers 
we face - the most important of which we have created for ourselves - but 
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also to the opportunities that go along with them. Risk is not just a negative 
phenomenon - something to be avoided or minimized. It is at the same time 
the energizing principle of a society that has broken away from tradition and 
nature (Ibid. pp. 62-63). 
But Giddens' extension of Beck's conception of ecological risk is a conflation. This 
conflation is necessary in order for his ideological treatise to hold together. That is, to 
account for how imperatives of capital accumulation, legitimation, social representa­
tion, and civic participation consistently hold together and can be achieved simulta­
neously. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to assess Beck's conception of eco­
logical risk in any detail. It seems to have considerable merit. But it is far-fetched 
indeed, to suggest that this type of risk is of the same ontological quality as the kind 
of risk that is associated with the management of financial assets, which so severely 
constrain welfare states through globalized financial markets. Moroever the 'human 
energies' required for civic involvement, mutual fund management, and reasonable 
assessment of ecological risk are hardly the same. In fact one can make the case 
that they stand in fundamental conflict. The conflict between these types of risk 
management can be inferred from arguments by Polanyi and Marx and most recently 
they have been elaborated by Offe, drawing on Habermas' conception of 'discourse 
ethics' (Offe, 1996). These conflicts are simply swept under the carpet by Giddens. 
The fundamental point here was already present in the work of Aristotle. According 
to hirn leisure is required for civic involvement and ethical deliberation in the polity. 
This is certainly not granted to the rugged possessive individualist, who is (necess­
arily) taking calculated risks on the stock market in order to maximize profits - not to 
mention the wage labourer in precarious consumer service employment (see Nuss­
baum, 1990). This kind of risk-taking is also likely to lead to atomization and anti­
communitarian behaviour as actors are disciplined and socialized into commodified 
relations of self regulating markets. One wonders where one might 'find Giddens' he­
roic rugged competitive, flexible and mobile individual, who also a nurturing parent, is 
rooted in a comrnunity, in which she has time and energy to invest civic involvement, 
and who can arbitrate in complex scientific debates about the wisdom of authorizing 
genetically manipulated produce. It would be a repressed super-ego indeed, that in 
this context would refrain from engaging in power-charged strategie language games 
driven on by economic necessities de'fined by the terms of market participation. 
To be sure, there is a lot of merit in much of what Giddens has to say about social 
democratic renewal - about environmental risk, diversification of lifestyles and the 
undermining of traditional authority which makes democratic deepening not only de­
sirable but also arguably necessary. But remarkably he ignores the empirical evi­
dence and the theoretical arguments that indicate how destructive self-regulating 
markets can be for the conditions required for such developments, and the extent to 




fashioned project of a humanization of capitalism. I will pursue this argument in the 
subsequent sections, where I will also enforce and iIIustrate my points with reference 
to research on the conditions of the emerging post-Fordist and post-industrial form of 
capitalism. 
Giddens' argument is directed against the 'old style' social democratic project of a 
humanization of capitalism. This project has allegedly never been concerned with 
creating the conditions for improvement and rationalization of the economic Isupply­
side' and productivity growth. Productivity growth has been taken for granted, and 
politics has been about social prevention of risk and about distribution. Giddens' 
'modern' Third Way alternative is based on the idea that social policy should be sub­
ordinated to, and be made to serve, a supply-side oriented economic policy. Seen as 
a juxtaposition against the allegedly obsolete idea of a 'humanization of capitalism', 
this means that market forces should be given as large a room of manoeuvre as 
possible in the labour market and in risk management. Moral hazard is to be elimi­
nated. A greater degree of private initiative and provision is also required in the areas 
of social insurance and policy, although public provisions are also required to prevent 
social polarization from becoming too large. This 'pluralization' is seen as part of a 
project to democratize the welfare state in order to enhance modern risk manage­
ment and a culturally pluralist society. 
Giddens' argument is problematic in a number of respects. To begin with, his char­
acterization of 'old style' social democracy is a caricatu re, probably based on the 
comparatively unsuccessful experience of British Labourism. Anyone with more tl1an 
a superficial acquaintance with the history of continental European and Scandinavian 
social democratic ideas would not recognize them in Giddens' characterization. So­
cial democratic doctrines have indeed emphasized the idea of a progressive hu­
manization of industrial capitalism as a gradual project of reformist socialism. But the 
doctrines were also and simultaneously concerned about the development of the 
productive forces. Therefore they were indeed very much concerned about the 'sup­
ply-side', as weil as 'demand-side' 'planning' measures that would achieve productiv­
ity growth and socially reflexive rationalization. We see this, for example, in the the­
ory and practice of the 'expansive wage policy' of Germany's IG Metall (eg. Markovits 
& Allen, 1984). We also see this in a more developed form in the Swedish 'Rehn­
Meidner model' - a theoretical elaboration of thoughts on 'solidaristic wage policy' 
that had preoccupied the Swedish trade union movement since the 19305 (Johans­
son, 1989). Rehn and Meidner suggested already in 1947 that selective labour mar­
ket policy could serve as a supply side instrument - an idea that has been taken out 
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of context and adopted in a more vulgar form by present day social democratic 
'modernizers' .4 
The Rehn-Meidner model was conceived by economists of the Swedish trade union 
federation, LO, after the Second WorldWar (Rehn, 1947; Meidner, 1947; LO, 1951). 
Its aim was to make a humanization of capitalism compatible with economic ration­
alization, by devising regulatory institutions that modified the capitalist wage relation. 
In the model, trade unions use their bargaining power in centralized negotiations with 
employers to maximize the wage-share for workers in the economy as a whole. But 
there is only one general negotiated macro-wage increase in the entire economy. 
This means that low productivity firms are punished, and are likely to go out of busi­
ness. But firms with high productivity growth are rewarded through lower wage rates 
and higher profits than they would receive in a 'free' labour market, where the labour 
supply would be scarce and they would be forced to increase wages further. This 
hastens the structural transformation and diffusion of core-technologies in the econ­
omy. Capital and labour are freed from the low productivity firms to the high produc­
tivity firms through the 'transformation pressure' that negotiated wages exert (Erixon, 
1994). The transformation is further enhanced by public investments in selective la­
bour market policy, which ensures that the labour force is trained accordingto the 
new labour demand. Grants are also provided for the relocation to new jobs. This is 
the 'supply-side' of the model that minimizes structural and 'frictional' unemployment. 
On the demand side, macroeconomic policies are pursued to prevent cyclical unem­
ployment. The full employment policy ensures that the unions have the power to ex­
ert transformation pressure through bargaining. 
So much for the 'productivity' side of the 'equation'. Concerning 'humanization', the 
Rehn-Meidner model is geared towards the guarantee of full employment, equal pay 
for equal work, and specifically to eliminate poverty traps in dead-end jobs. The con­
ception of 'equal work' is not determined by the market here, but by the subjective 
conception of a Ijust wagel of the wage-earner collective, defined and organized from 
within encompassing trade unions (Swenson, 1989). This de'fines the terms of legiti­
macy for trade unions in wage bargaining. It provides an incentive for unions to set 
the macro-wage high, so that the room of maneouvre of market determined wages 
('wage drift') is minimized. As long as an appropriate macro-economic stance is kept, 
this is productive because it facilitates transformation pressure. It should be noted 
that the model ought to be an instance of 'moral hazard'. Wages are not contingent 
In the Rehn-Meidner model, labour market policy such as labour force training, is only one component of 
policy that necessarily requires the other elements. It requires a solidaristic wage policy that squeezes out 
capitalist enterprises that cannot pay the negotiated wage increases. It also requires a macroeconomic full 
employment commitment on behalf of the government, so that sufficient demand is generated for the crea­
tion of new jobs. In other words, the Rehn-Meidner model does not see labour force training as a panacea, 




on the performance of individuals. The state is unconditionally committed to pursue 
full employment. Should an individual nevertheless not obtain a job, or should wage­
labour be insufficient to meet the publicly defined 'income norm' set by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, then universal social insurance and service schemes are available 
according to the principle social citizenship. This model provided the chief policy­
paradigm for Swedish post-war politico-economic development, and was remarkably 
successful in ensuring a combination of economic growth, equality and social secu­
rity (Hedborg &Meidner, 1984). 
If the model had an achilles-heel, it was on the financial side. How could one ensure 
that capital (investments) were to a sufficient degree channelled to high productivity 
ventures given that profits squeezed in order to avoid wage-drift? This problem was 
redressed in the post-war period through a low interest-rate policy made possible by 
a whole host of public interventions in financial and monetary intermediation (Noter­
mans, 1993). The Bretton-Woods system is one important but often neglected in­
stance in point (Ryner, 1994; 1999). Other exa.mples were the usage of public pen­
sion funds for productive investments, which set the stage for the most radical 
proposal of wage earner funds, when contradictions of capital accumulation mounted 
in the 1970s (Hedborg & Meidner, 1984). This was also described as a 'Third Way' ­
between capitalism and East European central planning - and it would have set the 
stage for a democratic market socialism (Meidner, 1980). But it was defeated 
through political (if you will, class) struggle, where the Swedish social democratic 
party quite clearly lost its nerve and retreated fromthe proposal. 
Underpinning the Rehn-Meidner model was a particular ideological-intellectual 
knowledge perspective that sought to synthesize insights from Marxian and institu­
tionalist political economy. In Swedish social democracy, these ideas centred around 
a notion of 'mis-rationalization' in advanced capitalism. The notion was introduced to 
Swedish socialists via the work of Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer, through trade union 
debates on strategy in the 1930s (De Geer, 1978). According to Bauer, misrationali­
zation occurs when there is a discrepancy between private-economic rationalization 
(implemented by individual enterprises in order to increase its profits) and societal 
rationalization. The reduction of costs of production for tl1e individual capitalist is not 
necessarily the same as the reduction of costs for society. Bauer argues that in ad­
vanced, functionally differentiated and organically complex capitalism, the tendency 
is towards increased instances of misrationalization. This tendency has its origin in 
the fact that wage labour is a commodity in capitalist society that the capitalist pur­
chases only as long as s/he needs it. However, the costs for (re)-production of labour 
power falls on society as a whole (and in the case of laissez faire, the cost is distrib­
uted to each individual wage labouring household). The discrepancy between private 
and social rationalization ca.n only be bridged where economic-production and social 
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reproduction are unified within the same organizational principle or meta-principle 
(for Bauer, the state).5 
In this ideological conception, rationalization as a principle is affirmed. However, the 
naive equation of rationalization with the unleastling of market forces is profoundly 
problematized. What Swedish social democrats took from Bauer as a guiding princi­
pie in their pragmatic search for appropriate welfare state mechanisms, was the idea 
that economic and social rationalization had to be viewed from an integral and holis­
tic perspective, that a common organizational meta-principle was needed (often re­
ferred to as 'planning'), and that the reproduction of labour was at the core of the 
problem. What was required was an integral welfare state, that had at its regulatory 
core, institutions that could promote economic rationalization at the same time as this 
rationalization was checked for social concerns. Swedish social democrats postu­
lated certain political goals of social security, that were held to be consistent with so­
cialist principles as they were achievable within the present development of produc­
tive forces. From this vantage point, they inquired empirically and experimentally 
which form of social organization was the most suitable to meet the ends in a given 
instance. Markets actors that could not deliver were to be eliminated, and where ap­
propriate, replaced by public or cooperative forms. 
This was highly controversial and politically explosive because it implied a serious 
challenge to the absolute discretion of private ownership of the means of production 
(on this point, see ego Kalecki, 1943). As a result, Swedish capitalists have continu­
ously fought off the most radical and logically consistent political implications of this 
thinking, such as the wage earner funds and Gunnar Myrdal's notions of democratic 
planning in the immediate post-war period. Nevertheless, Swedish social democrats 
in the post-war period were sufficiently strong to maintain this principle in the form of 
the Rehn-Meidner model. In other countries, this control of the 'supply side' has been 
weaker - perhaps particularly in Britain, where Labour in the end only came to sub­
scribe to a vulgar variant of demand-side Keynesianism, without any elements of in­
tegral planning. But this Iretreat to the demand side' was a signal compromise from 
the position of weakness. Seen from this pe rspective , Giddens' characterization of 
the demand-side orientation as the essence of social democratic ideas is not only 
inaccurate but ironic. 
I would maintain that this kind of integral welfare state perspective, that centres on a 
decommodification of the wage-Iabour relation, is as relevant and important a princi­
pie as it ever was. If it is true that social policy becomes more complex and difficult to 
implement in a culturally heterogenous and 'de-naturalized' society where norms 
must be discursively established, then it is more universal programmes and entitle-





ments that are needed, combined with regulatory policies that prevent capitalist mis­
rationalization ex ante (see Offe, 1996). It is a fallacy to think that cultural heteroge­
neity is antithetical to universalism. Only if social entitlements are formulated on a 
universal level can they be sufficiently abstract to include a multifarious range of 
identities and interests (Rothstein, 1998). Only through abstract social policy norms 
can the welfare state 'do its job' without refraining from the impositional encoding of 
'correct living' on social groups. Such general norms are also necessary in order to 
allow the state to transfer the implementation of welfare policy to different groups, so 
that they can gear the general entitlements towards their particular needs and situa­
tion. Mo reover, such a universal-abstract conception of social citizenship is needed 
to prevent social divisions and distributive conflicts between different groups.6 It is 
only through this broader conception of social citizenship that one can envisage a 
'discourse ethics' emerging, that would allow citizens to cope, for example, with the 
environmental risks that Giddens raises by invoking Beck (see Offe, 1996). But to be 
meaningful at all in this context, universal entitlements need to be set at generous 
levels, and services need to be of a high quality. This means that they are costly and 
that they require high tax-rates (Rothstein, 1998). It also means that distributive 
questions are best resolved ex ante at the level of the wage-relation, which as we 
have iIIustrated through the exposition of the Rehn-Meidner model requires a tight 
discipline on capital. In other words, social wage relations need to be modi'fied before 
the capitalist labour market generates its external effects on the lifeworld. This is an­
other way of saying that misrationalization needs to be prevented through and inte­
gral welfare state. 
In contrast to this 'integral' welfare state perspective, Giddens in fact conceives of a 
'residuarwelfare state. In the residual model, the market mechanism is not modified 
ex ante but construed as the basic mechanism of social organization. Welfare state 
measures are merely used as 'correctives' ex post when people cannot for 'valid rea­
sons' manage to make ends meet through market participation. This type of welfare 
state thinking is not new. It is the type that has tended to characterize western capi­
talist societies, especially in the Anglo Saxon world (Esping-Andersen, 1985; 1990). 
If anything Giddens - and neo-liberals more generally - are merely advocating a purer 
type of residualism. Such a welfare state, however, is full of contradictions. Though 
justified in a society that on the level of ideas privileges 'individual freedom', this type 
of welfare state by necessity must be selective and intrusive, as it is forced to 
economize on scarce welfare state resources. Hence the freedom of its clients is 
restricted and violated . This is as a result of the constraints that the unregulated 
capitalist market economy sets on it, in terms of Iimited rates of taxation, and ine-
On the integrative qua/ities of welfare universalism and the Gender-nexus, see Sainsbury (1996). Similar 
arguments pertaining to the welfare state and immigration are raised in Bommes & Geddes, 1999, espe­





qua.lities implied in unregulated labour markets. As neo-Marxist political economy 
established already in the 1970s, this type of welfare state is not propitious to the 
treedom required for democratic participation and inclusion in social life. Giddens 
totally ignores the contradictions between the terms of capital accumulation and his 
goals for social inclusion and democracy. I have in part already discussed how this is 
so in relation to his conflation to risk. In the next section I will continue on this theme 
in relation to the developments of postindustrial and post-Fordist capitalism. 
The difficulties of simultaneously achieving the conditions for a socially cohesive so­
ciety, democratic participation and a dynamic capitalist development is illustrated by 
a set of works which are in agreement with Giddens on the necessity of an economic 
'modernization' of social democracy, but that have no illusions what this implies for 
social inequality. Here I will specifically refer to the recent work of Esping-Andersen 
(1996) on 'post-industrial' welfare capitalism in an era of 'global competition' and 
Jelle Visser's and Anton Hemerijck's (1998) work on the on the "Dutch Model". I will 
use these works, and their empirical findings about the nature of 'post-industrial' 
capitalist restructuring, in order to iIlustrate the contradictions implied in Giddens' 
treatise. These works have the merit of being bluntly honest about what it would 
mean for social democracy to adopt itself to disciplinary neo-liberalism, given the 
nature of the capitalist post-industrial labour market. However, I will then take issue 
with these works in their argument (or implication) that social democracy by neces­
sity has to accept to neo-liberal norms. I will use my research on politico-economic 
developments in Sweden in the 1980s and the 1990s to make my point (Ryner, 
1994; 1996; 1999). 
According to Esping-Andersen, the basic dilemma of advanced welfare states con­
cerns how they should cope with ageing populations, lower fertility rates, and differ­
entiated 'Iife-cycles' on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the slower rates of 
growth that is implied in a shift trom a manufacturing-centred 'industrial' economy, to 
a service-centred 'post-industrial' economy, that at the same time is facing the in­
creased constraints of global competition. Especially, demographic trends, with a 
projected 50 percent increase in the age-dependency ratio between 1996 and 2020, 
threatens to over-stretch welfare state capacities (in areas such as health and pen­
sions), given present rules, benefits, and rates of economic growth. To meet such 
commitments resources equivalent to an estimated additional 5-7 percent share of 
GDP would be required. This indicates the severe fiscal strain that this secular trend 
exerts on welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1996: p. 7 cf. European Community, 
1993: p. 24; OECD, 1988). Given the imperatives of global competition, increased 
taxation is, according to Esping-Andersen, hardly a feasible route to raise the re­
quired resources. On the other hand, increased rates of productivity growth could 
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underwrite such needs for additional expenditure. An additional increase of 0.5-1.2 
percent of real taxable earnings would be sufficient to finance additional expenditure 
(Esping-Andersen, 1996: p. 7 cf. OECD, 1988: p. 70). But Esping-Andersen sug­
gests that such additional growth is difficult to achieve in the post-industrial economy. 
In post-industrialism there is an increased trade-off between employment, equality 
and high rates of productivity growth. This is because high value added jobs in 
manufacturing are becoming increasingly scarce as a result of increased capital 
intensity, generated by the introduction of automation-technology. The new jobs are 
increasingly to be found in the low productivity service sector, where wages conse­
~ 
quently have to be lower. The alternative to the creation of a low-wage economy is 
mass-unemployment, which further exacerbates the tendencies towards fiscal crisis. 
Esping-Andersen concretizes his argument with reference to different types of ad­
vanced welfare capitalism in the "OECD-world". Here he uses the typology of three 
'policy regimes' that he has developed elsewhere (Esping-Andersen, 1985; 1990). 
He argues that the 'continental-European model' - where christian democratic and 
corporatist norms have been particularly dominant - is trapped in an unsustainable 
trajectory of 'jobless growth', mass unernployment and fiscal crisis. In this model, 
wage norms, negotiated between trade unions and employers, characterize the la­
bour market. The development of tax-financed public welfare-services is limited. 
Welfare benefits and expenditure tend to be of a 'social insurance' type (health & 
unemployment insura.nce and pensions) funded primarily through 'pay as you go' 
employers and employee contributions, calculated from the wage rate (Lohnneben­
kosten). Eligibility tends to be segmented according to occupational status. In this 
welfare state type, high wages and a rigid wage leads to capital intensive corporate 
restructuring in the manufacturing, export-oriented sector. High wages also retard the 
development of the service sector. Whilst this development results in high productiv­
ity growth and high wages for those who remain employed (the 'insiders' of the la­
bour market), labour is to a signi'ficant extent shedded. In addition, the supply of la­
bour has increased because of increased female participation rates, which in­
creasingly counters the assumption (and core-value) of Christian Democracy of 'the 
traditional family'. Continental welfare states have responded to this excess labour­
supply, through schemes of early retirement, reduction of working hours, and high 
levels of unemployment insurance benefits. The problem is, however, that these 
have to be funded through an increase of payroll Nebenkosten, which increases 
wage costs further, and compels companies to further labour shedding. According to 
Esping-Andersen, the continental model is engaged in a hopeless battle to remain 
fiscally solvent, as growth rates no longer can be maintained to generate sufficient 
revenue for its transfer payment programmes. This is especia.lly so, because in­
creased capital intensity means that the payroll-tax revenue/growth rate ratio tends to 
decrease. Additionally, the unemployment problem becomes increasingly acute. The 
scope to switch to alternative forms of taxation, such as the taxation of capital, is 
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considered very limited in an era of global competition and transnational capital mo­
bility (Esping-Andersen, 1996b; see also Streeck, 1995). 
A more sustainable alternative, for Esping-Andersen, is the neo-liberal route of de­
regulation of the Anglo-Saxon residual welfare state as practised in the United States 
and Britain. Here, labour market deregulation, and a reduction of social benefits has 
resulted in a reduction of unemployment. It has created the conditions for the devel­
opment of a labour-intensive service sector, which depends on low wage flexible la­
bour but that also offers high skill and high (albeit often flexible and insecure) wages 
at the apex of its occupational stratum. Esping-Andersen argues that fiscal pressures 
a.nd unemployment problems tend to be resolved in this model. The emerging ser­
vice sector has proved to be capable of absorbing surplus labour, which off-loads 
fiscal burdens for the state. Furthermore, pensions become increasingly a private 
matter, generated through private savings and managed by mutual funds. Indeed, 
pension-fund management plays an important role in the emerging service economy. 
Esping-Andersen argues that welfare state retrenchment and accommodation to this 
type of service economy will be necessary in order to stabilize welfare capitalism. 
Compared to Giddens however, he is refreshingly blunt about what the distributive 
implications are of this type restructuring. He predicts that the result of this neoliberal 
thrust will be increased polarization and segmentation between core and periphery in 
the labour market, (Ieaving little room for Giddens' 'social cohesion'). Drawing on the 
American and British experience he points out that the trend towards 'flexible' and 
reduced wages has produced 'unprecedented levels of poverty' (Esping-Andersen, 
1996: p. 8). He (rightly) does not even seem to think it worthwhile to entertain the 
prospect that this type of welfare state might generate more participatory forms of 
democracy. From Esping-Andersen's account we can define a 'burden of proof' that 
Giddens' account would need to meet, but that he has not even attempted to meet: 
How can the wage conditions of the market-driven service economy be made com­
patible with the idea of social col1esion, when it manifestly seems to be based on 
generating a precarious peripheral labour force? 
This is of course also a question for Esping-Andersen, and perhaps somewhat sur­
prisingly he no longer offers the 'Scandinavian social democratic model' as a solution 
(compare with Esping-Andersen, 1990). Rather he seems to consider a kind of 'neo­
liberalism with a human face' as the 'best of possible worlds'. Wage segmentation 
and deregulation would here be tolerated, in order to generate the conditions for an 
employment-intensive, market-driven, service economy. But this model also includes 
a strong dose of active labour-market policy and retraining as in the 'Scandinavian 
Moder. Such measures are not likely to reduce inequality at any one time, but over 
the life-cycle, it is hoped, people should be able to move from low wage to high wage 
work. Further, for Esping-Andersen, corporatist wage negotiation a Ja the continental 
as weil as the Scandinavian model would have a role to play. Through a sort of con­
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cession bargaining, such negotiations would deterrnine the pace and set the terms 
for a shift towards wage flexibility, and thereby hopefully make sure that the starkest 
of inequalities could be avoided. 
Esping-Andersen's prescriptions are in the end similar to those of Giddens. They are 
also similar to those that both predict and prescribe a 'competitive corporatism' as an 
answer to contemporary welfare state imbalances (eg. Streeck, 1998; Rhodes, 1998; 
for a critical review, see Bieling, 1999). For these analysts, the "Dutch Model" of re­
structuring in the 1990s has been held up as a possible case of 'best practice' to 
emulate. More broadly, the Dutch Model has become a favourite case of social 
democratic modernizers, and its merits have been encanted in fora such as Die Zeit 
over the last few years. It is seen as an affirmation of the possibility to implement 
market oriented, supply-side reforms, and still maintain a somewhat retrenched, but 
nevertheless weil developed welfare state. 
The Dutch experience in the 1980s and the 1990s has been described in quite be­
nevolent terms by Visser and Hemerijck (1998). Theirs is a story about how a conti­
nent~l, welfare state has managed to generate employment growth and resolve fiscal 
crisis. A crucial reason behind this success has been wage moderation, negotiated 
through the corporatist 'social partners' (a process started by the Wassenaar Accord 
on 1982.) Fundamentally, this has included negotiated wage segmentation. A 
significant component of restructuring of the labour market has been the increased 
prominence of part-time and time-specific contracts, managed by labour bureaus, 
operating as recruitment subcontractors. As a result of these changes, a larger 
proportion of women are now absorbed by the labour market, while men - previously 
employed in 'regular jobs' - now tend to a larger extent to have precarious 
employment. The authors celebrate this as a successful attempt to move away from 
a male dominated labour market, to a more gender-egalitarian system that makes 
employment compatible with child rearing. In addition, to the changes of labour mar­
ket regulation, the state has taken on a greater role in the area of social security at 
the expense of proto-public corporatist 'pillar-organizations'. The state has used its 
capacities to reduce social entitlements, and to make them increasingly conditional 
on active job search. 
But the celebration of the 'Dutch Model' is problematic in a number of ways. The 
'achievements' of the Dutch Model ought to be relativized. Employment rates may 
have increased. But this is from one of the absolutely lowest levels in Europe. 
Hence, it is therefore doubtful whether labour supply is 'better' absorbed in the Neth­
erlands than in Sweden (with the highest participation-rate in Europe) even when the 
laUer has reached high levels of unemployment. Second, the higher employment 
levels in the Netherlands come at the price of income polarization. Between 1985 
and 1994, the percentage increase of wage dispersion in the Netherlands (as meas­
ured by '90-10 ratios') increased by 17.2 percent. This is higher than the percentage 
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increase in the USA between 1979 and 1995 (13.7 percent) , and slightly lower than 
that of the UK (18.6 percent). Admittedly this change is from a lower level of 
dispersion, but the change has taken place in a shorter time-frame. These three 
countries stand out as the OECD countries where wage-dispersion grows the fastest 
(Clayton & Pontusson, 1998 cf. OECD, 1993; 1996).7 Third, the Dutch record of pro­
duction and productivity growth is actually not particularly impressive. If one of the 
criteria of social democratic modernization is higher productivity growth, then the 
'Dutch Model' is a failure. Finally, claims that the Dutch Model is gender-progressive 
should be treated with great scepticism. The policies are not designed to relieve 
women from reproductive work. Rather, they seek to make waged work compatible 
with women's (assumed) child rearing duties, and hence make it possible for them to 
take on a 'double burden' . This is also a double burden they are increasingly com­
pelled to take if their partners also are employed in precarious work. The main point 
here is that even if progressive males agrees to share this burden, the work time re­
quired for generating sufficient wages and reproductive tasks in the household has 
increased for the family as a whole. Capital a.nd the state, on the other hand, incur 
no extra labour force reproduction costs, and average wage costs decrease. In other 
words, the rate of exploitation of women and men is increased. 
In addition to this relativization of Dutch welfare-state achievements, it is important to 
ascertain whether the Dutch Model could be emulated elsewhere. Here, also Visser 
and Hemerijck (1998: p. 184) eschew making any recommendations for other socie­
ties. In the Dutch case, a facilitating condition seems to have been its export struc­
ture. The Netherlands has managed to reduce its energy import-costs as a result of 
gas-reserves in the North Sea. This has allowed the Netherlands to tie its currency to 
the Mark, and to maintain a low cost of imports. Consequently, wage moderation has 
been easier to achieve. More broadly, the Netherlands function as a service center 
and a transportation-hub for the German economy. In this context, undercutting 
German wages has been important. This is, of course, an option that is not available 
to Germany, for exarrlple. And one has to ask what might happen to the 'Dutch mira­
eie' when Germany begins to close the wage-gap? 
The latter point indicates a.n important conceptual blind-spot of a single-minded 
comparativist and supply-side focus of the authors reviewed. They do not take into 
account the 'fallacy of composition' that is implied in the dynamics of neo-liberal so­
cio-economic restructuring. Political economists associated with the 'regulation 
school' (eg. Lipietz, 1989; 1995; see also Albo, 1994) have in this context talked 
about a self-enforcing policy trend of 'competitive austerity' that is particularly rele-
By comparison, the percentage increase in Canada was 4.7 (between 1981 and 1994), in Australia it was 
+6.1 (1980-1994). The Swedish rate increased slightly tram a very low base rate between 1980 and 1993 
(+4.4). In Norway and Finland wage differentials actually narrowed slightly. In Germany, wage rates narro­
wed markedly between 1983 and 1993 (13.8 percent). 
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vant to post-Maastricht Europe. In their pursuit of a single-minded supply-side 
agenda: monetarism, budget consolidation, wage moderation and welfare state re­
trenchment, states reduce the aggregate demand growth of the world and European 
economy, the markets upon which their export oriented strategies depend. As a re­
sult further competitive austerity is required, that further reduces aggregate demand. 
Of course, some small economies, with a favourable location in the international di­
vision of labour, such as the Netherlands, might develop sustainable growth strate­
gies on this basis, but they are contingent on a particular configuration of the export 
structure. Also Germany's growth model in the 1970s and the 1980s was based on 
this type of export orientation. Ironically, though, this kind of supply side orientation is 
increasingly unsuitable for Germany. This is not only because of the 'import-drag' of 
the former GDR, but also because Germany to a much lesser extent than before can 
count on extracting surpluses from its transnationalizing companies for the purpose 
of public and private mass consumption (Ziebura, 1997; Ryner, 1998). 
The authors in question also ignore the inhibiting constraints that the service sector 
exerts via global 'finance, not only on the welfare state but also on the rationalization 
of productive forces. There is strong evidence that the privatization of pension sav­
ings contributes significantly to myopie investment decisions. Adam Harmes (1997) 
has shown that pension fund managers are notorious for following the highly specu­
lative 'hedge funds' in their investment and swap-decisions. This observation is 
meaning'fully considered in relation to Susan Strange's work on 'Casino Capitalism' 
(Strange, 1989). According to Strange, hedge-funds have become the main source 
for currency-instability in the world economy, that they are supposed to hedge. 
Hence, they have become the creators of their own demand, that impose severe 
costs on productive corporations of the futures market. In addition, Strange argues 
that these currency movements are detrimental to the time-horizons in investment 
and innovation, which has had demonstrabated negative effects on productivity de­
velopments and the productive diffusion of new technology in the European economy 
(Michalet, 1991). 
Consequently I would argue that one can discuss the competitive austerity problem­
atic, which the Third Way discourse obscures and promotes, with reference to 
Bauer's aforementioned notion of 'misrationalization'. In the next section I will draw 
on my analysis of Swedish political economy in the 1980s and the 1990s to further 
concretize the thesis that competitive austerity and a single-minded market driven 
supply-side orientation a Ja Giddens' (and Esping-Andersen's) 'Third Way' promotes 
a misrationalization of the potentials unleashed by the post-Fordist forces of produc­
tion. We can understand this as the social opportunity cost of not realizing the po­




One striking feature of Esping-Andersen (1996) is his rejection of the 'Scandinavian 
social democratic' ideal-type model of post-industrialism that he had defined and 
defended in the latter chapters of The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). In 
this model, mass unemployment is avoided through tax-funded public investments in 
labour-intensive social welfare services. Especially, the welfare state is expanded in 
'reproductive' spheres, through the expansion of public child care and care and 
services. for the elderly. Employment expansion proceeds in the model without sig­
nificant wage-segmentation, because public service workers are unionized, and 
wages are determined through inter-sectoral coordinated and solidaristic wage pol­
icy. Surplus is thereby transferred from the low productivity, domestically oriented 
service sector, to(?) the export oriented high-productivity manufacturing sector in two 
ways: First, taxes (income taxes, corporate taxes, sales taxes and payroll taxes) are 
used to finance public service sector production, including its wage bill. Second, 
through coordinated and solidaristic wage policy, workers in the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector forfeit some of the wage increases, that productivity increases 
in their sector would grant, in favour of wage increases above productivity rates in 
the public service sector. (for economic-theoretical models, following in the tradition 
of the Rehn-Meidner model, developed jointly by economists reperesenting employ­
ers and workers, see Edgren, Faxen & Odhner, 1970; Faxen, Odhner, Spänt, 1989). 
Esping-Andersen's abandoned 'social democratic' model of post-industrialism could 
have significant merits from the point of view of generating balance in the welfare 
state. As a consequence of full employment and high levels of tax revenue, fiscal 
resources could be used to maintain transfer payment systems such as public pen­
sions, unemployment insurance and other universal benefits. In the model, income 
segmentation would be checked and income security would be maintained. If the 
model could be combined with a reduction of work-time, and a de-bureaucratization 
of social service delivery, it might also provide the 'leisure' and spaces necessary for 
a culturally pluralist civic involvement. A relatively equal distribution of income would 
also mean that capacities for such involvement might be relatively equally distributed. 
Nevertheless, Esping-Andersen no longer believes that the model is corrlpatible with 
the imperatives of economic rationality, and he invokes the Swedish experience in 
the 1980s and the 1990s to make his point: 
... [the] achilles heel of the system .... is the growing tax burden that a huge 
public labour market incurs. With high rates of productivity growth the system 
can be sustained: when productivity of private investments are sluggish, se­
vere cost problems emerge. This is exactly the situation that especially Swe­
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den faces today: declining fiscal capacity combined with rising pressures on 
public job creation/or income maintenance. Swedish policy makers and un­
ionists can no longer avoid wage flexibility and major social benefit cuts 
(Esping-Andersen, 1996: p. 12). 
In the wake of the run on the Swedish Crown in 1992, and the exceptionally deep 
recession 1991-93, which brought mass unemployment and a fiscal crisis to Swe­
den, it is impossible to deny that the Swedish social democratic project of the 1970s 
and the 1980s, that more or less conforms to Esping-Andersen's ideal type postin­
dustrial ideal type, failed. This project was above all advanced by state managers in 
the labour market and social service ministries and by trade unionists. It emphasized 
expansion of public service and expansion of solidaristic wage policy. It also empha­
sized statutory employment-security and the need for co-determination of workers 
and trade union rank and file in the organization of the workplace. It is certainly also 
true that the root of the failure was the inability to mediate the terms of distribution 
with the imperatives of export oriented capital accumulation. Indeed, a sluggish pro­
ductivity rate was the key indicator for this failure, as it expresses its inability of cre- • 
ating the conditions for an intensive regime of intensive capital accumulation based 
on relative surplus value augmentation - the necessary condition for any labour in­
clusive class compromise in capitalism (cf. Aglietta, 1979). 
But Esping-Andersen's analysis is based on a surprising conjecture. The last sen­
tence of the quote cited suggests that the root of poor productivity growth is to be 
traced to the lack of flexibility on the labour market. In other words, Esping-Andersen 
uncritically accepts the neoclassical 'Eurosclerosis-thesis', that dynamic inefficiencies 
(lack of productivity growth) are epiphenomenal to static inefficiencies caused by 
regulatory distortions of the labour market (including 'moral hazard'). (For the such 
an interpretation of the Swedish case, see Lindbeck et.al, 1994). 
Given its prevalence, it is remarkable how little empirical support there actually is for 
this thesis. A wide range of studies, using a variety of indicators and methods, have 
continously shown that the Swedish labour market of the 1980s func1:ioned compara­
tively weil (Bosworth & Rivlin, 1987; Aberg, 1988: 76-84; Standing, 1988; OECD, 
1989: 55-80; Holmlund, 1993). This, of course, is quite consistent with the idea that 
active labour market policy more than compensates as a generator of labour mobil­
ity, when wages are partly decommodified through solidaristic bargaining. Further, 
while it is true that productivity growth declined in Sweden in the 1970s, 1980s and 
the early 1990s, there is no evidence that there is a causal relation between this de­
cline and market distorting regulations (SOU, 1991: 7-144; Wibe, 1993). 
As to productivity-growth possibilities in firms attempting to adopt 'post-Fordist' tech­
niques in an industrial relations system based on 'rigid' negotiated wages and co­
determination, case studies such as those of Volvo's Uddevalla and Kalmar plants 
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(as weil as other plants, see Sandberg, et.al., [1994]), directly contradict the thesis 
that rapid productivity growth requires wage (numerical) flexibility. The Kalmar and 
Uddevalla plants demonstrated that bipartite co-determination of the division of la­
bour, work-tasks, work-time, staffing level and promotion ladders, as weil macro-cor­
poratist can be productively organized to harness the economies of new technology. 
This also means that unions have some scope to ensure that technology is designed 
to minimize labour shedding in favour of negotiated work-time reduction. Especially 
the Uddevalla plant moved away from the mass-production conveyor-belt paradigm 
in favour of general purpose machines that in principle reintroduced a high tech vari­
ant of crafts production (each production worker in a work team could in principle 
produce a car on her/his own. Productivity increases were impressive. After only two 
years of operation, the Uddevalla plant superseded the neo-Taylorist Gothenburg 
plant in productivity. With its 32.8 hours/car in 1992, the plant was still less produc­
tive than the 25 hours/car of Toyota in Japan. But this was still in the early life-cycle 
of the plant, and with a 500/0 rate of productivity increase 1990-92, managers at 
Volvo did not doubt that this gap would be closed. The potential of the plant is indi­
cated by the fact that one worker in Uddevalla built one car in 10 hours alone, al­
though the lay-up was designed for a team of seven (Berggren, 1993; Sandberg, 
1994). 
It should be noted, as work-sociologist Michel Freyssenet points out, that there is no 
reason to assurne that the logic of the techniques applied at Uddevalla are specific to 
automobile manufacturing. Rather 
in seeking to attribute ordinary human cognitive and cooperative dimensions 
to work activity [and thereby making multiple motion compatible with high pro­
ductivity][Uddevalla's organization] can be described as a different way of 
marrying manual activity with mechanization and automation, leaving the 
complex part of the productive process in the hands of the direct worker. In a 
dynamic manner it can be interpreted as another automation process, sus­
ceptible of generating a new social form of automation applicable to all pro­
duction process phases and to all activity branches (Freysennet, 1998). 
Freyssenet argues that this form of production presupposes a particular social and 
organizational context of negotiation and co-operation. Here he turns the debate 
around, and argues that, because the system is based on active involvement, it also 
presupposes guarantees that labour saving techniques do not translate into redun­
dancies etc. Hence, the question is not so much whether the system can be ren­
dered compatible with decommodification associated with social citizenship norms. 
The question is whether the potential of new technology can be fully realized in an 
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organizational and social setting, when labour-power is treated as a commodity to be 
shedded when productivity increases. 8 
There is, in other words, good reason to abandon the idea that post-Fordism requires 
numerically flexible wages. In principle there is no reason to assume that it is impos­
sible to pursue a 'social democratic' post-industrialism, based on full employment 
and the transfer of surplus to a unionized public service sector. It should be possible 
to generate productivity increases in the manufacturing sector, which in part could be 
used to subsidize wage increases in the public service sector. Further, solidaristic 
work-time reduction and partial workers' control of the introduction of new technology 
should also mitigate labour-shedding in the manufacturing sector. Such a develop­
ment would correspond to what Da.nielle Leborgne and Alain Lipietz (1988) call a 
'negotiated involvement' trajectory of post-Fordism. Here, co-determination provides 
an organizational form for functional flexibility - or, "networking and skill to adjust vol­
ume to demand without productivity losses" (Amin, 1994) - compatible with "general 
purpose" machines and CAO/CAM technology. Active labour market policy facilitates 
workforce training and mobility. Here the aim is a universal and equitable integration 
into the labour market through a new capitai/labourlsocial-citizenship accord, allow­
ing for solidaristic distribution of work, wages and leisure, in exchange for public 
goods such as a stable supply of a skilled workforce, and public provisions cutting 
social overheads (such as health and child-care). 
On the basis of this interpretation, I would contend that we can generate a more ten­
able hypothesis as to why the 'Scandinavian social democratic model' reached an 
impasse in the early 1990s, and hence we can specify more precisely what the con­
straints on social democratic renewal are. Regulation theory holds that a growth 
model needs to be encased in an institutional framework, a mode of regulation that is 
compatible with its central norms. It was the failure of implementing such a mode in 
the 1980s and the 1990s that pre-empted a negotiated involvement solution in Swe­
den. 
The hypothesis can be specified with reference to certain functional strengths and 
weaknesses that we can derive 'from the structural properties of the negotiated in­
volvement type of post-Fordism. On the one hand, as in Fordism, ex ante wage 
regulation could still serve the function of integrating mass production and mass con­
sumption in the negotiated involvement model. The assumption would be, of course, 
adequate process innovation to ensure productivity increases. But at the same time 
stable aggregate demand-expansion may serve to facilitate the dynamic determi­
nants of productivity increases (Boyer, 1991): "Iearning by doing", adequate invest-
Here Freyssenet invokes research in Japan indicating that, in their process of extending lean production, 
Toyota have had to take on principles from the Uddevalla model. Ibid. cf. (Shimzu, 1995). This corroborates 
weil with arguments that Japanese lean production, which combines a loss of autonomy, with a demand of 




ment, capacity utilization and economies of scale. These are the so-called 'Kaldor­
Verdoorn effects' that have been notable by their absence in the monetarist era of 
the 1980s, despite the technological revolution (Boyer & Petit, 1991). On the other 
hand, the negotiated model is much more vulnerable to breakdown resulting from 
contracting and unstable demand, because of its limited capacity for cost-cutting. In 
this sense it seems to require a "Keynesian dimension", in the sense of stable and 
expanding demand, as weil as a predictable institutional framework in which corpo­
rate and financial planning, public policy and negotiation can proceed. Moreover, it 
requires a certain balance of power between labour änd capital. 
The next section will iIIustrate how one can use this general line of argumentation to 
make sense of the crisis of the 'Swedish Model' in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. It will be argued that the term 'globalization' could be used as a shorthand 
explanation of the crisis of Swedish social democracy. But contrary to the economis­
tic and determinist conception of globalization that Giddens uses, I will emphasize 
political dimensions and power relations of globalization. These are power relations 
that in fact have generated what Bauer calls social misrationalization - a socially 
suboptimal appropriation of productive forces. The 'organic crisis' of socio-demo­
cratic regulation has three main determinants: internationalization of production, and 
globalization of finance, both of which increased the structural power of Swedish 
transnational capital. The third dimension was the acceptance of neo-liberal norms 
by Swedish social democrats themselves (through which we can deduce that the 
discourse of the third way is part of the problem rather than the solution). The shift to 
a social democratic neoliberalism, in turn, can only be understood if we, following 
Poulantzas (1978), invoke the importance of the epistemic (orms (cf. Foucault, 1970) 
associated with the 'institutional materiality' of the capitalist state practices, in which 
social democrats have become enmeshed, since they became engaged with the 
management of capitalism after World War 11. 
If it had not become apparent earlier, it became evident in the recession of 1991-93 
that Sweden had not managed to achieve a distinctly social democratic trajectory of 
'post-industrial/post-Fordist development'. Particularly symbolic of the failure to 
translate promising micro-economic developments into a full fledged regime of ac­
cumulation were the closures of Volvo's plants in Uddevalla and Kalmar. Since these 
plants were demonstrably the ones with the highest productivity potential of Volvo's 
plants, it showed how myopic corporate management can be in periods of severe 
demand contraction, where cost-cutting is an imperative, and where questions of 
short-term transport costs and productive compatibility with plants of strategic part­
ners, or sheer 'bureaucratic politics' within the corporation might overshadow other 
considerations (Sandberg, 1994). But more importantly sluggish productivity growth 
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throughout the 1980s (Erixon, 1991) indicates that there was a more general prob­
lem. 
The essence of the problem of regulation is to be found in the interplay of the wage 
relation and the institutions of finance and investment. As a result neither the dis­
tributive nor the productivity enhancing mechanisms of the solidaristic wage policy 
were at work. The Rehn-Meidner model had in the 1950s and the 1960s facilitated 
the macroeconomic diffusion of productivity growth, through a careful balance of sta­
ble and expanding demand and a profit squeeze. (this is usually singularly) Adminis­
trative capital controls and the BreUon Woods system had played a crucial role for 
this purpose (Ryner, 1999). International expansion ensured adequate demand-pull 
for the Swedish export sector. As a result, the Swedish macroeconomic policy-stance 
could be slightly restrictive over the business cycle (high taxes were emphasized). 
Together with high general wage demands, this ensured that average profit rates 
were kept down, and this ensured a tendency towards wage equalization. It also 
ensured a high transformation pressure on the economy, where low productivity 
private enterprises were forced out of business. Low average profits were neverthe­
less compensated with exceptionally low interest rates, which ensured productive in­
vestments. 
This relationship between demand, wages, profits, finance and investment did not 
obtain in the 1980s. International demand was not stable and expansionary after the 
BreUon Woods and the restrictive macroeconomic regime of the EMS-zone. One 
new development in this context was high international interest rates and high risk 
premia for currencies more inflationary than the Dollar and the Mark. This also af­
fected Swedish interest rates as long as attempts were made to maintain a certain 
value of the Crown. As a result of this, it was extremely difficult to maintain a macro­
economic policy that was sufficiently restrictive to enforce a profit-squeeze and 
maintain full employment at the same time. In the first phase of the post-Bretton 
Woods period Swedish policy makers responded by attempting to increase profits 
and investment levels of Swedish corporations through devaluations. It was hoped 
that in exchange for these employment enhancing measures, unions would restrict 
their wage demands and thereby contain inflation (eg Feldt, 1982). At the same time 
fiscal policy would be restrictive, so that budget deficits generated during the phase 
of Fordist crisis in ttie 1970s could be eliminated. 
The problem with such a strategy was that it created totally different terms for wage 
increases in the public service sector and the export oriented manufacturing sector. 
As a result, the goal of a solidaristic wage accord between the public and private 
sector unions and employers never materialized (Ryner, 1994 cf. Ahlen, 1989). The 
export sector achieved excess profits. In the absence of any employee investment 
funds or mechanisms ensuring that these profits would be transferred to the wage 
earner collecUve, it proved impossible for trade unions to legitimately contain wage 
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demands. This was especially so, when profits quite clearly were increasingly in­
vested abroad, or were perceived to be used to increase the dividends of shares. 
Additionally interest rates had increased, which put pressure both on corporations to 
continue to achieve high profit rates, and on manufacturing unions to demand high 
nominal wages. By contrast, public sector unions were expected to maintain low 
wage increases. But given the organizational clout that an 80 percent unionization 
rate gives, it was unreasonable to expect that they would see their real wages de­
cline, and they enforced wage demands in the 1980s through massive strikes if nec­
essary. As a result of these developments, Sweden experienced high inflation, high 
levels of union rivalry, as weil as capital-Iabour conflicts in the end of the 1980s. 
When the recession came in the 1990s, the cost structure of Swedish firms was un­
favourable. In addition, a speculative financal bubble, generated by pent-up nominal 
demand, collapsed, and this resulted in a severe bank crisis, that virtually bankrupted 
the state as it saved the monetary system. 
An important part of this story is the failure to generate productivity developments, 
that might have underwritten inflation. Two factors explain this absence of productiv­
ity growth. First, the devaluations combined with high interest rates favoured estab­
lished companies, also those that ought to have been pushed out of business 
through transformation pressure. It also discouraged the investment in new high pro­
ductivity ventures (Erixon, 1989). Second, Swedish firms used the profits generated 
to disproportionally invest abroad, especially high productivity firms were established 
or acquired on the continent, in order to obtain economies of market-proximity (T. 
Andersson, 1994). 
We can thus see how internationalization of production, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods, and the globalizaton of finance conspired to contain a social democratic 
mode of regulation. Internationalization of production, undermined the relationship 
between wage moderation and high productivity investments. The breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods, undermined the precarious balance between international demand, 
and domestic macroeconomic balance that had ensured the conditions of existence 
of the Rehn-Meidner model. Finally globalization of finance imposed higher interest 
rates. It also imposed more unstable and unpredictable interest rates and/or ex­
change rates. This totally undermined any possibility to calculate a fair wage/profit 
share, and wage distribution in the wage-earner collective, and any possibility to pre­
dict what kind of payoffs that wage moderation might yield in terms of future jobs. As 
a result the scope for 'responsible' coordinated bargaining was severely limited (In­
terview August 1993 with Harry Fjällström, LO Chief Negotiator). 
To this it should be added that Swedish employers in the 1980s had adopted a neo­
liberal ideological orientation. Hence they had deliberately begun to insist on a de­
centralization of bargaining, and they resisted any attempt to maintain solidaristic 
wage policy, either within the manufacturing sector or even less so with the service 
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sector. Increasingly they took the view that wages should be set according to the 
ability of the firm to pay. As a result, they used the increased structural power that 
transnational production implied and the divisions within the wage earner collective, 
that scopes for wage drift implied, to decentralize bargaining (Ahlen, 1989). 
But not only business interest organizations acted deliberately to enforce this devel­
opment. Also deliberate policies of the social democratic government served to en­
force market driven restructuring and a preemption of negotiated involvement. Here I 
will put aside the political demobilization of the trade union demands for wage earner 
funds in the 1970s, that were actively promoted by the social democratic government 
that was elected in 1982 (see Lewin, 1988). Such funds were explosive because of 
their obvious challenge to capitalist ownership prerogatives. At the same time, they 
might have constituted exactly the kind of investment politics needed, to resolve the 
contradictions in bargaining between the need for an expansionary full employment 
policy and a restrictive anti wage-drift policy, since wage earner funds would have 
siphoned off excess profits to wage earner administered investment funds, with a 
direct mandate to reinvest in co-determined corporate restructuring. 
I nstead , I will focus on the deliberately destablilizing monetary and borrowing policy 
which the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank pursued after 1985. This policy 
amplified in a critical manner the tendency towards higher and more unstable interest 
rates, and thereby further undermined the conditions for solidaristic wage policy. It 
expressed a change of orientation and outlook of social democratic economic state 
managers. 
The government deregulated capital and money markets in 1985, and this was fol­
lowed up by a formal deregulation of foreign exchange markets in 1989 (that by then in 
large measure was de facto deregulated anyway). Moreover, the strategy in managing 
the public debt changed. Together with a vow not to devalue again, the government 
decla.red it would no longer borrow abroad directly to finance the debt or cover balance 
of payments deficits, but would rather only borrow on the domestic market (Le only 
issue bonds in Swedish crowns). This meant that in order-to maintain a balance of 
payments, the Swedish interest rate would have to increase to a level where private 
agents would hold bonds or other debt in Swedish crowns, despite the devaluation risk 
(Bergström, 1993: 159-60). The broader purpose of this so called "norms based" 
monetary policy, was to contain inflation by exerting market discipline on collective ac­
tors, such as unions and social service agencies in wage- and budget bargaining 
(Sweden.Ministry of Finance, 1985; Hörngren, 1993). In other words, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Central Bank deliberately sought to amplify the territorial non-corre­
spondence between global financial markets and collective- and state bargaining, for 
disciplinary purposes. This is quite clearly a variant of "disciplinary neo-liberalism". This 
can only be described as an atterrlpt to redefine the terms of social regulation and rep­
resentation in the tripartite state. In effect, the Ministry of Finance abandoned its sup­
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port of solidaristic wage policy, since the effects of market forces on interest and profit 
rates which conditioned wage bargaining were to be maximized rather than minimized. 
The tendencies towards deeper commodification of the wage relation were thus en­
forced. 
The structural power mobilized by this form of rule has been effectively used to create 
a "crisis consciousness" at strategic junctures. Previously inconceivable decisions "to 
calm the markee have been taken in the context of rapid capital flight, including the 
decision to apply to the EC and to formally abandon the full employment commitment 
in 1990. But the lack of consent, as weil as 'further economic overheating, implied that 
fragmentation in bargaining and wage push inflation was amplified rather than miti­
gated. Moreover, it was in the context of the "extraordinary measures" of a wage 
freeze and a temporary ban on strikes (that did not pass Parliament) that the electoral 
support of the SAP plummeted to a historical low, ultimately leading to a humiliating 
electoral defeat in 1991 (Ryner, 1994). One cannot but conclude that capital deregula­
tion and the strategy to increase Sweden's interest rate sensitivity seriously backfired. 
The basic fallacy was that such a constitutionalist form of regulation would enhance 
incomes policy. But short-termism and speculative nature of the international financial 
flows totally undermined any predictability for bargaining. This served to further desta­
bilize the economy, and it in this context one should considerthe massive imbalances 
in the Swedish economy in the early 1990s. 
Social Democratic state agency was thus used to enforce the structural power of 
capital that was promoting neo-liberal restructuring. This raises the question why social 
democrats become neo-liberals? The policy of the Ministry of Finance are so antitheti­
cal to our understanding of social democratic rationality that it is tempting to invoke the 
term 'false consciousness'. The policy so clearly contradicted the terms of solidaristic 
wage policy, which also has been critical to the continued electoral hegemony of 
Swedish social democracy, based as it is on a 'wage-earner alliance' (Martin, 1993). 
The reasonable interpretation is that the Ministry of Finance acted according to its 
ideational convictions, and this would then be a case of the permeation of transnational 
neo-liberal hegemony in the practice of Swedish social democratic elites. 
I have no problem agreeing with this thesis, provided that it is not seen (only) in terms 
of social democrats travelling to and participating in meetings of the Bank of Interna­
tional Settlements where they undergo a cathartic experience, or are convinced by 
domestic business lobbies with connections in the Trilateral Commission or the Euro­
pean Roundtable of Industrialists. What such accounts would fail to capture is the re­
markable ease, and sense of perfect consistency, with which the social democratic 
managers in the Ministry of Finance (but not in the Labour Market Ministry or the Social 
Service Ministry) adopted the policies in question. In other words such accounts would 
not on their own be able to account for why social democrats would be so open and 
receptive to these policy ideas. My thesis (Ryner, 1996: ch. 7) concludes by showing 
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how this reeeptiveness was generated as a result of ideational developments within 
soeial demoeratie eireles during the golden age of Fordism itself. Under the surfaee of 
poliey-eontinuity, the way of arguing and justifying the mode of regulation ehanged. It 
ehanged from the Marxian/institutionalist eoneeption diseussed earlier, with its 
emphasis on the eontradietions of eapitalism, to a pieeemeal soeial engineering 
eoneeption, influeneed by Popper's eoneeption of falsifieation and experimentation. As 
a result of this, the erisis of the 1970s was not interpreted as a erisis of eapitalism, but 
as a falsifieation of Keynesian ideas, whieh verified the 'null hypothesis' of monetarism. 
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Final Showdown and New Horizons: Transnational 
Integration and the Making of Wide Area Logistics 
Networks 
1. 	 Beyond national capitalism: Varieties of cross border 
reorganization 
In this paper I want to introduce the field of transport and logistics "services" as an 
area of interest to study processes of transnationalized (re-) organization and institu­
tionalization. De- and Re-bordering (not necessa.rily along geographical and/or legal 
lines of the traditional nation state 1) are significant characteristics of a new type of 
capitalist development going beyond national frameworks of accumulation and 
regulation, of economy, state, and society. Although neo-gramscian approaches 
have started to take the rapid advance of regional integration projects more seriously 
(Gamble/Payne 1996, Röttger 1997), a general problem of critical accounts of the 
transnational recombination of power projects remains. Much work done so far re­
mains rather general with regard to significant changes in cross border production 
and regulation. Thus I want to propose the study of transformation processes at a 
sectoral and organizational level. I am therefore combining a neo-gramscian per­
spective on international relations (Cox 1987, 1983) with a neo-institutional and so­
cietal perspective in organization studies (Powell/DiMaggio 1991, Türk 1997). These 
approaches in organization theory have not lost their links to political sociology. Or­
ganizations can neither be separated from the societal context nor can they be un­
derstood as rational actors (which does not rule out rationality and efficiency as re­
current features of organizations). However, similar to the field of political science, 
the bridge between globalistJstructuralist approaches, for instance global commodity 
chain analysis (Gereffi/Korzeniewicz 1994), and (national) institutionalist approaches, 
for instance the national business system scheme (Whitley/Kristensen 1996), has yet 
to be built to take into account both private economic forces and public institutional 
forces as weil as the interaction between the two sources of power relations with re­
gard to trans-border processes of societal development. 2 
An interesting perspective on new aspects of "postmodern" statehood and achanging role of territoriality 
has been offered by Ruggie (1993). 
Interestingly, both Gereffi and Whitley as the leading proponents of the two theories agree with regard to a 
need to take supranational integration more thoroughly into account (see their debate Gereffi 1996, Whitley 




Examining the inter- and transnationalization of social relations should make it possi­
ble to "save" the insights gained in the recent convergence/divergence debate ("va­
rieties of capitalism", see Hollingsworth et. al. 1994, Unger /van Waarden 1995) 
while extending the analysis to supra- and transnational spheres of social relations. It 
is necessary in particular to develop societal/institutional perspectives which take 
economical and political integration projects such as the European Union more sys­
tematically into account , both for analytical and political reasons.3 In short, I want to 
focus on both class and state formation (Jaques Tilly) processes beyond the nation 
state, on the relationship between new types of labor and power division, and on the 
formation of supranational power structures in particular. 
To do so, state and infrastructure related sectors such as telecommunication, en­
ergy, and transport are Iikely candidates to provide empirical data and histories 
speaking to changing power relations both between private forces and between pri­
vate and public forces. All these industries were characterized by what Rall (1986) 
called "blocked internationalization". In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
strictly national pattern of organization in state and infrastructure related services 
was unlocked. Within Europe in particular, supranational regulation and transnational 
integration was extended to cover many areas previously not touched. As many of 
the products and services rendered by the state or private companies concerned are 
highly important both to business and to private consumers, a new deal has to be 
struck between economic and societal needs. 
Looking at contemporary development of transport and logistics systems of ad­
vanced industrialized countries, the formation of transnationalized business and 
power structures can be observed. Transnationallogistics complexes are highly in­
fluential in Europe as weil as in other supranational regions of the world (including 
special transatlantic links). At the center of the current restructuring are Europe's 
post offices. Within two years, the Dutch and German post offices have created in­
ternational empires of transport and logistics businesses. In reaction to this, both the 
French and British post offices have bought networks of small and medium compa­
nies (German Parcel, DPD) in Germany and elsewhere. (Plehwe 1999) Closest to 
European trans-border reorganization histories of transport and logistics providers, 
internationalisation (Whitley 1998). Michel Aglietta (1998, 55) correctly argues that many accounts (Iike 
Whitley's and the governance literature) based on Polanyi's approach of embeddedness focus on the de­
struction and / or reinforcement of old institutions while ignoring the construction of new ones. Unfortu­
nately, that's true for much of the work done by regulation theory scholars as weil if it comes to regional in­
tegration projects such as the European Union. 
Although Boyer/Hollingsworth (1997) speak about the "international nestedness of the market relations" 
signalling adeparture of national embeddedness arguments, there is no adequate reflection of the transna­
tional political economy of European integration in the conclusion to the book .. This is surprising since 
Schmitter's (1997) contribution to the book on the EU polity clearly demonstrates differences between EU 




connected trade associations, and expert networks as weil as supranational (regula­
tory) state policies are restructuring events in North America's NAFTA area.4 
Four important "innovations" concerning transport and logistics are considered cru­
cial in this "organizational field" (Powell/DiMaggio 1991) and with regard to recent 
transformations of capitalism at large: 
1. 	Firstly, an increasing leverage of "functional" (border crossing) over "political" ge­
ography in logistics organization challenging the traditional notion and comprehen­
siveness of national sovereignty; 
2. secondly, changing and "Iiquefied" organizational boundaries between logistics 
customers and suppliers in the process of ongoing logistical rationalization along 
the value chain challenging the traditional notion of organizational integrity of the 
firm ("supply chain management"); 
3. thirdly, the formation of innovative logistics intermediaries constituting a new vari­
ety of internationally operating enterprises challenging traditional government 
owned or state regulated transport organizations. These large scale, privately 
owned, (information) technology intensive, inter- and transnationally operating, 
and multimodal business organizations emerge to mediate process chains be­
tween business organizations eventually reaching into the organizations con­
cerned. They are "networks within networks". (Sydow 1992, 35-37) Apart from 
newcomers to the industry, some of the traditional transport companies with lim­
ited operational tasks hitherto (e.g. postal offices) thereby also turn into "glocal" 
(global/local) problem solvers with a wide variety of tasks depending on the char­
acter of specific supply chains and business networks. Surprisingly or not, the new 
type of service company seems to develop faster in Europe than in the U.S. 
(Lieb/Millen/ Wassenhove 1993, FT Survey Logistics 7.10.1997) which might be 
due to the greater variety of business systems in the old world.5 
4. fourthly, new sectoral and transsectoral as weil as transnational business associa­
tions and "epistemic communities" (Haas 1992) or "expert networks" (made up by 
academic and business logistics experts) have been established in order to shape 
the future of transnationalized supply chains and logistics systems. These a.1Ii­
ances reflect shifting regulatory circumstances and transformed private capital in­
terests. They already have a tremendous influence on public policy making and 
4 	 Information in this paper is based on my Ph.D. research on the issue of transnational integration of trans­
port in North America (Plehwe 1997b). Current research projects focus on the European story taking 
"global" developments under the GATT-Services regime into account (Plehwe 1997a, Plehwe/Bohle 1998). 
5 	 See Plehwe/Bohle 1998 for a discussion of logistics developments aiming to help reduce "created complex­
ity". See my paper on SAP (Plehwe 1998) for a parallel development in the business software market. The 
German enterprise has turned into almost a monopoly in a market dominated by U.S. producers until the 
late 1980s. 
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are set to gain an even stronger position. Whether or not knowledge and ideas 
playa role in public policy can be studied weil in the field of logistics. The central 
insight to be gained, however, relates to the relations of knowledge production, 
and knowledge circulation in the organizational field. Political scientists are weil 
advised to continue efforts to analyze the power behind specific knowledge and 
ideas apart from the content of concepts instead of (uncritically) celebrating 
knowledge and information societies. 
What can be learned about the relationsship of nationa.l "models" and transnational 
structures, of national and transnational spheres of accumulation and regulation by 
way of scrutinizing these transformations? In an attempt to explore the erosion and 
rebuilding of "imagined communities" (Benedict Anderson) and "real" social relations 
I want to trace the history of logistics thinking and reorganization in order to investi­
gate the causes of the large scale transformation of a traditional low profile "craft" 
business and predominantly national state sector. I will start out with a (very) short 
discussion of the traditional (pluri-national and strongly segmented, pluri-modal) 
transport system functioning until the 1970s. The "discovery" of the distribution 'func­
tion will be observed next to explain the origin of transport and logistics rationaliza­
tion as a central feature of new "politics in production" (Buroway 1985). The history of 
regulatory reform in transport 'frequently called "deregulation" is looked at subse­
quently to address questions of the transnationalization of "politics of producUon": 
regime competition coming up after national and international liberalization lowering 
or erasing internal and external barriers to trade and investment in transport services, 
intensified labor division and the making of transnational (state) formations in 
transportllogistics. In the concluding section I will discuss some of the features of 
major changes in transport and logistics mentioned before in an attempt to show 
some of the wider implications of the new patterns of intensified rationalization of the 
sphere of circulation. Powerful actors transformed national institutions to operate 
under a new set of transnationalized conditions and constraints (including suprana­
tional regions and international regimes). Both actors and structures have thus to be 
considered to understand the contemporary movement to build wide area logistics 
networks (Frybourg 1997) supporting transnationalized accumulation regimes. 
2. Strictly national: transport systems until "deregulation" 
Transnationalized transport and logistics complexes grew out of traditional, strictly 
national and "statist" or quasi "statist" transport systems. Traditional transport com­
panies such as airlines ("national flag carriers"), raiIways, shipping, forwarding, 
trucking and postal companies etc. historically often state owned administrations 
rather than business enterprises - have been and continue to be transformed in due 
course into integrated logistics service organizations helping to expand transnational 
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and inter-regional transport and logistics networks and to make them work, (Botelle 
1998) 
This was unthinkable under the terms transport organizations operated during most 
of the time of this century. Except for the United States, almost everywhere in the 
world almost all of the important tra.nsport organizations were state owned, Every­
where operations in national transport markets were severely restricted. The U.S. 
system of private transport industries (railways, airlines, trucking, etc.) supervised 
and regulated intensively by ("independent") agencies and commissions (Iike the In­
terstate Commerce Commission or the Civil Aeronautics board), however, can be in­
terpreted as a functional equivalent to European style direct state ownership. The 
U.S. postal office, of course, continues to be one of the largest state owned compa­
nies in the world. 
Under the terms of the old transport system, apostal company much like other 
transport companies was allowed to deliver mall (or other freight) to another country, 
but there was no legal way to do business within the foreign country as a foreign 
company until the 1980s.6 
I do not want to engage in a discussion of the rationale of state ownership and/or 
state intervention into transport markets and regulation of transport organizations 
which is discussed at great length e,g, incontributions to welfare economics disputed 
by market radical economists among others.7 Arguments of economists about "natu­
ral monopolies" (in railways), "ruinous competition" (in trucking), "external effects" 
and the like only replaced previous political arguments to use transport operations for 
societal purposes (military, industrial, regional, etc.) at a certain point of time in the 
history of capitalist and nation state development. 8 According to German transport 
scholar Fritz Voigt - writing before the market radical reinterpretation of this sector 
was organized in the 1970s9 - ansport has to fulfill three basic functions in human 
affairs: 
6 	 Of course foreign companies could become legal "nationals" and operate in some markets at least. But 
transfer of personnel e.g. was (and continues in many ways to be) restricted. Cross border operations had 
to be export/import relations (interlining) making use of different organizations even if they were owned by 
one company. Many times foreign companies could still not enter anational market due to market entry 
regulations applying for nationals and nationalized foreigners alike. 
7 	 On the history of transport regulation in North America see Plehwe (1997b), on Germany Voigt (1973). 
8 	 See Scherrer (1987) for a discussion of regulatory theory, Alfred Kahn (1970/71), president Carter's chief 
inflation fighter and deregulation expert, provided an excellent overview of regulatory questions and the re­
flection of a new rationality of regulatory politics. On Kahn's role in the regulatory reform era see McCraw 
(1984). 
9 	 An excellent history of the rise of neoliberal market radicalism has been written by Cockett (1995). Unlike 
many other contributions to the role of ideas, Cockett links the history of the Mont Pelerin Society founded 
in 1948 by Hayek and Friedman among others to the rise of think tanks and other channels of "second hand 
dealers in ideas". He also links the different intellecutal functions (production and dissemination of ideas) to 
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It is firstly a service to meet consumption needs; secondly, it is a necessary part of 
every division of labor and of every market and thirdly, it is an irnportant sphere with 
regard to the integration of the state and society. (Voigt 1973, 7-13, emphasis 
added) Werner Sombart underlined the historie innovation of the post office. Not the 
transport aspect of the postal system was new since messenger services had existed 
for a long time. What was new would today be called logistics: systematic collection 
and distribution as a task preceding and following the transport process. Sombart 
emphasized that the most important aspect of the postal system built in the course of 
the 19th Century was the equality of users: Every single person can use the big ma­
chine. 10 (Sombart 1969, 364f.) 
The second and the third functions mentioned by Voigt obviously are at the core of 
current tensions between patterns of intensified labor division regarding territorial 
and juridical boundaries as artificial and superfluous barriers (the market radical per­
spective) and the ongoing need for social, political, and economic cohesion at re­
gional, national, and increasingly, supranational levels.11 
For the purpose of the argument of this paper it is enough to point out that a "trans­
national" or "global" transport market did not exist since national statehood enforced 
the principle of national sovereignty strictly and extended it to ocean and air space. 
What today more and more is portrayed or appears as one big transport and logistics 
market12 was (and continues to be in many areas) a strictly confined national system 
their financial sources and diverse private and public interests. Therole of neoliberalism in reinterpreting 
the transport sector is analyzed in Plehwe (1997b). 
10 	 The universal price system was first suggested by Rowland Hills in Britain. The penny letter introduced in 
1840 in the UK led to an enormous increase of postal traffic within the British Empire (Geistbeck 1986, 393) 
11 	 There is no way to base market radicalism in transport on Adam Smith as many neoliberal arguments try to 
suggest. Smith certainly was weil aware of legal, and power barriers to transport and trade. He underlined 
the stimulus provided by inland water transport for the development of economies of scale, intensified trade 
and thence the opportunities of labor division. He was weil aware of the fact that the advantages of natural 
trading channels like inland shipping routes fully accrue to territories governed by one (state) power only. In 
his famous book "The Wealth of Nations" (1973, 39) he mentions the Danube traffic as a negative exarnple 
because Bavaria, Austria and Hungary all had jurisdictions over parts of that river. Not only does the state 
matter in the thinking of Smith. Robert Reich, the former U.S. secretary of labor reminds us of Adam Smith's 
conviction about the use of traditional transport regulation by the nation state: "Nor did Adam Smith object in 
principle to government intervention when the nation's interest required it. He opined that the Navigation 
Acts (trade with the colonies was only permitted if British flag ships were used for the transport, D. P.) were 
'perhaps the wisest of all commercial regulations of England' .because "defense is much more important 
than opulence", and that Britain should expand its empire by seizing islands from 'the Falklands to the Phi!­
ippines' ... " (quoted in Reich 1992, 19) The British Empire in fact introduced the protectionist regime substi­
tuting a liberal ocean shipping order enforced by the Dutch before. Only in the late 19th Century, a liberal 
regime was reestablished by the now predominant British Empire until World War I - the overwhelming 
market power of British shipping lines did not need the extra protection any more to shield its hegemonic 
status. (Cafruny 1987) 
12 	 Those observers of the transport industries who claim that transport, and most "naturally" ocean and air 
transport, are "global" industries support this line of thinking, consciously or unconsciously. (Kasper 1988, 
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made up by many segmented markets. Segmentation in European national states as 
weil as in North America included the separation of modal markets (raiI, air, road, 
water, pipeline), regional (geographie) markets (licenses for local and long-distance 
transport), certain product markets (most obviously the postal market), and last but 
not least the differentiation between commercial suppliers and own account transport 
operators (of industrial and trading companies) with the latter possibly accounting for 
up to half of the market in most countries.13 
Traditionally, therefore, transport users and transport suppliers were (and over­
whelmingly are) rather opposite forces with the state mediating between the two. 
Historically, state institutions helped tipping the power balance far toward the com­
mercial and state owned side of the business. Neither could large transport suppliers 
dictate prices (uncontrolled monopoly) nor could large transport users wring extraor­
dinary concessions (monopsony power).14 The national transport system thus was a 
part of what Ruggie (1982) called embedded liberalism. Not an overall globalization 
and integration of transport markets, but the reconfiguration and transformation of 
private and public as weil as national and international relations in this area have to 
be understood. 
I nternational transport in any case constituted a special market segment which was 
(and continues) to be governed by international regimes. (Krasner 1983) One aspect 
of particular importance certainly constitutes the fact that long distance and trans 
border movements of freight in particular grew much faster than GDP during recent 
history. 15 The increase indicates a significant change in the overall geographie and 
organizational division of labor and possibly expresses and explains a shift of priority 
Ronit 1995) If this understanding is shared, the satellite industry would probably figure as a "business of 
outer space" not matter whether or not the service is provided by American or European suppliers under 
specific legal arrangements. 
13 	 Counting not only transport but reshipment and warehousing as weil as extended logistics services the 
European market is worth about DEM 900 billion. Less than 50 percent of this total is supplied commer­
cially. (Klaus 1999) Own account transport was subjected to intensive regulation due to the fact that ship­
pers could not ofter own account services to others resulting in inefticient use of equipment ("dead heading" 
is interesting phrase used to describe trucks running empty and thus highlighting the valorization process). 
14 	
"Eine Zwischenstufe zwischen einem natürlichen und gesetzlichen Monopol und einem nur ökonomischen 
Monopol bildet das Monopol an den Verkehrsmitteln. Daher das Streben der Trusts, die Herrschaft über die 
Verkehrswege zu Wasser und zu Lande zu erhalten. Die Verstaatlichung der Verkehrsmittel verringert die 
Monopolfestigkeit und bewirkt so bis zu einem gewissen Grade eine Verlangsamung der Konzentration der 
Unternehmungen und des Eigentums." (Hilferding 1968, S.274) 
15 	 Compare data in WTO 1989, GVB 1997. Freight transport in Germany grew at a rate more than twice of 
GDP growth, 5.3 versus 2.2 per cent, respectively (1997). Road based freight long distance transport grew 
at 6.7 per cent. This development is strongly linked to intensified trade within Europe. (Aberle 1998) 
153 
in transport politics toward improving external transport chains (outside national 
space) rather than safeguarding national systems. 16 
So-called "Global" international transport of goods (= inter, lat.: between national 
markets), however, remains one of the most intensively regulated business areas 
subject to a variety of international regimes like the World Trade Organization estab­
lished and supervised by the international community of nation states and/or - in­
creasingly - supranational authorities like the EU. The market segment(s) of "inter­
national transport" have been regulated by multilateral regimes since the end of the 
last century. The world postal union was founded in 1874. (Geistbeck 1986) Air traffic 
is conducted under the regulations of the international transport law based on the 
Paris convention of 1919 wh ich extended national sovereignty to the air space. After 
WW 11 both the International Air Transport Association (IATA) made up by the private 
and/or state owned organizations and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) provided the overall regulatory framework. (Doganis 1991) To regulate inter­
national ocean shipping, in 1956 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was 
founded. Two predecessors, the International Shipping Federation und der Interna­
tional Chamber of Shipping, had failed to provide for the necessary framework. 
(Farthing 1993). A convention for multimodal transport services has been drafted and 
frameworks for other transport services are considered as topics of the GA TI-Serv­
ices negotiations. However, progress has been very slow to develop the "global" 
multilateral framework under the accepted principles of the World Trade Organiza­
tion. (WTO 1989, 1998a-d) It is quite amusing to read Kasper (1988) writing about 
the "global" airline industry suggesting that the U.S. should not adhere to the most 
favored nation principle of GATT in the case of airlines and rather use bilateral 
agreements to achieve maximum liberalization (see Doganis 1993 on various future 
perspectives on the international regime regarding airline regulation). 
Transport industries thus are "global" only in the sense that international transport 
operations provide for channels and mediate the exchange within the multinational 
trading system. Susan Strange interprets international transport regimes as secon­
dary power structure in the world system. Established regimes favored national com­
panies in virtually every country in the case of airlines and more or less prevented 
such ownership in the case of ocean shipping. 17 (Strange 1988) Due to logistical re­
16 	 Part of the explanation has to do with the production of the means of transport: Europeanization was a pre­
condition to enter the commercial aviation business for each European nation state confronted with the U.S. 
and Boeing. National systems of railways allowed Germany and France to develop High Speed rail equip­
ment. Due to the limits of anational market, protected producers seem to be increasingly interested in en­
tering foreign (protected) markets which is only possible if the home market is opened as weil. On the his­
tory of Europeanization in this regard see Plehwe (1997a). 
17 	 It might be the case that the interest of the U.S. in selling Boeing and McDonnell Douglas aircraft to all the 
national airlines stabilized the regime before Airbus became a serious competitor. 
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organization, however, the lines between the primary power structure of the produc­
tion system and the secondary power structure of the transport system are increas­
ingly blurred. 
Within this highly segmented and pluri-national framework, some transport compa­
nies started to expand strongly into foreign markets to offer new inter- and/or trans­
national services ("single lining" by one organization as opposed to inter lining by two 
or more organizations or parts of one organizations) since the late 1970s.18 Before 
the 1980s and weil into the 1990s, however, the transport industry belonged to the 
group of industries characterized by "blocked internationalization". (Rall 1986) Why 
did the entrenched pluri-national and highly segmented system come under siege? 
Didn't it serve weil the largest expansion in international trade, and thence transport 
in human history? What was the background for new regulatory frameworks erasing 
various barriers established by legal and ownership regimes? To understand why, 
we have to ascertain the discovery of the distribution (Iater: logistics 19) function which 
occurred around the advanced industrialized world of the late 60s. 
3. 	 Strong visions back in the 1960s: The discovery of the 
logistics function 
During the decade of the 1960s a significant change began to occur in man­
agement attitude towards the role and irnportance of the distribution function 
of the business firm. This change was not conHned by international bounda­
ries or concentrated in any narrow segment of industry type. During this pe­
riod a new literature of management philosophy emerged, encouraged by 
vigorous support from trade associations, the trade press, government, and 
the academic community. (La Londe/Grabner/Robeson 1993, 4) 
The first issue of the U.S. International Journal of Physical Distribution (1970) con­
tained an article by La Londe, Grabner, and Robeson on coming changes of the dis­
18 	 Certainly there have been multinationals in transport before liberalization created new opportunities: The 
Schenker organization (privatized since the late 19805) counted more than hundred firms abroad already 
before WW " and as subsidiary of the German railway had more offices abroad after WW " than the Ger­
man diplomatic service. On th history of the company originally inventing "Iess than truckload" (rail wagon 
load originally) services see Matis (1995) and Plehwe (1994). However, the activities of transport (in the 
case of Schenker freight forwarder) capital were narrowly circumscribed and since market entry was by and 
large under state control it was difficult to expand operations abroad. 
19 	 Only since the 19505 an economic understanding developed in addition to the military use of the word. 
(Bjelicic 1987) Logistics in its modern economic sense means that goods have to be at the right place at the 
right time in the quantitiy and quality needed. Logistics managment is thus concerned with organizational 
and operational tasks regarding aspects of time and space of the production (value creating) process. Cen­
tral to logistics are transport, reshipment, and warehousing and connected information, communications 
and control processes. Funtionally micro economists distinguish between supply, production, distribution 
and recycling logistics. (Danckwerts 1991) 
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tribution function in management (reprinted 23 years later in the renamed Interna­
tional Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 1993), almost a 
prophetic article in retrospective. It carried a description of the integration of the 10­
gistic 'functions as a single management task within the company in order to stream­
line and rationalize fragmented processes of material flow. The 1960s were de­
scribed as the decade of marketing while the 1970s were to become the decade of 
distribution management due to new competitive constraints. The renewal of scien­
tific management efforts, the impact of new technologies in data processing, the im­
portance of distribution to increase consumer satisfaction and the prospective impact 
of cost reduction in distribution on overall profitability were all factors cited to raise 
the value of distribution management. 
Distribution was not yet targeted then as a business area to be rationalized at large 
while the share of distribution costs of total costs was as high as 45 per cent in some 
product markets. "It would seem, therefore, that the new focus upon efficiency in 
distribution was a logical outgrowth of the American business environment. That is, 
one of the last remaining frontiers for significant cost savings in the business firm 
was the distribution area." (La Londe/Grabner/Robeson 1993, 7) The "last frontier" 
was already recognized in 1962 by Peter Drucker who referred to distribution as the 
"dark continent". And eight years even before Drucker, Paul Converse recommended 
academicians and practitioners to better address the physical distribution side of 
marketing. James R. Stock summarized this history of thought (and practice) indi­
cating continuing difficulties to perceive the whole of the logistics chain (not just dis­
tribution) and the strategic aspect of logistics. According to Stock only outsiders to 
the logistics field such as Michael E. Porter helped to more thoroughly address the 
logistics function although there is still need to research the interaction of logistics 
and other functional areas of the firm. (Stock 1990, 3-6) 
The increasing impact of logistic costs on profitability in any case was directly linked 
to increasing international competition by La Londe/Grabner/Robeson back in 1970 
(1993, 7) - intensified international competition facilitated by the beginning of the 
relative decline of economic hegemony of the United States vis ..a,-vis Japan a.nd 
Europe and the big crisis of accumulation later termed crisis of fordism (Aglietta 
1979) may in fact explain why the time was ripe for the final discovery of logistics. 
Logistics can be defined as a concept to guide economic processes (both at the mi­
cro and macro level of the economic system) and as a tool of rationalization to opti­
mize specific areas of the labor process focusing initially on transport, reshipment 
and warehousing including cost reduction for such services. (Danckwerts et al. 1991, 
39) The high share of labor costs in logistics operations led to the intensified class 
struggle in literally all areas of transport and logistics business after competition was 
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introduced into hitherto protected market segments. Maintaining or increasing mar­
gins necessitated deflated labor markets in the sector.20 
Later on, logistics thinking certainly turned into a crucial component of the rapid 
spread of a wide variety of new productions concepts such as Toyotism üust in time, 
quality control etc.) made in Japan and Business Reengineering (Dörrenbächer et al. 
1997) again made in U.S.A.21 In 1970, however, there was still a long way to go be­
fore reaching the stage of systemic (and inter and trans-organizational) rationaliza­
tion. (Altmann et. al. 1986) 
Separation of the distribution function in the early days of logistics thinking according 
to LaLonde et. al. (1993) would allow companies to better adapt to faster and more 
dynamically changing markets both with regard to product cycles and geographical 
expansion. The authors distinguished four factors with determining influence on the 
development of the distribution function in the course of the 1970s: Increasing ac­
ceptance of a systemic distribution approach, increasing weight of the demand side 
(buyers market), challenges coming from multinational distribution and increasing 
state influence on distribution policy and practice. (La Londe/Grabner/Robeson 1993, 
9, italics added) 
By 1980 in any case, most internationally operating companies would separate and 
integrate the logistics function within the organization. Increasing consumer impor­
tance would result from the rising use of electronic data processing of trading com­
panies and from concentration of economic power in horizontal and vertical market­
ing structures. The authors stress attempts of trading companies to push back ware­
housing costs to producers. This long standing contest between industrial and 
trading companies could certainly be traced back to the old days of capitalism and is 
winning increasing momentum in the 1990s with large trading companies trying to 
force industrial producers to abandon their own logistics operations. (Bretzke 1999, 
Hector 1998, Plehwe et al. 1998, 30/31) The fight over control of logistics operations 
thus is another example of changing power relations between organizations along 
the value chain (historically, after the era of merchant capitalism, power centered on 
the industrial end producer as focal company). Toyotist "Iean production" reorganiza­
tion of course intensified traditional hierarchies by creating first, second, and third 
(and may be more) tiers of supply companies. A new competitive dynamic has re­
cently been addressed under the term "Wintelism" (Microsoft Windows und Intel) by 
the authors Borrus and Zysman (1997). Not the traditional end producer, but produc­
20 	 Around five million workers (three million in trucking) made up the European labor force exempted from the 
European working time directive of 1993. Re-Regulation has been proposed to combat frequent abuse of 
transport labor contributing to frequent interruptions of the transport systems due to industrial strive (see EU 
Commission 1997a). 
21 	
"Cycle time compression" and "reverse logistics" (pull instead of push systems, efficient customer/consumer 
response) are the two most important concepts of the 1990s explained by LaLonde/Masters (1994). 
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ers of inputs somewhere along the supply chain occupy a more powerful position. 
Examples are Intel producing micro processors of computers and Microsoft produc­
ing soft ware. Manufacturers in the U.S. electronics business end up with a rather 
weak position of customized production demanding utmost flexibility to serve a wide 
variety of customers. 
Multinational challenges in any case were of utmost importance to U.S. companies in 
the 1970s because the share of international sales was far lower in the U.S. com­
pared to Europe (five versus 30 to 40 percent of GDP due to the tremendous home 
market). Companies in Europe (including several U.S. owned firms of course), there­
fore, were much more experienced with international distribution. However, U.S. 
based companies were perceived as being engaged in a drive to rapidly increase 
international production which would eventually transform the traditional export/im­
port organization. Due to resulting internationalized restructuring of the production 
and distribution process, distribution managers were set to gain a more central posi­
tion in the whole organization. LaLonde et. al. add a very interesting remark on sup­
ply structures of transport and logistics services: 
Parenthetically, it might be interesting to speculate on the role of distribution 
middlemen in the new international environment. 80th the evidence to date 
and the economic logic would seem to indicate that a new type of capital in­
tensive conglomerate will emerge during the 1970s to meet the needs of 
worldwide distribution. The functions of export packaging, shipment consoli­
dation, ship chartering, export-import documentation, stevedoring, storage, 
customs requirements, and multi-modal inland distribution 'will be offered 
by a single firm. Thus it is suggested that a new form of distribution middle­
man with intermodal capability and spanning a wide range of intermediate 
distribution functions will emerge to serve the needs of the multinational dis­
tribution manager during the 1970s. (La Londe/Grabner/Robeson 1993, 11, 
emphasis added) 
It is fascinating to see this forecast coming true only taking a little longer overall and 
involving a myriad of reorganization and deregulation battles. (Plehwe 1997a, b) 
Nevertheless, companies like Federal Express and DHL, hybrid transmodal and 
technologically advanced logistics providers, started up in the early 1970s. The U.S. 
Air Cargo Deregulation Act of 1977 was nicknamed FedEx bill because of the sup­
port lobby organized by FedEx CEO Fred Smith. (Hamilton 1990) 
Increasing state influence addressed by LaLonde et al. is of particular importance, of 
course. Government investment in infrastructure and subsidies, anti-trust control with 
regard to supply structures and relations between shippers and suppliers, and the 
regulation of markets are mentioned as weil as increasing indirect influences such as 
environmental and consumer protection measures (horizontal expansion of the state, 
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social regulation). Increasing product liability resulting from stronger government in­
volvement in particular was seen as a key factor expanding the role of distribution 
management into new areas. Interesting enough, prospectively rising state influence 
is not confronted with the demand to reduce government impact in this early analysis 
of profound changes in transport and logistics. This demand was strongly developed 
by market radical think tanks (Stone 1996, Smith 1991, Swann 1993) established 
recently to advocate "deregulation" and by the strongest private business forces 
during the 1970s. The Business Roundtable in the U.S., founded in 1972 by senior 
managers of large U.S. companies concentrated its attention on regulatory policies 
(both economic and social regulation) and mobilized support to the "deregulation 
movement".22 (EdsaIl1984, Vogel 1981, Plehwe 1989,351) 
The argument of LaLonde et al. already suggested correctly, however, that it was 
becoming far more important for (Iogistics) management to get involved in the potiti­
cal (re-) organization of the market. New politics in production could only be devel­
oped by changing the politics of production: The "age of regulatory reform" (Button/ 
Swann 1991) was coming and "deregulation" turned into an international movement 
(Gayle/Goodrich 1991) driven both by rising societal and state importance and by 
more aggressive reorganization strategies of business organizations and associ­
ations. The search for new accumulation strategies restoring micro economic profita­
bility and enabling new growth patterns (eyeing international markets rather than the 
home market) placed internal. and in particular external logistics reorganization very 
high on the agenda since the late 1970s. Politics in production in the case of trans­
port and logistics necessarily had to become politics of production. It was certainly 
possible to implement new priorities within the organizations of transport users, to 
change the structures and the modes of operation in the commercial supply indus­
tries, management had to go politics. "Deregulation" and privatization were the main 
concepts employed to overcome two important barriers to capital accumulation: state 
ownership of transport organizations and state regulation of market (entry). 
The fact that many forces advocated regulatory change during the 1970s including trade unionists, con­
sumerists, and ecologists should not wipe off the different agendas with regard to de- and re-regulation. 
Most certainly "deregulation" was not just a "successful fight" against "powerful private interests" (regulated 
firms and trade unions) for the good of all as DerthicklQuirk (1985) want to make us believe in their history 
of deregulation. The authors themselves provide counter evidence to their argument (firms changing sides 
etc.). Of particular interest is the omission of discussion of air freight "deregulation" (which nobody opposed) 
contradicting their argument and thus challenging the whole story. A detailed critique of this account and 
more evidence for the "business interest" in deregulation can be found in Plehwe (1997a). 
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4. 	 New politics of production: "Deregulation", regime 
competition, and transnationalization 
The politicization of the business community (van Schendelen/Jackson 1987) in 
general and the international "convergence" on "deregulation"/Iiberalization, and pri­
vatization strategies in North America and Western Europe is weil documented in­
cluding the special field of transport. (e.g. Bell/Cloke 1990, Button/Pitfield 1991, Ba­
nister/Button 1991) Within little more than one decade almost every important in­
dustrialized and many developing countries implemented liberalization and privatiza­
tion measures which is a puzzling phenomenon in itself suggesting strong conver­
gence forces. Many comparative studies and books offering case studies in fact 
discuss national variations and the pros and cons of privatization and deregulation 
within the national economical and political environment (mostly praising the results). 
Even where (sub-) titles suggest the consideration of international dimensions (Iike 
Gayle/Goodrich 1991 and Button/Pitfield 1991), however, the international sphere is 
considered exclusively with regard to issues of regime competition pitting nation 
states like companies against each other only. One country has to deregulate etc. 
because another country did so "successfully", one company has to change opera­
tions due to competitive best practice elsewhere. The story of politically active trans­
national market making by way of opening new spheres of private capital accumula­
tion (privatizing state owned market share and removing legal restrictions) to national 
private and foreign actors is mostly ignored, not to mention the constitution of supra­
national state powers (de jure or de facto). 
National regime competition extending to regional competition within states ("com­
petitive federalism" instead of cooperative or fiscal federalism) certainly is a core 
element of contemporary capitalist reality, but it doesn't come along without (inter­
and transnational) co-operation in the sense of voluntary or forcefully coordinated 
(state and private) action (Türk 1997). Already in 1978, OECD governments still led 
by the "trilateralist" (cooperative) spirit decided to take coordinated steps to liberalize 
various infrastructure markets including transport (OECD 1986) thereby setting the 
stage for intensified "regime competition" (negative or market-Ied integration) in 
transport. Instead of pragmatic, multilaterally coordinated liberalization as originally 
planned, the "aggressive unilateralism" (Bhagwati/Hugh 1990) of the Thatcher and 
Reagan governments (the latter in particular) pushed a new confrontational style 
within the OECD world which endangered the original aims of the liberalization pro­
ject at times and pitted regionalized economic blocs against each other at the end. 
For a while, regime competition looked quite like old fashioned imperialism. Within 
regionalized regulatory orders, however, economic nationalism and thus regime 
competition is narrowly circumscribed by legally binding obligations: the rule of law of 
a thence supranational state. New competitive integration strategies in Western 
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Europe and North America reinforced regionalization on both sides of the Atlantic 
since the mid-80s. 
The European Community 'first refused U.S. calls for a new GATT round on liberali­
zation in the early 1980s (including services in general and transport services in par­
ticular) and started to set up the 1992 agenda instead.23 Paolo Checchini's (1988) 
report included a very positive evaluation of the U.S. transport deregulation experi­
ence - ignoring available counter evidence with regard to service, industrial conflict, 
anti-competitive features etc. suggesting that the U.S. competitive position vis-a-vis 
Europe (suffering from perceived "Eurosclerosis" at the time) had been strengthened 
due to transport deregulation. 
Apart from the macro-economic "danger" of cheaper transport prices across the At­
lantic (supporting profitability in production and trade), the micro-economic challenge 
to European transport organizations already existed within the "fortress". UPS, DHL, 
Federal Express, and TNT, so called integrators operating multimodal transport 
chains and accounting for almost all of the global market share in expedited freight 
traffic as weil as so me other transport companies from the U.S. had started opera­
tions in Europe in the late 1970s. These actors expanded aggressively - albeit not 
always obeying the existing rule of the law. (Campbell 1994) The foreign companies 
are the real competitive threat immediately feit by established firms in Europe and 
elsewhere. The new mode of operation changed politics in production of transport 
suppliers and users.24 European observers openly stated the danger coming from 
the capital intensive U.S. integrators using modern information and communication 
equipment.25 European customers nevertheless were happy to support new transport 
and logistics suppliers delivering cost cutting services not yet available from estab­
lished (mostly national) organizations at the time. Internationally operating banks, 
consulting businesses, and industrial and trading companies used the new express 
23 	 The original 1992 agenda did not include transport liberalization. Internal dynamics already grounded in the 
treaty of Rome were responsible for the inclusion of transport industries in the overall drive to complete the 
internat market. (Compare Plehwe 1997b for a detailed account of the story.) 
24 	 The innovative transport suppliers offered door-to-door services with guaranteed time schedules (money 
back). Speed and reliability was organized within one organization ac ross the whole of the transport chain 
using modern hub-and-spoke systems (integrator: use of various transport modes). Later on the big four 
companies (UPS, FedEx, DHL, TNT) automated reshipment and warehousing and made intensive use of 
new information and communication technology (tracking and tracing via scanner and bar-code technolo­
gies, recently tracing via Internet. The whole system was built for freight up to 30 kg but supply structures in 
the heavier segments are imitating many of the central features. (Rendez 1992) Growth rates in this busi­
ness area consistently exceeded overall growth rates in transport and only recently the growth curve is flat­
tening a bit. 
25 	
"Die größte Herausforderung sind ... die amerikanischen Großunternehmen mit entsprechenden logistischen 
Infrastrukturen, zumal sie mit dem Luft- und Seeverkehr verzahnt sind. Dabei spielt der Rechnereinsatz 
eine große Rolle" (Bress o.J., 19). 
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business guaranteeing rapid and supervised service. (Wojtek 1987) Consider the 
breakdown of the postal order. 
On the initiative of DHL, the private courier companies continuously stepped up their 
collective strategy in the 1980s and 1990s to gain access to protected postal mar­
kets. Until 1984, the private competitors to national PTTs worked in a grey zone of 
the postal market as international mail business was reserved for the national mo­
nopolies. Most postal authorities and in particular French La Poste undertook con­
siderable efforts to stop the new services administratively (including raids by postal 
officers with police functions in France etc.). In 1984, however, German authorities 
decided on the legality of express delivery to Germany by outside firms. This legal­
ized an important part ot the new supply offered by the integrators in one countri6 
thereby securing the first European bridgehead. The courier/express companies took 
it from there to other countries and involved supranational EC competition authorities 
wh ich started to side with the private industry. (Campbell 1994) The support from EC 
competition authorities for the competitors to the national PTTs was all the more im­
portant since the European officials enjoy executive powers in the field of antitrust. 
The International Express Carriers Conference (IECC), originally tounded in 1983, 
was responsible tor most of the collective action on behalf of the new competitors to 
the old post offices. Initially a rather loose association depending heavily on DHL's 
financial support, the big four companies strengthened their efforts in 1987 with TNT 
and Federal Express matching DHL contributions and UPS becoming a full member 
in 1988. (Campbell 1994, 125) In 1988, IECC realized the increasing importance of 
the supranational EU level to influence postal (and other transport) policy. At this 
time the big four attracted smaller national companies (sometimes separately organ­
ized) thus directly binding together outsiders and insiders with a common interest 
together.27 Some IECC members differed, however, on the character of the planned 
European association. DHL wanted to limit the goals of the European association to 
traditional express service issues (its almost exclusive market) while the majority 
agreed on a wider agenda. (Campbell 1994, 126) In 1989, therefore, two competing 
European associations operated independently. The Association of European Ex­
press Carriers (AEEC) was founded by DHL and others while the other IECC mem­
bers started the European Express Organisation (EEO). Competing strategies not­
26 	 The decision was made with regard to technical questions of postal operations. The regulatory body found 
Deutsche Post to have no proper authority for a certain type of express business. The legal loophole cre­
ated aspace big enough for the international express companies to come in. (For details see Campbell 
1994,133) 
27 	 In Germany, German private cornpetitors of the Deutsche Bundespost joined the courier/express business 
association BIEK led by the international firms. In the Netherlands, the two associations, one combining 10 
international companies and the other organizing 200 SMEs decided to merge in 1993. (DVZ 14.1.1992) 
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withstanding, the two associations fought a common battle aga.inst the (multi-) 
national postal monopoly. 
It would be too long for this paper to trace the national and supranational histories of 
postal reform in the EU in detail (see Plehwe 1997a and König/Benz 1997). After 
many rounds of heated discussion, green and white book proposals of the European 
commission to reform the postal market in Europe in the course of the 1990s, con­
siderable national liberalization and European re-regulation has been finally agreed 
upon on December 18, 1996 by the Council of EU ministers. The current arrange­
ment leaves the postal monopolies with a reserved market for standard mai! up to 
350 grams and up to certain price levels to cover expenses needed to fulfill universal 
service obligations. Every country is free to open the market even farther, undermin­
ing the new balance from start. Germany's reserved market includes only letters of 
. up to 200 grams. Fuilliberalization within the European Union is on the horizon (after 
2002) with adecision to be taken by the Council in 2000. It has yet to be decided, 
however, how to finance universal service obligations if the remaining monopoly for 
regular mail is lifted. The important innovation emphasized by Werner Sombart men­
tioned above may be lost. The gap between business and private consumer services 
is likely to grow large. 
In any case postal affairs have already lost their rigid "state service" character. Even 
restricted letter services are are dealt with as apart of the larger parcel/postal and 
express markets as apart of the overall transport market indicating changing per­
ception and regulatory/organizational practice. (Panorama of EU-industry 97, Eu­
ropä.isches Parlament 1997) Altogether, several 100.00 jobs have been lost in 
Europe's post offices. 
Not only external and internal pressure by foreign companies, but internal struggles 
between different groups of capital (and state owned organizations) and alliances 
between "outside" and "inside" companies were thus driving the development and an 
increasing importance of triad competition. 
Overall European 1992 planning in turn supported the U.S. shift away from coopera­
tive multilateralism and towards a new regionalism propagating deeper integration 
with Canada (CUSTA) and Mexico (NAFTA). CUSTA and NAFTA were strongly sup­
ported by the initial refusal of the European Community to follow the U.S. call for a 
new round of GATT negotiations and by the lack of will to give in to U.S. demands 
during the long lasting Uruguay round starting in 1986. (George 1996, Payne 1996) 
In North America, however, both Canada and Mexico only accepted (the Mulroney 
government in Canada) or even pushed (the Salinas government in Mexico) regional 
integration after preferred strategies of lowering trade dependency on the giant 
neighbor failed. (Appel Molot 1994, Payne 1996) "Permeable fordism in Canada had 
meant the development of tighter and tighter links with the American economy. Thus, 
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the post-fordist Canadian economy was almost guaranteed to be even more perme­
able than the fordist one." (Jenson: 1989, 84) 
4.1. Transnational Varieties: North America ... 
Transport was not a sector subject to rapid liberalization in the CUSTA and NAFTA 
agreements written to protect national arrangements in transport by and large (com­
pare detailed analysis in: Plehwe 1997b, 443-445). Thus it could be argued that 
transnationa.lization did not occur in North America, when one only regards the legal 
framework. The real development turned out quite different in the NAFTA region. 
The larger transport companies in particular answered to increasing demand for in­
tegrated trans border services of large shippers in particular and expanded opera­
tions into the neighboring countries despite strong obstacles. Integrated trans border 
organizations have been established by foreign direct investment (in the trucking, 
railway and ocean shipping sectors), and strategic alliances (in the trucking and air­
line sectors). (Compare major trans border moves of North American companies in 
the annex to this paper) 
Aggressive unilateralism also threatened the declared aim of "open markets" within 
the North American region spurring defensive protectionism during a phase that 
could inded be called regime competition (between the U.S. and Canada unHI about 
1988). A "trans border trucking war" resulted from differing legal regimes bene'fi'ting 
Canadian truckers28 until Canadian authorities gave in to demands of U.S. compa­
nies and politicians. The Canadian government subsequently adjusted the provincial 
and central state regulatory system to the liberalized U.S. 'framework. Large integra­
tors like UPS and Federal Express at the same time massively entered the Canadian 
market. The Canadian Post office, however, in turn was allowed to buy the largest 
private parcel company in Canada, Purolator, to meet the new competition. The Ca­
nadian company started to provide cross border services with the minor U.S. inte­
grator Airborne Express. Despite all these protectionist and competitive moves, both 
U.S. and Canadian companies expanded their organizational networks across the 
border, changing the terms of competition and the structure of logistics networks. 
Regulatory 'frameworks have been adjusted by and large after a phase of intensi'fied 
regulatory competition with Canada following the U.S. example. Continuing resis­
tance by provincial governments was broken in Canada much like federal preemp­
tion clauses included in each U.S. law promoting regulatory reform in the transport 
sector transferred regulatory powers from the state to the federal level in the U.S. 
Consider the following court rule exempting Federal Express and UPS from state 
regulations related to trucking in 1991, for example: 
In the case of airlines, Canadian passengers benefited from U.S. deregulation at the expense of Canadian 
airlines. Diversion was strongest from the airport of Montreal to the U.S. city of Burlington in Vermont. 
164 
28 
FedEx is exactly the kind of expedited all-cargo service that Congress speci­
fied and the kind of integrated transport system that was federally desired. 
Because it is an integrated system it is hybrid, an air carrier employing trucks. 
Those trucks do not destroy its status as an air carrier. They are an essential 
part of the all-cargo service that FedEx innovatively developed to meet the 
demands of an increasingly integrated nation. Congress has freed it from the 
constrictive grasp of economic regulation by states. (TrafHe World: 19.12. 
1994, 24, emphasis added) 
"Hybrid" FedEx belongs to the 'five largest trucking companies and to the ten largest 
airlines in the U.S. at the same time. (Traffic World: 1.8.1994, 11) Certainly state in­
fluence has been diminished with regard to direct economic intervention in transport 
markets in many ways, but more important to an understanding of the story is the 
fact that state regulatory influence has changed substantially including the further 
centralization of regulatory powers.29 
Even without supranational authorities, a North American regulatory framework pro­
vides for a transnationalized regime of capital accumulation. In the railway segment, 
North American transnationalization is even further advanced compared to Europe, 
although the merger of the German and Dutch freight railways signals a similar de­
velopment. Road transport across borders instead is still far more restricted in North 
America. Limited cabotage rights (inland transport by foreign providers) established 
under NAFTA have not been implemented with Mexico.30 UPS in turn withdrew from 
inner Mexican transport after Mexican authorities retaliated U.S. protectionism in 
trucking by restrietions on UPS operations. Across the Atlantic ocean, cabotage 
rights have been fully irrlplemented in 1998 creating the legal opportunity to build a 
road based transport organization across the whole of the EU. Transnational integra­
tion in North America thus in many ways can be described as the extension of the 
U.S. regulatory framework into the neighboring countries meeting resistance wher­
ever possible. Only after the Mexican peso crisis one year after the implementation 
of NAFTA, the Southern neighbor opened up many more national protected areas to 
foreign (U.S. in particular) investment, including the railway sector. Private organiza­
tions nevertheless have established trans-border logistics networks by and large free 
of state intervention. Little to no resources cross borders in North America to help 
underdeveloped regions (NAFTA is about trade, not aid) and fiscal federalism has 
29 	 Among the many eontributions to the history of deregulation the work of Dempsey (1989) provides the best 
assessment I know of. 
30 	 The Clinton administration thereby opposed both Mexiean and U.S. trueking and shipping interests proteet­
ing pay and working eonditions of unionized trueking labor. Unlike the Carter administration eonfronting a 
pro Republiean Teamsters' organization, the Teamsters of the 1990s lean towards the Demoeratie Party. In 
addition to labor market eoneerns, safety issues related to outdated Mexiean equipment played a role in the 
deeision to delay liberalization of trans border traffie. 
165 
been reduced within the nation states. Infrastructure investment is thence dependent 
on regional wealth; polarization and uneven regional development are likely to 
increase. 
4.2. ... and Western Europe 
Complications with regard to liberalization and regionalization of transport systems in 
the U.S., however, do not come as a surprise considering the long European history 
of integration in transport. Until 1985, the so called Common European Transport 
Poliey remained strongly constrained by the idea and practice of positive (policy led) 
integration (harmonization). Transport was considered a field of common policy de­
scribing the highest degree of integration in the initial 1957 treaty of Rome. (Reh 
1993, 35) Compared to the two other 'fields of common policy, trade31 and agricul­
ture, very little resulted from the far reaching idea of a common European policy until 
1985. Even at this point in time the European council of rTlinisters was forced to de­
velop a deeper integration strategy because of European court action. Members of 
the European parliament supported by the European Commission sued the Council 
of Ministers for not meeting the general requirements of the 1957 treaty of Rome. 
(Amtsblatt 1983, 9-10) 
The court ruled the Council guilty. Already by 1969 the European council of ministers 
had been obliged to develop concrete plans to integrate European transport (devel­
oping specific rules for commercial trans border traffic) and was asked to do so im­
mediately. Forced to act, the heads of European government decided at the Milan 
sUrTlmit in 1985 to include transport in the 1992 program to complete the European 
common market. This program was originally inspired in 1982 by the European 
Roundtable of Industrialists, a group of leading managers representing Europe's 
largest industrial enterprises. (Holman/van der Pijl: 1992) It replaced the positive or 
policy led strategy of integration by a negative or market led approach. Old time pluri­
national integration in transport accepting the idea of unrestricted national sover­
eignty in transport within the nation state was thus replaced. 
After 1985, nation states across Europe had to change transport regulations to allow 
for unhindered trans border transport organization, still an unfinished business to be 
sure. Liberalization of inner European traffic has been completed in the road, air, and 
inland water segments of the market. The railway segment is still lagging behind de­
spite efforts to create European freeways, for example. The postal system is likely to 
be integrated almost completely into the European market framework by 2003. Un­
like the North American path, regulatory market making is supported by financial 
The European Commission represents the EU members with regard to foreign trade of industrial and agri­
cultural products, but not in services. Currently the Commission trys to expand its responsibilities to cover 
the air transport sector. 
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support to poorer regions much of which is invested in transportation infrastructures. 
With the Maastricht Treaty, the European Commission gained new authority in infra­
structure policies with the responsibility for the Trans European Networks (in rail­
ways, highways, electricity and communication links). (Jarzembowski undated, 1998) 
The European Commission, furthermore, is fighting to take the jurisdiction of interna­
tional trade in services from the national governments in the field of a.irline traffic. 
The previously unchallenged link of national transport companies and national trans­
port equipment production was broken at the same time in Europe's 1992 program 
(in principle at least) due to the change in government procurement rules. The 1992 
program forced each nation state to invite Europe wide bidding on larger contracts. 
(Busch 1991, 50-53) Since implementation both commercial transport and industrial 
production of transport equipment are no longer strictly national in Europe from a 
legal point of view. Today the German industry might find it more difficult to develop 
the ICE high speed train against the French TGV. ICE development was still possible 
within the old framework of protected national transport and equipment production 
markets. 
These and other efforts with regard to the deepening of European integration rein­
forced the already existing European division of labor within transnationalized pro­
duction networks. Although many restrictions (tax regimes, remaining universal serv­
ice obligations of rail and postal companies, restrictive practices etc.) still constrain 
full integration even within Europe, transnationalization of transport and logistics 
services overall has nowhere else developed further. By 2003, even the universal 
service in the postal sector (already restricted to standard mail) will most likely be de­
nationalized (and Europeanized!) realizing the vision of apostal union already ex­
pressed in the so called "Spaak-report" spelling out the design of the European Eco­
nomic Community. (Regierungsausschuß 1956) Today's market radical postal union 
of course is different from the European perspective back in the 1950s. Then coop­
erative and limited 'fiscal federalism (still propagated in the "McDougall" report, see 
EC Commission 1997) was the mainstream and market radical perspectives on 
"competitive federalism" (short for degenerating the EU system into a free trade zone 
like NAFTA) were at the margins. Today, the picture is different combining all kinds 
of "competitive federalisms" and "competitive corporatisms". 32 Instead of a coherent 
European transport system similar to those in developed national territories, a frag­
mented system is likely to result. The irony of history may have it that Europe is 
building up special regulatory agencies which have been dismissed in the U.S. in the 
age of regulatory reform in favor of direct administrative work. (Majone 1994 a/b) The 
European road to transnational integration, however, still knows many more com-
A campaign has been started recently by the German Naumann foundation to support the concept of com­




pensatory mechanisms than the North American region. Since none of the European 
countries is strong enough to dictate conditions, it is quite likely that competition plus 
compensation and a greater role of the Europeanized state will characterize the 
European system in the future as weil. 
5. 	 Conclusion: Central features of transnationalized trans­
port systems 
What will the impact of transnationalized transport and logistics systems be? What 
can be said about the central features already in existence and what kind of research 
is needed to better understand the restructuring? I will elaborate shortly on the four 
significant changes mentioned in the beginning. 
5.1. 	Functional (cross border) logistics 
During the pluri·-national, strictly national phase of transport policy making, the func­
tional geography of logistics was determined by political geography. There is a long 
way to go to turn the resulting European patchwork into an integrated network. Euro­
pean railways, e.g., use five different electricity systems. But the importance of tech­
nological and infrastructure friction should not be exaggerated. It has been acknowl­
edged in recent studies that full implementation of a common transport policy 
depending mainly on the effectiveness of the regulatory state - is far more important 
to the truly integrated transport market than the infrastructure aspects so much dis­
cussed. (Ponti/Maffii 1997) 
Already the implemented changes have changed distribution channels quite dra­
matically across Europe. Medical equipment producer Baxter Internationa.l, for ex­
ample, reduced 35 warehouses to 'five serving cross-national regions. (FT 15.10. 
1996, 111) Many companies have been doing exactly the same (Norrman 1997, Hack­
man 1996) supported by logistics suppliers and mushrooming logistics consultant 
firms. The Financial Times writer emphasizes regionalized aspects of logistics re­
organization in a survey quoting " ... the trend towards greater geographic integration 
of supply chains in many industries, as manufacturers and retailers grasp the oppor­
tunities created by the removal of barriers to cross-border movement of goods within 
the expanding European single market." (FT 15.10.1996, 111) Tensions between 
national and international regulatory frameworks thus turn into tensions between 
supranational regional and inter-regional entities with internationally operating pro­
ducers and traders searching solutions for both wide area regional networks and 
"globalized" logistics systems. 
It is quite unlikely, however, that progress achieved within Triad regions with regard 
to liberalization will soon be transferred into a "global" regime. Transport services are 
a hot issue in the upcoming GATT-Services negotiations, but experts already have 
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lowered expectations.33 Whether tensions between regional and global types of 
"protectionism" will increase or not will be an interesting subject to study. National 
protectionism in transport is a matter of the past - in Europe and NAFTA-North 
America34 at least. The multinational fordist principle of living and getting along with 
the neighbors gave way to aggressive postfordist transnational merger and acquisi­
tion activity and regulatory realignment. Increasing cross-national penetration of pro­
ductive capital goes along with increasing cross-national .Iabor division and joint pro­
duction which in turn strengthens demand for transnationalized transportation and 
logistics services. TNT Express company, for example, wrote a manual of how to 
take advantage of deepened European integration in transport in aseries launched 
by the British manufacturing association Confederation of British Industry. (CBIITNT 
1992) This cooperative approach of logistics suppliers and customers brings us to 
the second feature. 
5.2. Value adding partnership: third party logistics 
Conflicts between transporVlogistics suppliers and users over prices for services 
were a recurrent theme under the state mediated system. Liberalization decided the 
conflict by and large in favor of large transport users who can now make 'full use of 
their monopsony powers vis-a-vis dependent service companies. All in all, the trend 
in logistics costs in Europe is downward (projected decline to 6.3% of GDP down 
from 7.2%) despite growing requirements. (ELA 1997, 11) Contrary to possible ex­
pectations, relations between transport and logistics suppliers and users did not 
worsen across the board despite the pressure created on the supply industries. 
Rather some segments of transport suppliers and some segments of transport users 
have had reasons to complain: sma" trucking companies and their employees and 
self employed drivers in particular have a hard time to recover operating costs let 
alone make adecent living (Bologna 1994). Reregulation of working time (including 
owner operators) in the transport sector (officia"y to improve safety at the workplace 
and for the environment) is partly a result of deteriorating conditions. (EU Commis­
sion 1997a) 
Modern transport and logistics suppliers in fact have been able to separate secon­
dary logistics (reshipment, warehousing etc.) functions from the primary transport 
business. The large logistics businesses operate huge networks and buy many of the 
transport services like the shippers themselves. Logistics suppliers in fact turn into 
33 	 See for an overview WTO 1998 a~d, the European commissioner on foreign trade, Sir Leon Brittan, per­
ceived only tor the area of ocean shipping services an application on multilateral GA TI principles. (DVZ 
16.2.1999,9) 
34 	 Though there was not much in terms of liberalizing all of the transport sector ac ross borders, existing re­
strictions had to be registered. Transparency and the establishment of an official procedure of conflict 
regulation are the most important steps toward deeper integration apart from liberalization steps taken. 
169 
transport users this way. Such logistics companies enter medium and long term 
contracts with shippers to take over parts of the traditional commercial and own 
account business: in house transport, reshipment, warehousing, and sometimes 
even parts of manufaciuring, marketing and other processes. (Aden et al. 1993) 
Shippers and logistics service companies this way create a rather stable "value crea­
tion" partnership (Johnston/Lawrence 1989) and reconfigure the supply chain to­
gether. Logistics service companies insource what industrial producers and trading 
companies offer to source OUt.35 Practically all of the large transport companies have 
developed such services. Recently, a second wave of large U.S. suppliers (after the 
integrators, airlines and forwarding companies) coming from the leasing industry 
(Penske and Ryder) have entered the European theater to take advantage of the 
growing market volume in contract logistics. In one of the largest projects reported in 
newspapers, TNT-Traco (the Italian subsidiary of TNT Automotive Logistics) took 
over more than 1.000 employees of the Italian car manufacturer Fiat in Turin. (DVZ 
23.01.1997, 8) 
This growing partnership between Fiat and TNT is a good example of many interor­
ganizational networks beeing developed: The takeover of Turin in house logistics 
came after successfull employment of TNT to run the spare part distribution 'first in 
Italyand later across Europe, and South America. This contract is worth more than 
DEM 400 Mio.36 
Overall contract logistics is now the fastest growing transport market segment (GVB 
1997) indicating a substantial change of logistics management including new efforts 
to coordinate supply chain management and shift labor from (frequently high paid) 
industrial producer organizations to service companies (usually having a lower pay 
load). Across Europe, about one third of logistics business is likely to be done in third 
party schemes, up from 10 to 20 percent depending on market maturity (compare 
table in annex). "Supply chain managment is moving up the corporate agenda", 
writes Charles Batchelor. "As competitive pressures increase, companies are being 
forced to rethink how - and where - they can squeeze costs out of the supply pro­
cess." (Financial Times 1.12.1998, 1)37 
35 	 Müller/Prangenberg (1997) provide a good overview over outsoucing except that their otherwise detailed 
book omits the logistics and business software completely. 
36 We found more than one hundred reports on 3rd Party arrangements in the German transport journal Deut­
sche Verkehrszeitung over the last years. Most examples are on the car industry followed by consumer 
goods and electronics. Toward the mid 1990s the number of reports on 3rd Party projects reaching into sev­
eral countries have increased. 
37 	 An extreme example is the production of the SMART car at Hambach (Mercedes/Swatch) in France. All of 
the parts are sourced (modular sourcing) from only seven system suppliers and three logistics service com­
panies. 85 percent of production is thereby sourced from outside suppliers. (Schumann 1997) 
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Companies are helped to do so by large third party logistics service companies, by 
software producers improving supply chain management writing logistics software 
(like SAP, BAAN,Oracle, and Peoplesoft) to improve the information flow across 
organizational and country borders, and by a growing community of consultants ad­
vising shippers to outsource all or parts of their logistics and connected operations. 
Almost every large consultancy firm in the meantime has hired logistics experts of­
fering such services. Price Waterhouse Coopers e.g. is writing the industry analysis 
ordered by the European Commission in order to develop policies strengthening the 
European competitive position. (Financial Times 1.12.1998, I) Although European 
providers are considered to lead the industry, U.S. customers take better advantage 
from integrated services in Europe due to a long standing perception of Europe as an 
integrated market. (Hastings, 1997) Ongoing "dramatic" industry restructuring in 
Europe and elsewhere results from supply organizations still too small to cover de­
mand for geographically and diversified services. 
5.3. New logistics service multinationals 
From what has been said before it should be evident that the supply industry of 
transport and logistics services already has undertaken massive reorganization ef­
forts. Industry reorganization intensity may be exceptional indeed except compared 
to the telecommunications' sector. Financial Times speaks about "frantic restructur­
ing" (1.12.98) to build the national, transnational and interregional organizations able 
to meet the changing needs of logistics customers. After the "external shock" (Flig­
stein 1991) of liberalization starting in the late 70s in the U.S. and in the mid 80s in 
Europe, many traditional companies be they airlines, railroads, trucking or forwarding 
businesses have reorganized their operations to build up economies of scale, reach, 
and scope. The two major ways of doing so are internal and/or external growth 
(mergers and acquisitions) or cooperation in strategic alliances. 
Industry reorganization has developed in several waves in Europe with large for­
warding companies being transformed to integrator like business at the end of the 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Instead of an expected period of rest, a new 
wave of m&a activity is shaking up the industry at the end of the decade with the 
postal companies taking center stage as already mentioned (p. 5) It is plainly evident 
now that alliances of small and medium enterprises eventually established to cover 
all of Europe are not strong enough to compete against the large logistics service 
conglomerates being formed. Even the strategic alliances of larger companies or­
ganized to face up to the integrated organizations are unlikely to survive. Since 
Nedlloyd agreed to seil its parcel and logistics business to Deutsche Post AG (and 
DP AG subsidiary Danzas AG) for around DEM 1 billion, the European E-1 alliance 
forged by the Dutch player is likely to dissolve forcing the partners of Nedlloyd to re­
think their strategies and eventually to seil out to one of the few big players remain­
ing in the market. (DVZ 20.3.1999, 1 /2) 
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The structure of the reorganized transport and logistics sector is difficult to assess at 
this point. It is clear, however, that transnational concentration and centralization of 
private capital is becoming the central feature. Due to the takeover of DHL and TNT 
by European companies, the industry is not dominated by U. S. providers anymore, 
and the current reorganization of large European postal companies is likely to 
change the face of the industry again. Severallarge companies in a number of mar­
ket segments are now protected by their size and market power rather than by regu­
latory frameworks. These companies cannot be compared with the traditional state 
enterprise: they are lean (and rather mean) co-managers of rationalized supply 
chains. Since rationalization of production is not promising anymore, rationalization 
of the sphere of circulation of goods and value is the order of the day: Cycle time 
compression and efficient customer response, reverse logistics etc. are the concepts 
developed by logistics experts to add value via logistics management. It is becoming 
more evident in the course of this change that transport is actually not a service but 
"the continuation of the production process in and for the circulation process" (Marx 
1981,153). 
Private logistics power is thus amassed at the expense of direct state control. Not 
only transport and logistics suppliers, and large companies in particular, but the 
changing relationship between logistics users in industry and trade and logistics sup­
pliers have to be considered with regard to private interest formation processes cre­
ating new priorities in public policy making. In addition, a number of human "go be­
tweens" (academia and consulting) are positioned to reap enormous benefits from 
reorganization and restructuring. Logistics users, logistics suppliers, and "experts" 
(sometimes appearing as scientists, sometimes as consultants) have created an 
"iron triangle", a powerful transnational logistics complex within Europe and beyond. 
5.4. Interest representation: Transnational associations and "expert 
networks" 
Once national state and corporatist structures are undermined by liberalization and 
transnational market making, important changes in the way private (and public) in­
te rests are combined and represented can be expected. Deeper European integra­
tion has reinforced the attention of political scientists on interest groups and net­
working processes influencing European public policy making. (Eising/Kohler-Koch 
1994) Optimistic observers expect new problem solving capacities at the suprana­
tional level of the European multi level polity while pessimistic observers regard 
transnational pluralism replacing national corporatism (Streeck/Schmitter 1994) as 
an obstacle to good governance. (Compare discussion on problem solving capacities 
in: Scharpf 1997) In transport and logistics, research to assess the changing system 
of interest representation has yet to be conducted. It is most obvious, however, that 
there has been a tremendous change in the way interest mediation in Europe and 
beyond works since privatization and liberalization took hold. What kinds of interests 
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do privatized railways have that expand in foreign countries, build up large road 
based organizations and develop logistics rationalization projects? What kind of 
interests do postal companies develop that become global logistics enterprises? 
Literally none of the markets of the transporVlogistics sector is like it used to be 50 or 
one hundred years. Neither are the organizations dominating the industry. 
Among the interesting aspects to be studied are the formation of transnational asso­
ciations of large companies and new combinations of users and suppliers of trans­
port and logistics services. The Freight Forwarders Europe group consisting of eight 
large companies was set up in 1994.38 Due to the acquisition of the Swedish Bilsped 
group by the German giant of theindustry Schenker, the association now counts 
seven members but is open to other companies of size. This group most likely has 
been set up to match the influence the large express companies (represented by the 
International Courier Conference (ICC)) have achieved in Brussels, basically break­
ing up the postal monopoly. (Campbell 1994) ICC was dominated by companies of 
U. S. origin and supported by national competitors to European postal monopolies. 
The association is now likely to be transformed substantially due to the acquisition of 
the small and medium sized company networks in the parcel market by expanding 
postal enterprises. Nevertheless there are (at least) two "transnational" organizations 
of large companies operating in addition to traditional European networks of trans­
port companies etc. The stability of the traditional networks combining national asso­
ciations at the European level has been severely undermined in recent years. 
The Clecat organization for example of (national) forwarder associations has been 
reported to almost break apart due to differing perspectives on future strategy. So me 
member associations (from weaker European economies) want a European orienta­
tion while others support a "global" perspective indicating the ongoing struggle be­
tween what could be called Euro-protectionists and global(-ization) protectionists 
(DVZ: 8.10.1998,1).39 (Compare Cox 1995 on a similar typology of US companies 
with regard to NAFT A) 
Contrary to Heritier's (1997) and Eising/Kohler-Koch (1994), I do not think that na­
tional path dependency is the key to understand Europeanization of interest repre­
sentation. Heritier's (1997) analysis in four European countries of path dependencies 
and divergent developments in national adaptation to European Hberalization in road 
transport fails to explain the reasons for specific paths of national business restruc­
38 	 In 1993 and 1994 alone, no less than seven new European associations in transport have been estab­
lished. (DVZ: 5.1.1995, 1). 
39 	 Similar developments have been reported in the trucking and intermodal segments of the transport sector. 
A European trucking organization (UETR) was set up in 1997 by four national associations not satisfied with 
representation of the International Road Union (IRU) alone. (DVZ 23.8.1997,2). Four companies in the in­
termodal (rail/road) market were unhappy enough with the European Intermodal Association to found 
Groupement des Transports Combines in 1998. (Cargoworld 14.4.1998). 
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turing and is totally silent on reorganized interest representation at the European 
level. National model thinking actually seems to predetermine the analysis: the for­
mation of a separate business organization of larger Italian companies is considered 
"paradox" due to continuing corporatism in this country. The continuation of financial 
support of the state for small companies (now including foreign cornpanies to con­
form with the European legal framework) is used as an indicator for continuously 
higher influence of small companies in the national polity. This perspective neglects 
the Europeanization of private interest power . A general focus on road transport 
much in general is not adequate anymore to understand the changing structure of 
the transport and logistics business. 
May be even more important than new transnational associations of private transport 
companies are "transsectoral" associations of a new type. In 1995, a special interest 
club of large logistics users and suppliers (50:50) has been founded. The aim of 
"European Freight and Logistics Leaders" combining one hund red large shipping and 
logistics supply organizations is to support the value adding partnerships by shifting 
political priorities at the European level. Not any narrow perspective on parts of the 
transport and supply chain but an integrated approach is supported. (DVZ 19.11. 
1998, 9). Private producers thence take over a traditional state function: the integra­
tion of partial interests. 
A similar perspective is guiding the European Logistics Association (ELA), a network 
of now 35 national logistics associations. (DVZ 10.12.1998, 7) This association as­
sembles practitioners of the shipping and supply industries, and academics. Since 
the 1980s, a growing number of universities have established specific logistics pro­
fessorships mostly in economics departments. Many of the predominantly. micro 
economists teaching at universities, however, are also involved in consultancy serv­
ices provided to both shippers and logistics suppliers such as the Berlin based "Zen­
trum für Logistik und Unternehmensplanung". 
The private/public expert network has expanded its presence in Brussels following 
suggestions of the European Commission to establish a logistics think tank. Asked 
whether or not lobbying activities will be strengthened, current head of ELA professor 
Pfohl (Darmstadt) suggested that he disliked the word, the network is out there to 
provide knowledge. ELA in any case will offer direct membership to large companies 
with the European level association. (DVZ 10.12.1998, 7) 
Success in influencing agenda setting at the EU level by providing knowledge, and 
channels to communicate knowledge, and last not least some powerful private inter­
ests has been frequently observed in the recent history of European integration. 
Several initiatives of the Roundtable of European Industrialists have placed infra­
structure and transport issues high on the European agenda during the 1980s and 
early 1990s (ERI 1984, 1987a/b, 1992 undated a/b). A more specialized network of 
logistics experts and special interest have taken over the job: In 1997, the first Euro­
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pean logistics forum has been organized by ELA jointly with EC Commissions VII 
(transport) and 111 (lndustry). In 1997 as weil, the Commission published a new con­
cept on freight transport using a logistics and systemic transport concept for the first 
time (EU Commission 1997). 
Not unlike European developments, U.S. and Canadian logistics associations of in­
dustrial and trading companies have merged to form the International Association of 
Logistics Providers in 1994 (Transport Topics 15.8.1994, 6). The new association 
wants to take the Mexican counterpart in and opened membership to logistics sup­
pliers. In 1995, an important new group called "Supply Chain Council" has been set 
up by a U.S. consultant group. This Council combines the largest industrial and 
trading shippers, important logistics providers (mainly 'from Anglo-Saxon countries), 
the business software producers, and the international consultant firms (of course). 
European offices have been opened and European companies are invited to enter 
the transatlantic dialogue on how to further improve the making of transnational (and 
transatlantic in particular) logistics networks. (DVZ 3.11.1998, 1, see documentation 
of the Council in the internet: www.supply-chain.org) 
It almost goes without saying that consumer representatives, ecological acUvists, 
trade unionists, and "grass routes politicians" are ha.rd to find in the new transna­
tional logistics complexes. Observers of the European and transatlantic integration 
process at the same time acknowledge the importance of private business groups 
(Iike the Transatlantic Business Dialogue) which drive the re-regulation process. 
(Lankowski 1997) Politics supposedly is all about problem solving. There is no doubt 
that "problem solving" capacities can be enhanced this way. The question to be 
raised remains, however, whose problems are solved. Some may continue to doubt 
that strengthening international (freight) transport links, which damage the ecological 
system and improve logistical rationalization strategies that reinforce jobless growth 
are appropriate answers to central European and indeed global questions. KohIer­
Koch (1996) is right in any case to demand a better understanding of the interrela­
tionship of special interest lobbying and regulatory politics, which is likely to be of 
some importance to the further development of transnationalized varieties of capital­
ism. 
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Annex: Major trans border initiatives in North America 
U.S. Companies in Mexico Ventures 
ABF Servicio Libre a Bordo Alliance (1993) 
Celadon Transportes Hercel Alliance 
Carolina Tresguerres Alliance (1994) 
Challenger Motor Freight TNL Internacional Alliance 1993, since 10/94 
own licence 





Alliance (1993) 8/95: 26 
Mexican partners 
J.B. Hunt Transportacion Maritima Alliance (1992) 
Schneider National Transpo Virel 1993, 100 percent own 
M.S. Carriers Transportes EASO 50 percent, 1994 
Roadway Express Transportes de Nuevo 
Laredo 
Joint Venture TNL-Roadway 
1995 
Yellow Freight Syst. Transportes Sierra Alliance 
GATX GATX Mexico 1994 




Pool, Inc. (TIP) 
'-IP de Mexico S.A. 1992 
I Xtra Corp. Xtra Mexicana 1995 
Union Pacific Rail Transmex/USA mind. seit 11/95 
Norfolk Southern Rail Transmex/USA 1995 
United Parcel Service UPS de Mexico $120 Mio. since 1991 
Source: International Brotherhood of Teamsters (summer 1996) based on reports of various journals 
such as Transport Topies, Traffie World, Journal of Commeree, Traffie Management, T and D, BNA 
International Trade Reporter 
There are few large Mexican companies operating abroad. However, the shipping 
company, Transportes Maritima Mexicana entered in various alliances including the 
purehase of parts of the Mexican rail system (in the North East) together with U.S. 
road Kansas City Southern and the strategie alliance with Canadian Pacific, the large 
Canadian rail and ocean shipping company. 
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u.s. Companies in Canada (1990s) 

• 	Allied Holdings buys Auto-Trans (1994: 54 % market share car haulage, buys 
Ryders hau lage business in 1997) 
• 	 Consolidated Freightways creates Epic Express (1995) 
• 	 Union Pacific/Overnite: all Canada Service 1995 
• 	 Penske, Tower Group, Hub Group, Fritz Companies, International Logistics 
all expand or enter Canadian market 
• 	Oxford Capital Inc. purchases former CP parcel service Canpar 
• 	 Roadway buys Reimer Express, one of largest Canadian L TL companies 
• 	Yellow declines to purchase Interlink, bankruptcy of one of the largest Canadian 
L TL carriers in 1997 
• 	American Airlines buys stake in Canadian International 
Major Canadian initiatives 
• 	Canadian Post purchases Purolator (Alliance with U.S. Airborne Express) 
• 	Various transnational alliances of Canadian companies with regional U.S. 
L TL carriers 
• 	Canadian Pacific Railroad and Canadian North America expand transnationa.l 
railway network in the U.S., Canadian North America buys lliinois Central 
• 	CP buys Lykes Shipping Une 
• 	Air Canada buys stake in Continental, enters alliance with United 
Source: Transport Topies, Traffie World, Journal of Commeree, Traffie Management, T and D, BNA 
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